Medical malpractice

The plaintiff underwent an incisional hernia repair surgery performed by the defendant general surgeon.

Following the surgery, the plaintiff developed a bowel leak requiring emergency repair and subsequent treatment for a fistula and wound infections.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action alleging the surgeon breached the standard of care by failing to order bowel preparation, failing to 'run the bowel', and improperly repairing the bowel perforation.

The court dismissed the action, preferring the evidence of the defendant's expert witness and finding that the surgeon's conduct met the standard of care in all respects.

The court also found that causation was not established.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action sought leave to amend their Statement of Claim for a fourth time.

The defendant physicians opposed several amendments, arguing they introduced new statute-barred claims for wrongful death and spoliation of evidence, added new allegations based on unpleaded facts, and impermissibly withdrew prior admissions.

The court allowed most of the amendments, finding they merely particularized the existing factual matrix, but struck specific sentences that implicitly advanced a statute-barred wrongful death claim, contained inflammatory language, or pleaded immaterial legal conclusions regarding non-delegable duties.

The appellant physician appealed a trial judgment finding her liable for the respondent's catastrophic brain injury following an acute asthmatic attack.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by delaying intubation and failing to call for help sooner.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on a critical care note containing double hearsay and opinion evidence regarding the respondent's hypoxemia, and erred in his causation analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the note was admissible under the business records exception and as a party admission, and that the trial judge's causation findings were supported by the expert evidence.

The respondents brought a medical malpractice action after the plaintiff suffered a severe brain injury from a cardiac arrest during a caesarean section.

The trial judge found the primary obstetrician (Dr. Padmore), the anesthesiologist (Dr. Jamensky), and the hospital liable for negligence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeals of Dr. Padmore and the hospital, finding the trial judge erred in his legal causation analysis regarding their respective pre-delivery acts and omissions.

The Court dismissed Dr. Jamensky's appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that he breached the standard of care by prematurely converting the patient to a general anesthetic and that this negligence caused the cardiac arrest.

Dr. Jamensky was held solely liable for the agreed $12 million in damages.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action.

The trial judge found that the respondent breached the standard of care by discharging the appellant without reviewing an MRA, but concluded that this negligence did not cause the appellant's second, severe stroke.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the admission of expert evidence and agreeing that the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case on causation, as the evidence did not show that treatment with Heparin would have been more effective than Aspirin in preventing the second stroke.

In a medical malpractice action arising from catastrophic injuries inflicted on a newborn by his biological mother, the plaintiffs alleged that a family physician and a pediatrician negligently failed to report child protection concerns under s. 72 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found that the family physician conducted adequate mental health and coping assessments, and that neither physician had reasonable grounds to suspect the infant was a child in need of protection.

Although the family physician breached the standard of care by not providing the pediatrician with a fuller mental health history, that breach had no causal consequence.

The court further held that, even if a report had been made, the Children's Aid Society would likely have treated the matter as low risk and would not have intervened in time to prevent the assault.

The action was dismissed, with damages nonetheless fixed by agreement at $13,250,000 under Rule 7.08.

The appellant suffered a bowel leak after surgery and developed septic shock.

He sued the hospital and a nurse for delayed diagnosis and treatment, alleging nursing negligence and medication errors.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of the standard of care and that the appellant failed to prove causation, as his injuries were inevitable due to the onset of the sepsis cascade before the alleged negligence occurred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the 'but for' causation test.

In a complex medical malpractice trial, the defendant hospital brought a mid-trial motion seeking leave under Rule 31.11(6) to introduce discovery transcripts of a deceased doctor from other actions.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing they did not have the transcripts when prior Pierringer orders were made and would be irreparably prejudiced because their experts had not reviewed them.

The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs did not have the transcripts prior to trial and that admitting them now would cause irreparable prejudice that could not be compensated by costs or an adjournment.

The defendant radiologist moved for summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice claim against him, arguing the plaintiffs failed to tender expert opinion evidence on causation.

The plaintiffs cross-moved for leave to admit late-served expert reports from a gastroenterologist and a radiologist.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to admit the late reports, finding that their exclusion could cause a miscarriage of justice and the defendants would not suffer undue prejudice given the trial's adjournment.

Relying on the newly admitted expert evidence regarding standard of care and breach, the court dismissed the defendant's summary judgment motion, concluding that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed and that an inference of causation might be drawn at trial.

The issue of costs thrown away due to the trial's adjournment was reserved to the trial judge.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim in a medical malpractice action to replace 'Dr. John/Jane Doe' with two specific physicians, after the expiry of the limitation period.

