Lorne Michael Honickman

The plaintiff, Avi Berger, moved to stay a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) application pending the outcome of his Superior Court action, in which he claims a beneficial ownership interest in the property at issue.

The defendant Sammie Millis, the current owner, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the LTB has sole jurisdiction over tenancy and eviction matters, and that the Superior Court action regarding beneficial ownership can proceed independently.

The court found no special circumstances to warrant a stay and held that granting one would be unjust to the landlord.

This costs endorsement addresses the entitlement and quantum of costs following the successful anti-SLAPP motion by the Canadian Anti-Hate Network and Bernie Farber.

The court awards full indemnity costs of $49,319.13 to the moving parties, finding no basis to depart from the statutory presumption under s. 137.1(7) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The decision reviews the relevant factors for costs, including proportionality, complexity, and settlement offers, and finds the amount sought to be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

The appellants, Charles McVety and Canada Christian College, appealed a motion judge's decision to dismiss their anti-SLAPP motion against a defamation action brought by Kory Teneycke and Rubicon Strategy Inc. The defamation claim alleged that McVety publicly stated Teneycke acted in a conflict of interest regarding Ontario's vaccine passport policy and profited from it, and that Teneycke was prejudiced against Christians.

The motion judge found substantial merit to the defamation action and that the appellants had no viable defences, partly due to potential malice, and that the public interest favored allowing the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's analysis of the claim's merits and defences, and while agreeing the balancing analysis was flawed, a fresh analysis led to the same conclusion that the public interest in allowing the action outweighed the public interest in protecting the appellants' expression, given the low quality and malicious motivation of the speech.

The request for leave to appeal costs was also dismissed.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation claim brought by the plaintiffs, a tattoo artist and her company.

The defamation arose from negative online reviews and social media posts by the defendants regarding alleged misadventures and disputes over tattoo services, pricing, and plagiarism.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the expressions, while attracting public attention, were fundamentally about private contractual and consumer disputes and did not relate to a matter of public interest as contemplated by the anti-SLAPP legislation.

The court also awarded costs against the defendants, noting the motions were inappropriate and tactical.

This case concerns an anti-SLAPP motion brought by the Canadian Anti-Hate Network (CAHN) and Bernie Farber against multiple plaintiffs who initiated a $44 million action following the Ottawa protests and the invocation of the Emergencies Act.

The plaintiffs alleged defamation and civil conspiracy, claiming CAHN provided false information to government and police, influencing the emergency measures and freezing of assets.

The court dismissed the action against CAHN, finding the plaintiffs failed to particularize their claims, lacked substantial merit, and could not overcome valid defences such as non-compliance with notice periods under the Libel and Slander Act and the Limitations Act.

The court also determined that the public interest in protecting CAHN's expression on a matter of public interest outweighed the harm alleged by the plaintiffs, and declined to award damages to CAHN.

The applicant, a victim of fraud, sought orders to freeze and trace funds amounting to 290,000 Euros ($430,000 CDN) that were fraudulently wired to a bank account held by one of the respondents.

The applicant also sought a sealing order for a previous related application containing personal information.

The court found the applicant's affidavit credible and determined that the funds were paid under a mistake of fact, making them repayable.

The court granted all relief sought by the applicant, including the freezing and tracing orders, and the sealing of the prior application.

Dr. Covant, a veterinarian, appealed a Divisional Court decision that upheld a finding of professional misconduct by the College of Veterinarians of Ontario's Discipline Committee.

The misconduct stemmed from re-selling large quantities of veterinary drugs to human pharmacies, which violated an amended regulation (s. 33(2)(d) of R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 1093) restricting such sales to "reasonably limited quantities" for "temporary shortages." Covant argued the regulation was unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad, the misconduct finding was erroneous, and the imposed penalty was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming that the regulation was not impermissibly vague or overbroad, the professional misconduct was properly established given Covant's ongoing sub-distribution enterprise, and the one-month suspension and costs award were fit and reasonable.

The appellant challenged a lower court order that struck two versions of his statement of claim (except for a battery claim) and denied him leave to amend it a third time to add a new party (the Union) and a civil conspiracy claim.

The motion judge had found the claims against the Union and the civil conspiracy claim to be statute-barred, and declaratory relief also barred as it was connected to damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the civil conspiracy elements were not pleaded in earlier claims and that the new claims were out of time, even when reading the self-represented appellant's pleadings generously.

This decision concerns a motion for costs brought by the defendants following the plaintiff's discontinuance of a defamation action.

The plaintiff had initially filed in Small Claims Court, then transferred the action to Superior Court, increasing the claim tenfold, before discontinuing it prior to discoveries.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the plaintiff's claim lacked bona fides and was vexatious, especially given an earlier police investigation identified the plaintiff as a suspect in online death threats against the defendants' son.

The court, exercising its discretion under Rule 23.05 and the Courts of Justice Act, found the plaintiff's conduct exceptional and awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale, concluding the claim was not bona fide and lacked justification.

The court fixed costs at $27,000.

Three police officers sued the Attorney General of Ontario for misfeasance in public office, alleging Crown prosecutors mishandled stay applications brought by two accused persons who claimed the officers assaulted them during an arrest.

The majority held that prosecutorial immunity bars misfeasance claims by police officers against Crown prosecutors, as allowing such claims would fundamentally undermine prosecutorial independence and objectivity and imperil the accused's right to a fair trial.

The majority found that the mutually independent relationship between police and prosecutors is incompatible with a regime of legal accountability running from prosecutor to police.

In dissent, one justice would have dismissed the appeal, finding four policy reasons why prosecutorial immunity should not apply to deliberate and unlawful prosecutorial conduct causing serious harm to police officers facing findings of brutality, and that the high liability threshold for misfeasance adequately guards prosecutorial independence.

