Laurence A. Pattillo

The accused brought an application in the nature of certiorari seeking to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for trial on charges of trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

The accused argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction because the only identification evidence consisted of in‑dock identification by police witnesses.

The court held that while in‑dock identification evidence is inherently dangerous, it is not presumptively inadmissible and may constitute direct evidence for the purposes of the committal test.

Applying the test from United States of America v. Sheppard and R. v. Arcuri, the court found there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, could convict.

The preliminary inquiry judge therefore acted within jurisdiction in committing the accused for trial.

The applicant sought mandamus compelling issuance of criminal process after a justice of the peace refused to issue process under s. 507(1) of the Criminal Code for proposed charges of theft over $5,000, fraud over $5,000, and forgery against a third party.

The court reviewed whether the justice of the peace committed jurisdictional error or failed to exercise discretion judicially in concluding that no prima facie case existed.

The evidence consisted largely of the applicant’s testimony concerning a company cheque and invoices allegedly connected to fraudulent conduct.

The court held the record contained no evidence establishing essential elements of the alleged offences, including personal receipt of funds, fraudulent deprivation, or creation of false documents by the proposed accused.

The justice of the peace properly exercised the gatekeeping function under s. 507(1), and mandamus was not available.

The accused brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of search warrants executed at an apartment where police seized a firearm, cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and cash.

The accused sought exclusion of the evidence under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that the Information to Obtain relied on confidential informants and contained misleading statements and insufficient disclosure.

The Crown applied under step six of the Garofoli procedure to permit the court to consider the unredacted affidavit.

The court held that the redacted ITO and judicial summary provided sufficient disclosure to allow a facial challenge under the Debot criteria and therefore granted the Crown’s cross‑application.

After excising two exaggerated statements from the affidavit, the court concluded that the remaining information established reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

The search authorization was upheld and the Charter application dismissed.

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded $250,000 in damages for oppression, the court determined the issues of prejudgment interest and costs.

The court rejected the plaintiff's expert calculation for prejudgment interest, instead applying the Courts of Justice Act rate from the date the cause of action arose.

The court awarded the plaintiff substantial indemnity costs, finding the defendants' conduct in taking excess compensation and deliberately withholding information to be egregious and reprehensible.

The defendants' Rule 49 offer did not apply because the judgment, which included substantial indemnity costs, was more favourable than the offer.

Costs were fixed at $413,000.

The accused was charged with indecent assault contrary to s. 156 of the Criminal Code for alleged sexual acts against a child occurring between 1973 and 1976.

The complainant testified that, when he was between five and seven years old, the accused forced him to perform oral sex on several occasions in the accused’s home.

The accused denied the allegations.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the witnesses, noting the significant passage of time and inconsistencies in the complainant’s recollection, including concerns about opportunity and inaccuracies regarding physical details.

The court concluded that, although it could not fully accept the accused’s denial, the Crown failed to prove the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Following a summary judgment motion resolved by agreement, the applicant sought costs against the respondent Figueira.

The court held that the applicant was entitled to full indemnity costs based on the clear wording of a promissory note signed by the respondent, which provided for 'all costs of the collection'.

The court apportioned the total costs claimed among the three respondents and awarded the applicant $39,500 in full indemnity costs against Figueira.

The Crown applied for a ruling that several statements made by the accused during police interrogation were voluntary and admissible.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings under the Charter, alleging violations of ss. 7, 8, and 9, including unlawful arrest, an unjustified strip search, and failure to bring him before a justice within 24 hours contrary to s. 503 of the Criminal Code.

The court held the arrest was supported by reasonable and probable grounds and the strip search was justified as incident to custody and conducted reasonably.

Although the police breached s. 503 and the accused’s s. 9 Charter rights by delaying his appearance before a justice, the court found no prejudice warranting a stay.

All statements were admitted as voluntary except for a late oral statement made at 5 p.m., which was excluded.

A secured lender brought a motion for summary judgment seeking payment of accounts receivable assigned to it following borrower default.

The moving party relied on security agreements governed by Virginia law and the Uniform Commercial Code, asserting a right to collect accounts receivable directly from an account debtor.

The responding parties argued the lender’s decision to collect receivables rather than realize on other collateral was commercially unreasonable and raised triable issues.

The court accepted expert evidence on Virginia law and held the UCC’s commercial reasonableness requirement applied to the manner of collection, not the decision to pursue accounts receivable over other collateral.

The court further held that cause of action estoppel barred the applicants’ claims due to prior litigation in the United States.

Summary judgment was granted and the related application dismissed.

The applicant sought recognition and enforcement in Ontario of an international arbitral award issued in New York requiring the respondent to pay over USD $3.5 million.

The respondent argued the application was premature because it was commenced within the three‑month period for setting aside an award under the UNCITRAL Model Law and that enforcement would be contrary to public policy due to ongoing regulatory proceedings before the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The court held that the relevant inquiry is whether the award is binding at the time of the enforcement hearing, not when the application was commenced.

As no application to set aside or suspend the award was pending and the regulatory proceeding did not undermine the arbitral decision, there was no basis under Article 36 of the Model Law to refuse recognition or enforcement.

The award was recognized and enforced in Ontario.

Following earlier reasons dismissing most applicants’ requests for interim advancement of legal expenses from a corporation, the court addressed the costs of the applications.

The respondent corporation sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $559,000 or alternatively partial indemnity costs, while the applicants argued that costs should remain in the cause of the underlying indemnity issue.

The court held that although the respondent was largely successful, payment of costs should be contingent on the outcome of the trial determining entitlement to indemnity.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs of $25,000 for a related motion and $165,000 for the applications, subject to specific allocations among applicants and exceptions for one successful applicant and another who withdrew participation.

