Sexual assault

The youth appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a five-year-old child.

At trial, credibility was the central issue, and the appellant denied the allegations.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, finding the complainant's evidence compelling and rejecting the appellant's denial as one of convenience.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons inadequate.

The reasons failed to explain how the trial judge reconciled problems with the complainant's evidence or why the appellant's evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for multiple offences, including assault, sexual assault, and uttering threats, against three former partners.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, quashing the convictions relating to one complainant because the trial judge improperly relied on prior consistent statements that were not in evidence to bolster her credibility.

The convictions relating to the other two complainants were upheld.

The Court granted leave to appeal the sentences on the remaining counts, varying them to run consecutively rather than concurrently, resulting in a total sentence of 32 months.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation, arguing the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the newly enacted long-term offender provisions.

The Crown conceded the error.

However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the Johnson framework to find no reasonable possibility that the designation would have been different.

The court noted the appellant's high risk to reoffend, diagnoses of pedophilia and sexual sadism, and unsuitability for control in the community.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault.

The convictions were based on the testimony of a single complainant regarding historical sexual activities.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly apply the criminal standard of proof, noting her inadequate treatment of significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and her problematic formulation of her ultimate conclusion.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, obstruct justice, assault with a weapon, and assault, as well as his sentence of four years and four months.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction on prior consistent statements and by improperly applying Gladue principles during sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice regarding the prior statements.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of granting credit for 34 days of pre-sentence custody, varying the sentence on one count to one month consecutive.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the Crown's closing remarks to the jury resulted in an unfair trial.

The appellant contended that the Crown inappropriately invited the jury to put themselves in the position of a victim, commented on the complainant's demeanour, and offered unproven facts regarding the complainant's mother's feelings of guilt.

The Court of Appeal found that while some of the Crown's comments were inappropriate and best left unsaid, the trial judge's balanced and fair charge to the jury was sufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of domestic abuse against his wife, including assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault, and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to warn the jury against propensity reasoning regarding the multiple counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the evidence on each count was admissible context for the others and that a limiting instruction would have required explaining the proper uses of the evidence, which would have operated against the appellant's interest.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the global sentence was fit given the aggravating domestic context.

The young person appealed findings of guilt on two counts of sexual assault involving two child complainants.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, considering collusion, and applying the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge adequately scrutinized the evidence and properly rejected collusion.

Although the trial judge erred at the second step of the W.(D.) analysis by asking if the appellant's evidence 'could not reasonably be true', the Court applied the curative proviso, concluding the Crown's case was overwhelming and the rejected evidence could not have left a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation, arguing the Crown improperly split its case by cross-examining him on a segment of his police statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that defence counsel at trial did not object to the cross-examination, did not object to the jury instructions, and specifically declined the trial judge's offer of a mistrial.

The court found no basis to conclude the trial was unfair.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly grappled with the central issue of the complainant's lack of consent and reasonably accepted expert evidence regarding forced sexual intercourse.

The court concluded the reasons were sufficient and the verdict was supported by ample evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for administering a stupefying substance and sexual assault, as well as his 22-month sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to stay the charges due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, misapprehending expert toxicological evidence regarding the effects of GHB and alcohol, and finding that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no unreasonable delay and that the trial judge's findings regarding the complainant's incapacity to consent due to intoxication were supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing evidence, misapprehended testimony, and failed to properly apply the W.(D.) principles and the Sheppard standard for sufficiency of reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were detailed, properly addressed the evidence, and correctly applied the law.

The court upheld the finding that the complainant was too intoxicated to consent and that the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple offences, including sexually assaulting two 14-year-old boys, and was designated a dangerous offender by the trial judge.

On appeal, the appellant argued he should have been designated a long-term offender, asserting his risk could be managed in the community with chemical castration and strict supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.

The court noted the appellant's unwillingness to take sex-inhibiting drugs and the unavailability of the required level of community supervision.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversal of the burden of proof, and upheld the SOIRA registration and the non-application of the Kienapple principle.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence from four years to three years due to the appellant's youth, lack of criminal record, low risk of re-offending, and positive personal circumstances.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault and two counts of administering a stupefying substance.

He argued the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence, and the trial judge erred in relying on the complainants' conservative sexual nature to assess consent.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's factual findings were supported by the evidence, including expert toxicological testimony that the complainants' symptoms were not caused by alcohol alone.

The court concluded the complainants were drugged and rendered unconscious, making them incapable of consenting to sexual activity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering and committing sexual assault, arguing his guilty plea was not voluntary and informed due to the incompetence of his trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's conduct throughout the multi-day trial, including his failure to object to the facts read-in and his own testimony, belied his claim that he did not intend to plead guilty to the offence as charged.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge lacked jurisdiction because he failed to put the appellant to his election under s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the record did not show substantial compliance with the section or an effective waiver by the unrepresented appellant.

As a result, the trial was a nullity.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a young person, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and forcible confinement, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainants' credibility regarding consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony about her lack of consent and concluding that the trial judge did not engage in impermissible propensity reasoning.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography, sexual interference, and sexual assault, as well as his sentence.

He argued that the destruction of a videotaped interview prejudiced his right to make full answer and defence, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek a stay, failing to request counselling records, and failing to advance a fabrication defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the lost videotape, no merit to the ineffective assistance claims, and no error in the trial judge's consideration of evidence or the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two charges of sexual assault against two young family members.

The appellant argued the trial judge did not properly deal with inconsistencies in the complainants' testimony and erred in relying on the evidence of a nurse practitioner regarding the causes of one complainant's sexually transmitted infection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and that there was abundant evidence supporting the conviction.