This is an appeal of convictions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

GMJ Electric Inc. was convicted for failing to provide a scaffold and failing to provide adequate information, instruction, and supervision to a worker who fell from a ladder.

Gino Martignago was convicted as a supervisor for failing to ensure a worker used prescribed protective devices.

The appellants argued that the trial justice erred by adopting an absolute liability approach, crafting an unworkable protocol, and applying a narrow definition of "supervisor." The appeal court upheld the trial justice's findings, confirming that a fall hazard existed, due diligence was not established, and the employer failed in its duty to inform and instruct.

The court also affirmed the broad definition of "supervisor," finding that multiple individuals could hold supervisory roles without excusing the appellant's obligations.

The appeals were dismissed.

The defendant ANI Media Private Ltd. moved to dismiss or permanently stay the action brought by Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or *forum non conveniens*.

SFJ, an Ontario-incorporated not-for-profit, alleged a defamation campaign orchestrated by the Republic of India and carried out by Indian media outlets, including ANI Media.

The court found that while a presumptive connecting factor (tort committed in Ontario due to online access) was arguable, it was rebutted because the claims were not sufficiently connected to Ontario to reasonably expect ANI Media to respond there, especially given the Republic of India's immunity and the broad nature of the alleged campaign.

Consequently, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice declined jurisdiction and dismissed the action.

The court also briefly addressed *forum non conveniens* for completeness, noting that India was not clearly a more appropriate forum due to significant impediments for SFJ to litigate there.

The plaintiff moved for an extension of the deadline to set the action down for trial, while the defendants brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The action, stemming from a 1998 arrest, had been stayed due to related criminal proceedings until 2017.

The court applied a contextual approach, considering the preference for merits-based decisions and timely resolution.

It found the plaintiff provided an adequate explanation for the delay, including the criminal proceedings and subsequent steps taken to gather evidence.

The court was not satisfied that the defendants demonstrated actual prejudice.

Consequently, the plaintiff's motion was granted, extending the deadline, and the defendants' cross-motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

The plaintiff initiated a motion for civil contempt against the defendant for breaching an interlocutory injunction that prohibited the publication of false or defamatory statements.

The court found the defendant in contempt for publishing defamatory statements on her personal websites and one specific third-party website, concluding that she either published or caused the publication of these statements.

However, the court did not find sufficient proof beyond a reasonable doubt for other third-party website postings.

The decision outlines the three-part test for civil contempt and provides specific actions the defendant must take to purge the contempt, including deleting defamatory content and requesting removal from third-party sites, prior to a penalty hearing.

The defendant, Michael Elaschuk, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff, Jade Thelwell's, claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlawful act conspiracy, and defamation, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and constituted an abuse of process under Rules 21.01 and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that while the plaintiff's motivations were mixed, the action itself did not constitute an abuse of process sufficient for dismissal, especially as it was the only current claim against Elaschuk.

However, the specific pleadings for intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, and defamation against Elaschuk were struck due to lack of specificity regarding intent, agreement, and particular defamatory statements, respectively.

Leave to amend these pleadings was granted, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs to Elaschuk.

The plaintiffs, having successfully resisted the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendants argued against costs, citing s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, which presumes no costs unless an award is appropriate.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' request for costs, finding that the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous or unmeritorious, despite the plaintiffs' success in allowing their defamation claims to proceed.

The court emphasized that the anti-SLAPP legislation encourages challenges to potential SLAPP suits and that merely dismissing an anti-SLAPP motion is insufficient to justify a costs award under s. 137.1(8).

The defendants, owners and publishers of a Portuguese-language newspaper, brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' defamation actions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiffs, a financial advisor and his company, alleged defamation based on articles published about syndicated mortgages, which they claimed falsely implicated them in fraudulent and criminal conduct.

The court applied the four-step anti-SLAPP analysis, finding that while the publications related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiffs demonstrated substantial merit to their claims, reasonable grounds to believe the defendants lacked valid defenses (truth, fair comment, qualified privilege), and that the harm suffered by the plaintiffs was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression.

The motion was dismissed, allowing the defamation actions to proceed.

Police officers appealed a motion judge's decision striking their negligence claim against the Crown while allowing their misfeasance in public office claim to proceed.

The officers alleged that Crown attorneys negligently and misfeasantly failed to adequately investigate assault allegations against them during criminal prosecutions, resulting in reputational harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the negligence claim based on established Crown immunity principles, but affirmed that Crown attorneys are not immune from claims of misfeasance in public office.

The court also upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the Crown's motion to strike the action as time-barred, finding that limitations issues should not be determined under Rule 21.01(1)(a) unless pleadings are closed and facts are undisputed.

The Plaintiff sought a civil contempt order against the Defendant for breaching an interlocutory injunction prohibiting defamatory statements.

The court found the first two elements of contempt (clear order, knowledge) were met, but the third element (intentional breach) could not be fairly determined on affidavit evidence alone due to controverted facts and credibility issues.

The motion was adjourned for an oral hearing with viva voce evidence, and the injunction remained in effect with additional directives for the Defendant regarding intermediaries.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Ontario, brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action on the ground that it was barred by a limitation period.

The plaintiffs, police officers, alleged negligence and misfeasance in public office by Crown counsel.

The court, applying the principles from Beardsley v. Ontario Provincial Police, found that the limitation period issue involved legal and factual complexities, including the discoverability of a potentially novel claim, and therefore should not be determined at a preliminary stage before pleadings were closed.

The preliminary question was decided in favour of the plaintiffs, and the motion to dismiss on this ground was denied.