Eric K. Gillespie

The appellants sought to consolidate two leave to appeal proceedings before the Court of Appeal, arising from regulatory action by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector concerning sled dogs.

The first leave application related to the legality of dog removal and compliance orders, while the second concerned a statement of account for dog care costs.

The court applied Rule 6.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding a common factual origin but distinct legal questions.

The motion judge dismissed the consolidation request, concluding that the balance of convenience did not favour consolidation, as there was little efficiency to be gained in written leave applications and the potential prejudice to the respondent outweighed marginal benefits.

Following a hearing, the parties agreed that there would be no order as to costs.

The Divisional Court endorsed the agreement, making no order as to costs.

The Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (CAWI) removed 229 dogs from the applicants' commercial dog sledding business and issued a statement of account for over $1.1 million for their care.

The Animal Care Review Board varied the account to approximately $505,000, disallowing transportation and veterinary costs and reducing boarding costs.

Both the applicants and the CAWI brought applications for judicial review of the Board's decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed both applications, finding that the Board's allocation of the initial evidentiary burden to the CAWI, its refusal to admit fresh evidence, and its determinations regarding the various costs were all reasonable.

The applicants raised a preliminary objection seeking the recusal of Leiper J. from the panel on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicants argued that Leiper J.'s involvement in two prior decisions involving the same parties, including a refusal to grant a stay that was later partially reversed by the Court of Appeal, met the threshold for disqualification.

The Divisional Court dismissed the objection, finding that the applicants failed to meet the heavy burden of rebutting the strong presumption of judicial impartiality, noting that prior involvement alone does not establish bias and there were no allegations of improper conduct.

The moving parties sought a stay of an Animal Care Review Board decision confirming a $1.5 million statement of account issued by Animal Welfare Services for the care of approximately 200 seized dogs.

Without a stay, the dogs would be forfeited to the Crown.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the balance of convenience favoured the moving parties, as refusing the stay would render related ongoing proceedings moot and destroy their unique herd of dogs.

The motion for a stay pending judicial review was granted.

The moving parties, operators of a dog-sledding business, sought to set aside a single judge's decision refusing to extend a stay of an Animal Care Review Board costs order regarding the care of their removed dogs.

The Divisional Court panel dismissed the motion, finding no error in the motions judge's balance of convenience analysis, which heavily weighed the mounting public costs of caring for the dogs.

The panel also rejected a request to disqualify one of its members based on prior involvement in a related judicial review, and admitted but gave no weight to fresh evidence of a new statutory application for the dogs' return.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside a previous decision and to admit fresh evidence.

The Divisional Court reserved its decision on the motion.

However, the court ordered that the stay of the Animal Care Review Board's decision be continued pending the release of the court's decision on the motion.

The parties were also directed to advise the court of any resolution reached at an upcoming board hearing.

The moving party sought leave to appeal several decisions of the Ontario Land Tribunal regarding a secondary plan and zoning bylaw, alleging breaches of procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds did not raise questions of law of general or public importance.

The court noted that the Tribunal's procedural decisions, including limiting cross-examination and quashing summonses, fell within its statutory discretion to control its own process and did not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The moving parties sought to continue a stay of an Animal Care Review Board decision requiring them to pay $505,760 in boarding costs for 200 sled dogs seized under the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm (forfeiture of the dogs), the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

The court noted the mounting public cost of boarding the dogs, estimated at $4 million, and the moving parties' inability to pay.

The motion to continue the stay was dismissed.

The applicants sought judicial review of two decisions by the Animal Care Review Board regarding their sled dog business.

The Board had confirmed orders requiring the applicants to improve living conditions for their dogs, including lengthening tethers and remediating doghouses.

When the applicants failed to comply, animal welfare inspectors removed approximately 230 dogs.

The Board subsequently ordered that most of the dogs not be returned until the applicants complied with the orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications for judicial review, finding the Board's interpretation of the tethering requirements reasonable and concluding that the removal and retention of the dogs were justified due to the applicants' ongoing non-compliance with the minimum standards of care.

