Lorne Michael Honickman

The appellant applied for a registration certificate for his Armi Jager AP80 firearm, which was refused by the Registrar of Firearms on the basis that it is a prohibited firearm.

The Ontario Court of Justice reversed the Registrar's decision, finding that the AP80 was not a variant of the AK-47.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the Attorney General's appeal and restored the Registrar's refusal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, holding that the Ontario Court of Justice failed to properly apply the reasonableness standard of review to the Registrar's decision.

The Court of Appeal further held that the AP80 is the same weapon as the AK-22, which is expressly declared by regulation to be a variant of the AK-47, and is therefore a prohibited firearm.

During an appeal, an added party sought to raise a Charter challenge to provisions of the Municipal Elections Act.

The Divisional Court declined to hear the constitutional question, noting that the evidentiary record was woefully inadequate.

Furthermore, the order adding the party explicitly stated that it was not to unduly widen the scope of the appeal.

The court held that a Charter application could be brought at any time on a proper record, but it would not be heard in the current appeal nor referred back to the motions judge.

The moving party sought costs of her successful motion to intervene as a party in an appeal.

The respondent argued that no costs should be awarded or that costs should be determined by the panel hearing the appeal, alleging that the moving party violated the scope of the permitted intervention by filing prohibited evidence.

The court ordered that the costs of the motion to intervene be determined by the panel hearing the appeal, as they were best positioned to assess compliance with the intervention conditions.

During an appeal regarding a municipal election, the intervenor/appellant sought to introduce affidavit material detailing after-the-fact efforts to determine voter eligibility through canvassing and signed forms.

The Divisional Court ruled the evidence inadmissible, citing concerns over its hearsay nature and lack of reliability based on how it was compiled.

Consequently, the responding affidavit material was also excluded.

Three parties brought motions to intervene in appeals from a judgment declaring two municipal elections invalid.

The successful candidate in one ward sought to be added as a party, a voter whose vote was discounted sought to intervene as a friend of the court, and a neighbouring municipality sought to intervene as a friend of the court.

The court granted all three motions, finding that the successful candidate had a direct interest, the voter offered a unique perspective on the voting process, and the neighbouring municipality could provide useful context on the impact of the lower court's decision on municipal elections generally.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to decline jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was a real and substantial connection between the Ontario court and the claim, satisfying the test for jurisdiction simpliciter under both Muscutt and Van Breda.

The Court also found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion regarding the forum non conveniens analysis, noting that even if recent Supreme Court jurisprudence attenuated the juridical advantage point, there were sufficient other bases to support the decision.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $12,000.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Michigan and brought an action in Ontario against the Michigan driver and owner, an unidentified driver, and her own Ontario insurer.

The defendants successfully moved to stay the action on the basis of forum non conveniens, arguing Michigan was the more appropriate forum.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by failing to give weight to the plaintiff's choice of forum and by not considering the claim as a whole, including the necessary claim against the Ontario insurer.

The appeal was allowed and the stay was set aside, allowing the action to proceed in Ontario to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the lower court.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions, no reason to doubt the correctness of the lower court's decision, and that the proposed appeal did not raise matters of general importance due to the exceptional factual circumstances of the case.

The court also dismissed the defendants' motion for security for costs, as there was no good reason to believe the plaintiff's action was frivolous and vexatious.

Given the mixed results, no costs were awarded.

The respondent successfully sued her mother for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to protect her from sexual abuse by her father during her childhood.

The mother appealed, arguing the action was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches due to the 42-year delay in bringing the claim, and that she was powerless to intervene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability, finding no acquiescence by the respondent and that the mother failed to establish she was unable to protect her daughter.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding damages, reducing the award for lost income from $100,000 to $20,000 due to a lack of evidentiary foundation for the higher amount.

A cross-appeal regarding trial costs was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' appeal from a Master's order dismissing their action for delay, the successful respondents sought costs on a partial or substantial indemnity basis.

The court found the claimed amounts to be excessive and applied the principles from Boucher to fix costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court awarded total costs of $59,852.03 across the four groups of respondents.

The plaintiffs appealed a case management Master's decision dismissing their action for delay.

The action, commenced in 1998, arose from a television news broadcast.

The Master found the plaintiffs' delay to be intentional, inordinate, and inexcusable, and their conduct contumelious, noting repeated failures to comply with court orders and timetables.

