Lorne Michael Honickman

The plaintiff, a union member, commenced an action against three union officials for defamation, battery, and negligence arising from a union election dispute.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The plaintiff delivered a fresh as amended statement of claim and later brought a cross-motion for leave to deliver a second fresh as amended statement of claim to add the union as a party and assert a claim for civil conspiracy.

The court struck all claims without leave to amend, except for the battery claim against one defendant, finding that the proposed civil conspiracy claim and the claims against the union were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for investment fraud on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiffs had invested funds between 2006 and 2008 but stopped receiving payments shortly after.

Despite making inquiries and receiving no payments or return of principal by May 2013, the plaintiffs did not commence their action until September 2016.

The court found that a reasonable person in the plaintiffs' circumstances ought to have known of the claim by May 2013 at the latest.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Three police officers sued the Attorney General of Ontario for misfeasance in public office, alleging Crown prosecutors mishandled stay applications brought by two accused persons who claimed the officers assaulted them during an arrest.

The majority held that prosecutorial immunity bars misfeasance claims by police officers against Crown prosecutors, as allowing such claims would fundamentally undermine prosecutorial independence and objectivity and imperil the accused's right to a fair trial.

The majority found that the mutually independent relationship between police and prosecutors is incompatible with a regime of legal accountability running from prosecutor to police.

In dissent, one justice would have dismissed the appeal, finding four policy reasons why prosecutorial immunity should not apply to deliberate and unlawful prosecutorial conduct causing serious harm to police officers facing findings of brutality, and that the high liability threshold for misfeasance adequately guards prosecutorial independence.

The applicant, a minor hockey coach, sought judicial review of a Children's Aid Society (CAS) decision verifying that six children were at risk of emotional harm due to his coaching conduct.

The Divisional Court granted the application and set aside the CAS decision.

The Court found that the CAS breached procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicant with adequate notice of the specific allegations and the legal standard being applied.

Furthermore, the CAS's investigation was inadequate and its decision was unreasonable, as it failed to properly apply the legislative criteria for emotional harm and lacked a logical, reasoned basis for its conclusions regarding each child.

The applicant pharmacist sought judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Review Committee (ICRC) of the Ontario College of Pharmacists to issue an oral caution and require a remediation program following dispensing errors.

The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable and the remedial measures were unduly harsh.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the ICRC's decision was transparent, intelligible, and justified based on the applicant's failure to exercise due diligence when dispensing a 'red flag' medication.

The court also held that the caution and educational requirements were remedial in nature, not punitive, and were appropriate in the circumstances.

This is an appeal of convictions under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

GMJ Electric Inc. was convicted for failing to provide a scaffold and failing to provide adequate information, instruction, and supervision to a worker who fell from a ladder.

Gino Martignago was convicted as a supervisor for failing to ensure a worker used prescribed protective devices.

The appellants argued that the trial justice erred by adopting an absolute liability approach, crafting an unworkable protocol, and applying a narrow definition of "supervisor." The appeal court upheld the trial justice's findings, confirming that a fall hazard existed, due diligence was not established, and the employer failed in its duty to inform and instruct.

The court also affirmed the broad definition of "supervisor" finding that multiple individuals could hold supervisory roles without excusing the appellant's obligations.

The appeals were dismissed.

The applicant brought motions to convert a condominium application and counter-application into an action, consolidate them with an ongoing defamation action, permit the use of discovery evidence across proceedings, and strike a defamation pleading in the counter-application.

The court found the matters were deeply interwoven, involving the same factual matrix regarding the applicant's conduct and social media posts about the condominium board.

To avoid inconsistent findings and multiplicity of proceedings, the court ordered the conversion and consolidation.

The court also granted leave to use discovery evidence and struck the defamation pleading with leave to amend for failing to provide adequate particulars.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiff argued that the limitation period should be deferred under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, because it was not legally appropriate to commence a civil claim while criminal charges arising from the defendant's statements to the police were ongoing.

The court applied the Court of Appeal's reasoning in Sosnowski v. MacEwan Petroleum, finding that the civil claim and criminal charges were not 'two sides of the same coin' and that subjective, evaluative concerns do not delay discoverability.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The appellants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $10,891.88 following a successful appeal from a Master's decision.

The court found no basis for awarding costs on an elevated scale, noting that while the earlier motion may have been due to the respondent's conduct, he could not be blamed for the appeal itself.

Applying the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, the court awarded the appellants costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $5,583.33.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision denying them leave to examine non-parties to trace funds and enforce a 1997 judgment against the respondents.

The Master had also ruled that the respondent did not have to provide further answers to previously ordered questions, citing the passage of time and the expiry of limitation periods.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the Master erred in law by invoking the doctrine of laches and the Limitations Act, 2002, as there is no limitation period for enforcing a judgment.

The court ordered the respondent to provide further answers and permitted the examination of the non-parties.

The defendant ANI Media Private Ltd. moved to dismiss or permanently stay the action brought by Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or *forum non conveniens*.

SFJ, an Ontario-incorporated not-for-profit, alleged a defamation campaign orchestrated by the Republic of India and carried out by Indian media outlets, including ANI Media.