Following an appeal from an arbitral award concerning mining concessions and a contractual right of first offer, the court addressed costs of the appeal.

The earlier decision allowed the appeal in part, confirming that the right of first offer was triggered but overturning the arbitrator’s findings regarding partnership, fiduciary duties, and the remedy ordered.

Both parties claimed substantial success and sought partial indemnity costs.

The court held that success on the appeal was divided, as each side prevailed on significant issues.

In the circumstances, the appropriate disposition was for each party to bear its own costs.

During a criminal trial involving armed robbery and firearms offences, the Crown sought admission of three oral statements and one video statement made by the accused while in custody.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the statements were voluntary under the confessions rule.

The court found that the accused’s initial spontaneous remark to a police officer while being escorted to a washroom was voluntary and admissible.

However, the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that subsequent statements made during an unrecorded 52‑minute discussion with police and the resulting video statement were voluntary, particularly given concerns about possible inducements and the absence of a reliable recording of the interrogation.

The later statements were therefore ruled inadmissible.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated a dangerous offender following his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and breaches of a recognizance.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record involving violence and sexual assault, and suffered from schizophrenia and antisocial personality disorder.

Three expert witnesses agreed the offender was a high risk to reoffend violently and sexually, but disagreed on whether his risk could be managed in the community.

The court found that the offender met the criteria for a dangerous offender and that his risk could not be adequately controlled in the community under a long term supervision order due to his history of non-compliance with medication and court orders.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention in a penitentiary.

Following dismissal of a creditor’s motion seeking to compel a court‑appointed receiver to answer extensive questions and pay funds relating to a claim under s. 81.1 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the court addressed the receiver’s entitlement to costs.

The responding creditor argued costs should await determination of a separate request to unseal confidential documents and contended it had achieved partial success.

The court rejected those submissions, holding the creditor had been entirely unsuccessful and that delaying costs would improperly leave their determination in the creditor’s control.

Finding the motion constituted an unwarranted fishing expedition that unnecessarily increased the receivership’s expenses, the court concluded the conduct was sufficiently improper to justify substantial indemnity costs.

The receiver’s costs were assessed at $23,236.76 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following a three-day trial determining the shareholders of a corporation, the successful respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The applicants argued costs should be in the cause or limited due to a settlement offer and alleged excessive time claimed by counsel.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were not justified because the applicants’ conduct was not reprehensible and the settlement offer did not comply with Rule 49.10 nor yield a result as favourable as the offer.

Applying the reasonableness factors under Rule 57(1), the court reduced the claimed hours and fixed partial indemnity costs at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

Appeal from an arbitral award under s. 45(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 concerning a joint venture relating to mining concessions in Peru.

The arbitrator held that the appellants breached a contractual right of first offer and a trust relationship by granting a cesión minera (assignment of concession rights) to a third party without offering the opportunity to the respondents.

The court upheld the arbitrator’s finding that entering into the cesión minera triggered the right of first offer and constituted a breach of the contractual trust arrangement.

However, the court found the arbitrator erred in law by concluding that the parties’ relationship constituted a partnership giving rise to broader fiduciary duties and by crafting a remedy tied to the broader share purchase agreement rather than the cesión minera itself.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part and the matter remitted to the arbitrator to determine appropriate terms for offering the cesión minera to the respondents.

The applicant corporation sought orders under the Securities Act and the Business Corporations Act to restrict certain shareholders from voting shares allegedly acquired in breach of early warning reporting requirements, to declare that a shareholder rights plan “flip‑in event” had occurred, and to invalidate a dissident proxy solicitation ahead of an annual general meeting.

The court declined to address the alleged early warning breach because the matter was already the subject of an ongoing Ontario Securities Commission investigation and had previously been withdrawn from related litigation.

Even if a breach had occurred, the court held that the discretionary remedy of prohibiting voting rights would not be appropriate given the circumstances and absence of harm to the market or shareholders.

The court also found no evidence that the respondents acted jointly or in concert in organizing the proxy solicitation or that the circular was misleading under applicable securities and corporate law regulations.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought damages arising from the termination of a memorandum of understanding and a subsequent agreement relating to the proposed development of an 80 MW wind energy project on the defendant's industrial lands.

The court held that both documents were largely agreements to agree and therefore unenforceable with respect to the broader development and lease arrangements.

However, the documents imposed limited binding obligations, including a requirement to provide 60 days’ notice before termination of the memorandum and an obligation to allow access for wind measurement under the second agreement.

The defendant breached those obligations by terminating immediately and preventing continued wind testing.

Claims for fiduciary duty, breach of confidence, unjust enrichment, partnership, and loss of chance damages were rejected.

The applicants sought a declaration that they validly exercised a shotgun buy/sell provision in a shareholders agreement, requiring the respondents to transfer their shares in the corporation.

The respondents argued the shotgun notice was invalid because it was issued jointly by two shareholders, and alternatively, that the applicants repudiated the agreement by demanding a release not required by the contract.

The court held that the shotgun provision, interpreted in its factual matrix, allowed for joint exercise by the applicants as a single shareholder group.

The court further found that the applicants did not repudiate the agreement, as they were ready and willing to close without the disputed release, whereas the respondents refused to close.

The application was granted, and the respondents were ordered to transfer their shares.

The applicants sought a determination of the shareholders of 7538715 Canada Ltd. and whether the respondent Mohammad Petgar was an authorized director.

The applicants claimed they owned 100% of the shares and provided all the investment money.

The respondent claimed he and his estranged wife, the primary applicant, each owned 50% of the shares.

The court reviewed documentary evidence, including a shareholders agreement and bank guarantees, and found that the respondent and his estranged wife were each 50% shareholders.

The court also found that the respondent was an authorized director of the company.