On appeal, the plaintiffs sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the principal plaintiff's incarceration, which the court rejected for lack of due diligence.

The Divisional Court held that the appropriate standard of review for a case management Master's dismissal for delay is one of deference, requiring palpable or overriding error.

Finding no such error and no denial of natural justice in the Master's refusal to grant an adjournment, the court dismissed the appeal.

Four physicians appealed the dismissal of their action against a hospital regarding a reduction in their operating room allocation.

The motion judge had dismissed the action against the hospital, finding the court lacked jurisdiction as the matter fell under the statutory review regime of the Public Hospitals Act, but allowed the action to continue against the hospital's CEO.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the physicians' appeal and allowed the CEO's cross-appeal, concluding that the dispute over operating room access was a matter of hospital privileges governed by the Act, and that the pleadings failed to allege any personal wrongdoing by the CEO.

The appellant, a newspaper reporter, wrote an article that breached a publication ban under s. 486(5) of the Criminal Code.

Neither the reporter nor the newspaper knew of the ban.

The trial judge acquitted the reporter as a principal but convicted the newspaper.

On summary conviction appeal, the reporter was convicted as an aider and abettor under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code based on an objective mens rea standard.

The Court of Appeal allowed the reporter's appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that liability as an aider or abettor under s. 21(1)(b) or (c) requires subjective mens rea, specifically knowledge of the circumstances constituting the offence.

The appellant and the Crown both appealed a sentence of six months' imprisonment, three years' probation, and a ten-year s. 161 order for internet luring.

The appellant had communicated explicitly with an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old girl and was arrested at a pre-arranged meeting location.

The Crown sought to introduce fresh statistical evidence on youth internet usage, which the Court of Appeal rejected for failing the due diligence requirement.

The Court upheld the trial judge's factual findings, including the rejection of an expert's opinion that the appellant did not intend physical contact.

The Court concluded that a conditional sentence was inappropriate for this offence, and while the six-month sentence was lenient, it was not manifestly inadequate.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The accused was acquitted at trial of impaired driving and driving over 80 after the trial judge simply stated he agreed with and adopted the defence submissions.

The summary conviction appeal court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge's reasons inadequate.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the standard for adequate reasons for an acquittal is informed by the presumption of innocence, the trial judge's terse reasons in this case failed to explain the basis for the acquittals and prevented meaningful appellate review.

The appellant landlord appealed a trial judgment ordering it to pay damages to the respondent tenant based on promissory estoppel.

The trial judge found the tenant undertook renovations based on the landlord's representation that the premises could be used for film and photography, but the landlord later interfered with this business.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability finding but reduced the damages award from $55,120 to $34,120, finding the trial judge failed to adequately consider evidence of a slow market when calculating lost revenue.

The appellant sued multiple defendants for malicious prosecution, defamation, and other claims arising from a child sexual abuse investigation that resulted in criminal charges which were later stayed.

After his civil action was dismissed at trial, he appealed, primarily arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the ineffective assistance claim was an abuse of process because the appellant had already sued his trial counsel for negligence and settled that action.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge should have ordered a mistrial and that the trial judge erred in dismissing the defamation claim against the child's grandmother.

The appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a threat to cause death.

The appellant admitted to saying 'kill you' but claimed the full sentence was 'You are acting like I'm trying to kill you.' The trial judge failed to make a finding on the actual words spoken and did not explain why the appellant's innocent explanation was rejected.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding the actus reus of the offence was not made out on the trial judge's reasons.

The respondents in a civil appeal brought a motion to quash the part of the appeal that relied on the alleged incompetency of the appellant's trial counsel.

The moving parties argued that incompetence of counsel is not a recognized ground for a civil appeal, that the appellant had already recovered damages from his former lawyer, and that the appeal lacked merit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the ground relating to a mistrial was sufficiently interrelated with the other grounds and should be considered by the panel hearing the appeal.

The court also directed that the appellant's former counsel be served with the materials and given an opportunity to respond.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing part of his defamation action arising from material posted on the respondent's website.

The motions judge had ruled the internet publication was a 'broadcast' under the Libel and Slander Act, rendering the claim statute-barred for failure to provide timely notice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the internet publication constituted a broadcast from a station in Ontario, particularly given conflicting expert evidence on the nature of internet dissemination.