The moving parties, operators of a dog sledding business, sought a stay of an Animal Care Review Board decision requiring them to pay over $500,000 for the costs of care of over 100 sled dogs removed by animal welfare authorities.

The stay was sought pending the determination of two related applications for judicial review challenging the underlying compliance and removal orders.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm due to the potential forfeiture and euthanization of the specially trained dogs, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay to prevent the judicial reviews from becoming moot.

The court granted the stay on terms, including a requirement for future submissions on financial security for ongoing care costs.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal that upheld an Official Plan Amendment and Rezoning approved by the City of Ottawa.

The amendments permitted the development of a warehouse and e-commerce centre on lands adjacent to Highway 416.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no extricable error of law of sufficient importance to warrant appellate review.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash a municipal council resolution directing staff to proceed with the development of an arena/event centre.

The applicant alleged procedural unfairness and bad faith, arguing that a staff update report failed to include requested information.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no evidence of procedural unfairness, bad faith, or arbitrary conduct by the council.

The court also noted that while an alternative statutory remedy existed under the Municipal Act, it exercised its discretion to hear the judicial review to avoid further delay in the long-standing planning process.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to declare a municipal election invalid.

They argued the removal of 1,131 names from the preliminary voters' list constituted an irregularity under the Municipal Elections Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants failed to adduce evidence that any voters were disenfranchised or that the presiding justice erred in concluding no irregularity occurred.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed their complaint regarding a failure to provide sign language interpretation during a private prosecution.

The Divisional Court upheld the dismissal against the private prosecutor and the individual who laid the information, finding they did not provide a 'service' under the Human Rights Code.

The Court also dismissed the application against the Justices of the Peace due to judicial immunity.

However, the Court found the Tribunal's dismissal of the complaint against the Ministry of the Attorney General was unreasonable, as the Tribunal ignored explicit allegations that requests for interpretation were made to the court clerk.

The matter against the Ministry was remitted to the Tribunal.

The respondent, having been successful on the appeal, sought costs of $34,377.28 on a substantial indemnity basis relying on a settlement offer.

The appellant argued he was a public interest litigant and that no costs should be ordered.

The Divisional Court found the appellant did not demonstrate he was a public interest litigant and held that costs should follow the event.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding Rule 49 did not apply, and instead awarded the respondent costs of $20,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The moving party sought an extension of time to review interlocutory rulings and a costs order made by a judge who had previously denied their motion for leave to appeal a Land Planning Appeal Tribunal decision regarding a new hospital site.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the interlocutory rulings merged with the final decision denying leave, rendering them moot.

The court held that the proposed review was an abuse of process attempting to collaterally attack a final decision, and that the costs order was well within the motions judge's discretion.

The appellant appealed a Review Decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal, arguing that the Tribunal erred in law by applying the 'Clergy principle' to allow the respondent's planning applications to be assessed under the policy regime in place when they were originally filed in 1990.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Clergy principle is a procedural policy choice within the Tribunal's exclusive jurisdiction, not a legal principle subject to appeal on a question of law.

The Court also found that the Tribunal provided sufficient reasons for its decision.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash a resolution by the City of Brantford to sell a municipal golf course to fund affordable housing.

The applicant argued the City breached its procedural by-law, failed to notify First Nations under an agreement, and that councillors had a disqualifying bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no procedural error, that the applicant lacked standing to raise the First Nations notice issue, and that the high threshold for establishing a closed mind by municipal councillors was not met.

The application was also dismissed due to a seven-month delay in bringing the proceeding.

The respondent municipality brought a motion for security for costs against the applicant, a newly formed corporation seeking judicial review of a municipal resolution to sell a golf course.

The applicant conceded it had insufficient assets but argued it had a good chance of success and was engaged in public interest litigation.

The court found the applicant did not have a good chance of success on its procedural, notice, or bias arguments, and that the matter was not public interest litigation.

The motion was granted, and the applicant was ordered to post $10,000 as security for costs.