Eric K. Gillespie

The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent municipality's decisions to approve planning applications and a demolition permit for the respondent theatre company's heritage theatre, located in a heritage conservation district.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant, a local building corporation, lacked both private and public interest standing to challenge the decisions.

In the alternative, the court held that the municipality's decisions to permit the demolition and exempt the new theatre from parking requirements were reasonable, as they were based on extensive consultation, expert reports, and a balancing of heritage conservation with accessibility and economic benefits.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision dated September 29, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the agreed amount of $4,000.

The respondent City of Toronto brought a preliminary motion to strike portions of the applicant's 1,127-page application record in a judicial review of a zoning bylaw amendment for supportive housing.

The applicant sought to introduce affidavit evidence regarding other City projects to demonstrate a pattern of closed-mindedness and lack of consultation.

The court partially granted the motion, striking evidence that was irrelevant, argumentative, inflammatory, or related to post-decision events, while permitting some evidence regarding the applicant's claims of bias and an improperly restricted record to remain for the panel's consideration.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Agricultural and Rural Affairs Tribunal dismissing a recusal motion based on an alleged apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court granted an extension of time to file the application but ultimately dismissed the judicial review as premature.

The court reaffirmed that absent exceptional circumstances, judicial review of interlocutory administrative decisions should await the completion of the underlying proceeding, and allegations of bias do not automatically bypass this rule.

The applicants applied to the Normal Farm Practice Protection Board regarding disturbances from the respondents' farm.

The Board dismissed the application and awarded costs against the applicants.

The applicants requested a review of the costs order only.

A vice-chair granted the review based on a reasonable apprehension of bias and ordered a new costs hearing.

Both parties appealed to the Divisional Court.

The respondents appealed the finding of bias, while the applicants argued the dismissal of the application should also have been overturned.

The Divisional Court quashed the respondents' appeal, finding the vice-chair's order was interlocutory.

The Court dismissed the applicants' appeal, holding the vice-chair did not err by only deciding the specific issue raised in the request for review.

This costs endorsement addresses the fixing of costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action for delay.

The court reviews the parties’ submissions on quantum, the applicable legal principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, and the reasonableness of the fees claimed.

The court ultimately fixes costs in favour of the defendant Town of Bracebridge, finding the amounts sought to be fair and proportionate given the complexity and history of the litigation.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Niagara Escarpment Commission to refer an application to amend the Niagara Escarpment Plan to the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, applying the doctrine of exhaustion.

The court held that absent exceptional circumstances, judicial review should not fragment ongoing administrative processes, and the merits of the proposed amendment would be properly decided by the Tribunal.

The developer and the municipality brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review of a Draft Plan of Subdivision Approval.

They argued the court lacked jurisdiction due to the statutory appeal scheme and that the applicant lacked public interest standing.

The court dismissed the motion to quash, finding it was not plain and obvious that jurisdiction was ousted or that standing should be denied.

The court also partially granted a motion to strike portions of the applicant's affidavit, striking two expert reports but allowing correspondence and video evidence to proceed to the panel.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Windrift Adventures Incorporated’s appeal from the dismissal of its defamation action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that the action lacked substantial merit and that the harm suffered was not sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the respondents’ expression.

The court also rejected the appellant’s argument that a finding of “abuse” is required for dismissal under s. 137.1, clarifying that the test remains as set out in Pointes Protection Association.

The applicant, a community organization, sought judicial review of an Ontario Land Tribunal decision dismissing their request to reconsider a zoning by-law amendment.

The amendment permitted a housing development for people leaving homelessness on a property already containing seniors' housing.

The applicant argued the development should be restricted to seniors leaving homelessness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable and consistent with the Provincial Planning Statement, as restricting zoning by age would violate equality rights.

The Court also found no procedural unfairness despite inappropriate submissions by the respondent's counsel, though it denied costs to the successful respondent as a result.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether the Rebuilding Ontario Place Act, 2023 (ROPA) violates section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and whether a public trust doctrine exists in Canadian law.

The appellant, Ontario Place Protectors, challenged the constitutionality of ROPA, arguing it insulated state action from judicial scrutiny and breached public trust.

The Court found the application judge erred in denying public interest standing but held that ROPA does not contravene section 96, as it preserves judicial review and does not usurp the core jurisdiction of the superior courts.

The Court also found no basis for a public trust doctrine in Canadian law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents brought a motion for security for costs of an appeal regarding a proposal to locate a homeless shelter.

The appellant, a corporation, admitted it had insufficient assets to pay costs but did not claim impecuniosity.

The court assessed the merits of the appeal, finding the grounds relating to prematurity and the rejection of expert evidence on domestic law to be weak.

Considering the holistic factors and the justice of the case, the court ordered the appellant to pay $7,500 into court as security for costs.

The applicant challenged provisions of the Rebuilding Ontario Place Act, 2023 (ROPA), arguing that s. 17(2) violated s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 by impermissibly removing superior court jurisdiction and access to remedies, and that other sections (ss. 9, 10, 11, 17(2)) breached public trust.

The court dismissed the application, finding that ROPA did not preclude judicial review and that the specific immunity granted was within legislative authority and did not "maim" the superior courts' core jurisdiction.

The court also rejected the public trust doctrine as a basis for striking down legislation or for a declaration without practical utility, and found the applicant lacked sufficient evidence for public interest standing.

The appellants brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Ontario Land Tribunal dated January 2, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Animal Care Review Board confirming the removal of animals from his zoo and ordering him to pay $105,059.35 in care costs.

The applicant argued the Board's decisions were unreasonable due to an absence of evidence, misapprehension of evidence, and failure to consider his expert evidence and legal submissions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decisions reasonable and denying the applicant's motion to admit fresh evidence.

The applicant sought a declaration that the proposed use of a property as a municipal shelter was not permitted under Toronto's zoning by-laws, arguing it was not a permitted use and that a proposed patio was prohibited.

The respondents asserted the matter should have been brought as an appeal under the Building Code Act, 1992, and that the intended use was permitted.

The court found the proceeding was properly an appeal of the chief building official's decision, not a Rule 14 application.

The court affirmed the chief building official's decision, finding no error in the determination that the shelter use was permitted and that the patio issue was premature as no final decision had been made on it.

The applicant brought an application in the Divisional Court.

On consent, the application was discontinued without costs so that the applicant could bring its proposed proceeding in the Superior Court of Justice.

The order was made without prejudice to the parties' rights to contest the validity of the proposed claim.

The applicants brought a motion for a stay of a Divisional Court order, pending determination of their motion for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court had dismissed their judicial review of an Animal Care Board decision approving costs for animal care.

The applicants sought the stay to prevent forfeiture of animals due to unpaid accounts.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test for stays, combined with principles for leave to appeal from Sault Dock Co. Ltd. The court found no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm (as the animals had already been forfeited), and that the balance of convenience did not favour a stay.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Animal Care Review Board confirming a statement of account for over $1.5 million in care costs for more than 200 seized sled dogs.

The applicants argued the Board erred in its evidentiary findings, including relying on hearsay and failing to make adverse credibility findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision was reasonable as it was based on uncontroverted evidence from the respondent, and the applicants had failed to adduce any evidence or cross-examine the respondent's witness at the hearing.

The defendants, including CTV and several journalists, brought a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action arising from a W5 investigative report on dog sledding operations.

The court granted the motion, finding that the expression related to a matter of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to establish that its defamation claim had substantial merit, as the impugned broadcasts did not identify the plaintiff or lacked essential elements of defamation.

Furthermore, the plaintiff could not show that the defendants lacked valid defences of justification, fair comment, and responsible communication, nor that the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.