Kirsten Crain

The City of Ottawa appealed a remittal decision that found various provisions of a 1981 Agreement and related contracts governing golf course lands to be inoperative.

The Court of Appeal had previously struck down conveyancing provisions in the agreement for violating the rule against perpetuities.

The application judge held that without these provisions, the remaining obligations to operate a golf course in perpetuity fundamentally altered the parties' original bargain and were therefore inoperative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the removal of the conveyancing provisions frustrated the balance of the agreement, rendering all provisions relating to the golf course lands void.

The respondents brought a medical malpractice action after the plaintiff suffered a severe brain injury from a cardiac arrest during a caesarean section.

The trial judge found the primary obstetrician (Dr. Padmore), the anesthesiologist (Dr. Jamensky), and the hospital liable for negligence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeals of Dr. Padmore and the hospital, finding the trial judge erred in his legal causation analysis regarding their respective pre-delivery acts and omissions.

The Court dismissed Dr. Jamensky's appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that he breached the standard of care by prematurely converting the patient to a general anesthetic and that this negligence caused the cardiac arrest.

Dr. Jamensky was held solely liable for the agreed $12 million in damages.

The respondent hospital brought a motion to compel the applicant physician to answer questions and produce documents regarding his financial income, which he had refused during cross-examination.

The cross-examination occurred in the context of the physician's motion to stay the hospital's decision to suspend his privileges.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the physician did not allege financial harm in his stay motion, relying instead on loss of professional satisfaction and reputation.

Therefore, the financial information sought was irrelevant to the issues of irreparable harm and balance of convenience.

The defendant lawyer brought a requisition under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff's claim arose from an aborted real estate transaction and alleged that the defendant lawyer was involved in the issuance of a municipal order to comply.

The court found that the defendant lawyer owed no duty of care to the plaintiff vendor and that the action appeared frivolous on its face.

The court ordered a stay of the proceeding and directed the Registrar to issue a notice to the plaintiff that the court is considering dismissing the action.

The defendants successfully defeated the plaintiff's motion for an injunction regarding the processing and delivery of radioactive Cobalt-60.

The defendants sought costs of $69,000 on a partial indemnity basis, while the plaintiff argued for $25,000 or deferral to arbitration.

The court considered the complexity of the technical and legal issues, the high value of the goods involved, and the urgency of the motion.

The court fixed costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendants at $45,000 for fees and $6,000 for disbursements on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction preventing the defendants from terminating a cobalt irradiation services agreement and requiring continued supply of irradiated Cobalt‑60 pending arbitration.

The defendants terminated the agreement after the plaintiff failed to pay approximately $4 million in overdue invoices despite a contractual requirement that invoices be paid within 30 days.

Applying the RJR‑MacDonald test, the court held that although a limited serious issue existed regarding whether providing only 30 days’ notice to cure default complied with the duty of good faith, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and the balance of convenience strongly favoured the defendants.

The court found that cancer treatment supply would not be disrupted because the product could be sourced elsewhere and existing supplies remained usable.

The motion for an injunction was denied.