The court found that while a presumptive connecting factor (tort committed in Ontario due to online access) was arguable, it was rebutted because the claims were not sufficiently connected to Ontario to reasonably expect ANI Media to respond there, especially given the Republic of India's immunity and the broad nature of the alleged campaign.

Consequently, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice declined jurisdiction and dismissed the action.

The court also briefly addressed *forum non conveniens* for completeness, noting that India was not clearly a more appropriate forum due to significant impediments for SFJ to litigate there.

The plaintiff moved for an extension of the deadline to set the action down for trial, while the defendants brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The action, stemming from a 1998 arrest, had been stayed due to related criminal proceedings until 2017.

The court applied a contextual approach, considering the preference for merits-based decisions and timely resolution.

It found the plaintiff provided an adequate explanation for the delay, including the criminal proceedings and subsequent steps taken to gather evidence.

The court was not satisfied that the defendants demonstrated actual prejudice.

Consequently, the plaintiff's motion was granted, extending the deadline, and the defendants' cross-motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

The plaintiff initiated a motion for civil contempt against the defendant for breaching an interlocutory injunction that prohibited the publication of false or defamatory statements.

The court found the defendant in contempt for publishing defamatory statements on her personal websites and one specific third-party website, concluding that she either published or caused the publication of these statements.

However, the court did not find sufficient proof beyond a reasonable doubt for other third-party website postings.

The decision outlines the three-part test for civil contempt and provides specific actions the defendant must take to purge the contempt, including deleting defamatory content and requesting removal from third-party sites, prior to a penalty hearing.

The defendant, Michael Elaschuk, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff, Jade Thelwell's, claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, unlawful act conspiracy, and defamation, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and constituted an abuse of process under Rules 21.01 and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that while the plaintiff's motivations were mixed, the action itself did not constitute an abuse of process sufficient for dismissal, especially as it was the only current claim against Elaschuk.

However, the specific pleadings for intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, and defamation against Elaschuk were struck due to lack of specificity regarding intent, agreement, and particular defamatory statements, respectively.

Leave to amend these pleadings was granted, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs to Elaschuk.

The plaintiffs brought a motion in 2019 to enforce a judgment obtained in 1997, seeking a further accounting from the judgment debtor and leave to examine third parties in aid of execution.

The court found that the plaintiffs' extreme delay constituted laches and that any potential claims against the third parties were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court dismissed the request to examine third parties but ordered the self-represented judgment debtor to re-attend an examination to answer specific questions on a best efforts basis.

The applicants, who were foster parents, sought a review of the children's aid society's decision to refuse their application to adopt a child who had lived with them for 22 months.

The society had removed the child and refused the adoption due to a verified child protection concern regarding unexplained bruising on another foster child in the applicants' care.

The Board found the society's investigation was significantly flawed and concluded the bruising was likely the result of accidental infliction of harm during a game.

Determining that the applicants posed no risk of harm and that the child was strongly attached to them, the Board rescinded the society's decision and ordered the child placed with the applicants for adoption.

The plaintiffs, having successfully resisted the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendants argued against costs, citing s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, which presumes no costs unless an award is appropriate.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' request for costs, finding that the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous or unmeritorious, despite the plaintiffs' success in allowing their defamation claims to proceed.

The court emphasized that the anti-SLAPP legislation encourages challenges to potential SLAPP suits and that merely dismissing an anti-SLAPP motion is insufficient to justify a costs award under s. 137.1(8).

The defendants, owners and publishers of a Portuguese-language newspaper, brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' defamation actions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiffs, a financial advisor and his company, alleged defamation based on articles published about syndicated mortgages, which they claimed falsely implicated them in fraudulent and criminal conduct.

The court applied the four-step anti-SLAPP analysis, finding that while the publications related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiffs demonstrated substantial merit to their claims, reasonable grounds to believe the defendants lacked valid defenses (truth, fair comment, qualified privilege), and that the harm suffered by the plaintiffs was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression.

The motion was dismissed, allowing the defamation actions to proceed.

Police officers appealed a motion judge's decision striking their negligence claim against the Crown while allowing their misfeasance in public office claim to proceed.

The officers alleged that Crown attorneys negligently and misfeasantly failed to adequately investigate assault allegations against them during criminal prosecutions, resulting in reputational harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the negligence claim based on established Crown immunity principles, but affirmed that Crown attorneys are not immune from claims of misfeasance in public office.

The court also upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the Crown's motion to strike the action as time-barred, finding that limitations issues should not be determined under Rule 21.01(1)(a) unless pleadings are closed and facts are undisputed.

The Plaintiff sought a civil contempt order against the Defendant for breaching an interlocutory injunction prohibiting defamatory statements.

The court found the first two elements of contempt (clear order, knowledge) were met, but the third element (intentional breach) could not be fairly determined on affidavit evidence alone due to controverted facts and credibility issues.

The motion was adjourned for an oral hearing with viva voce evidence, and the injunction remained in effect with additional directives for the Defendant regarding intermediaries.