The proposed defendants opposed the motion, arguing it was an attempt to add new parties out of time.

The court found that the litigation finger was clearly pointed at the proposed defendants, establishing a misnomer.

The court declined to exercise its residual discretion to refuse the amendment, noting the proposed defendants had early notice of the claim and suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The motion was granted.

The Attorney General of Canada requested that the plaintiff's statement of claim be referred to the court under Rule 2.1.01(6) to be dismissed as frivolous or vexatious.

The plaintiff alleged medical malpractice and sought Charter remedies arising from his arrest and incarceration.

The court declined to issue a notice to dismiss the action, finding that while the pleading required work, a claim for failure to provide medical care to a prisoner is not necessarily frivolous on its face.

The decision was made without prejudice to the defendants bringing formal motions to strike.

The self-represented plaintiff filed a 400-page Statement of Claim alleging medical malpractice resulting in his wife's death.

The court found the pleading unintelligible and potentially frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court stayed the action under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act and directed the Registrar to issue a notice under Rule 2.1.

The plaintiff sued two doctors for medical malpractice, alleging that a failure to notify her of a referral appointment led to prolonged casting of her fractured fingers and a poorer outcome.

The court found that the referring doctor's office had properly notified the plaintiff of the appointment, which she failed to attend.

Furthermore, the court accepted expert evidence that the prolonged casting met the standard of care given the severity of the fractures, and that any delay in mobilization did not cause the plaintiff's permanent impairment.

The action was dismissed.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against several healthcare providers and police officers regarding a psychiatric assessment hold under the Mental Health Act.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff failed to produce an expert report addressing professional negligence.

The court found that without a supportive expert report, the plaintiff had no prospect of success.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed, with costs awarded to the defendants.

Following divided success on two summary judgment motions in a medical malpractice action, the court invited costs submissions.

The plaintiff submitted a 13-page document despite a four-page limit, prompting the court to read only the first four pages.

The court found no reason to depart from its presumptive view that costs should lie where they fall, noting that pre-motion squabbles between lawyers rarely influence costs.

No order as to costs was made.

In a medical malpractice action against two oral surgeons, the plaintiffs moved to remove one defendant's counsel based on a conflict arising from the firm's prior joint representation of both defendants.

Although the former client had earlier given a waiver, the court held that a later agreement that counsel would not act adversely to his immediate interests modified that consent.

Applying the duty of loyalty to former and current clients, and emphasizing public confidence in the administration of justice, the court found it would be difficult if not impossible to conduct the trial without a substantial risk of adversity, compromised process, or mistrial.

The motion was granted and counsel was removed, with new counsel to be retained and a new trial date fixed.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's medical malpractice action on the basis that it was statute-barred.

The plaintiff underwent jaw surgery in 2001 and experienced ongoing complications, but did not commence the action until 2008.

The plaintiff argued the claim was not discovered until she received an expert opinion in 2006.

The court applied the discoverability principles and found that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the material facts to found a cause of action by August 2003 at the latest.

Consequently, the action was commenced beyond the applicable limitation period and was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action following the sudden death of Emilio Spirito at Trillium Health Centre.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' negligence, specifically the failure to insert a nasogastric tube, caused the deceased to aspirate fluids and die.

The court found that the defendant doctors and nurses met the standard of care in their treatment and monitoring of the deceased.

Furthermore, the court accepted expert pathology evidence that the deceased died from bilateral lobar pneumonia acquired from air-borne bacteria, meaning there was no causal connection between the alleged negligence and the death.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff suffered a fractured jaw and permanent nerve damage during the extraction of a wisdom tooth by the defendant oral surgeon.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action alleging the surgery was unnecessary, lack of informed consent, and negligence in the extraction procedure.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the extraction was necessary, the defendant adequately disclosed the risks, and the defendant met the standard of care during the surgery.

The court preferred the evidence of the defendant's expert and found that a jaw fracture can occur even with the use of minimal force.

The appellant was severely injured in a car accident and treated by the respondent orthopaedic surgeon.

The respondent failed to diagnose a spinal fracture, leading to delayed immobilization, and the appellant was eventually diagnosed with paraparesis.

The trial judge found no fault and no causation.

The Court of Appeal found the respondent committed a fault by failing to conduct proper neurological tests and immobilize the patient, but upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the accident itself, not the medical fault, caused the paraparesis.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming the Court of Appeal's intervention on the standard of care and its factual findings on causation, and declined to apply a presumption of causation.