Conspiracy

This appeal concerned a dispute over the purchase and sale of a luxury home, where the purchaser sought rescission of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale due to fraudulent misrepresentation and latent defect.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment for rescission and equitable damages against the seller.

The appellants (seller and co-defendants) argued errors in the finding of fraudulent misrepresentation, latent defect, and the appropriateness of partial summary judgment given a pending conspiracy claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's finding of fraudulent misrepresentation based on the seller's failure to disclose safety risks and false representations, and upheld the partial summary judgment, finding no risk of inconsistent findings between corporate and personal liability for fraud.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the Canadian canned tuna market.

The motion judge dismissed the certification motion, finding a failure to plead material facts for a reasonable cause of action and an insufficient evidentiary basis for common issues.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the claim lacked material facts to support a Canadian conspiracy and that there was no sufficient factual basis for the proposed common issues, particularly given the distinct Canadian and U.S. tuna markets.

The court also confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the lower court's order effectively ended the proceeding.

The defendants, Basil Dixon and Nathan Brown, were charged with conspiracy to import cocaine following a large-scale police investigation ("Project Southam").

The trial, heard by a judge alone, relied heavily on intercepted communications and surveillance.

The court found that voice identification evidence from a detective constable was unreliable due to limited exposure and lack of formal training.

However, based on circumstantial evidence, including intercepts and surveillance footage, the court identified Dixon as "B" and Brown as "R" in the communications.

Applying the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Dixon conspired to import cocaine from Guyana (Count One) and that both Dixon and Brown conspired to import cocaine using a pilot (Count Three).

This is an appeal from a motion judge's decision dismissing the plaintiffs' motion to amend their pleadings in a class action alleging a multi-bank conspiracy to fix gold and silver prices and engage in 'spoofing'.

The motion judge had found the proposed amendments time-barred or improper for joinder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by treating amendments as new causes of action when they were alternative theories based on existing facts, and by misapplying the 'actual knowledge' standard for limitation periods.

The Court also found a palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's assessment of JP Morgan's joinder, concluding that the CFTC order did not preclude conspiratorial spoofing allegations.

The amendments were allowed, with the possibility for some respondents to plead a limitations defence at trial.

Melanie Pereira was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic cocaine, conspiracy to traffic fentanyl, and possession for the purpose of trafficking in both drugs.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the significant amounts of fentanyl and cocaine, and mitigating factors, such as her status as a first offender, her remorse, and the impact of incarceration on her two young children.

The Crown sought an eight-year sentence for fentanyl and a 5-6 year concurrent sentence for cocaine, while the defence sought a reformatory sentence of two years less a day.

The court sentenced Ms. Pereira to 60 months (5 years) imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, along with a 10-year section 109 order and a DNA order.

Ali Lalji was found guilty after trial of conspiring to import 40 kilograms of cocaine into Australia.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the large quantity of cocaine and Lalji's trusted position as a deputy in the conspiracy, and mitigating factors, including his lack of prior convictions, strong community support, and prospects for rehabilitation.

Applying sentencing principles, including denunciation, general deterrence, and parity with co-conspirators, the court sentenced the offender to nine years' imprisonment, with credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The appellant, Dmitri Davidov, appealed his conviction for importation and conspiracy to import cocaine, and sought leave to appeal a non-communication order.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by improperly using inconsistencies between the appellant's pre-trial police statement and trial testimony to infer guilt, rather than solely for credibility assessment.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding the evidence of guilt overwhelming and the conviction inevitable.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal the non-communication order was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the order was deemed a reasonable exercise of discretion to protect witnesses.

The appellant, OZ Optics Ltd., appealed the dismissal of its action against two former general counsel, Diane Lesley Evans and Samuel Edgar Schwisberg, following a successful motion for summary judgment.

The action alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and negligent performance of service.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the bench, upholding the motion judge's findings that the claims were amenable to summary judgment, that Evans's actions did not constitute a breach or cause loss, and that Schwisberg's obligations under a holdover clause were absolved by the appellant's actions.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, Devon Dinall, appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine, conspiracy to traffic cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime.

His defence at trial was that he was involved in a marijuana trafficking conspiracy, not cocaine.

The primary ground of appeal argued that the trial judge erred in jury instructions on conspiracy and the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, specifically by failing to instruct on the possibility of multiple overlapping conspiracies and misrepresenting his admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, viewed functionally and as a whole, clearly conveyed that conviction required proof of participation in a cocaine conspiracy, despite one misstatement.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instruction regarding expert evidence on drug slang.

This case involved a dispute over a verbal contract for the supply of coyote furs between a fur marketing company and a fur manufacturing company.

The marketing company sued for unpaid invoices, and the manufacturing company counterclaimed for breach of contract, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, and conspiracy.

The court found a binding oral contract for a specific quantity of furs at a fixed price.

The marketing company breached the contract by failing to deliver the agreed quantity and by unilaterally increasing the price.

The court adjusted the marketing company's claim for unpaid invoices, granted the manufacturing company a refund for poor quality furs on one invoice, and relieved it from paying two other disputed invoices.

Claims for negligent misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, and conspiracy were dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

Minimal damages were awarded to the manufacturing company for the breach of contract due to lack of reliable quantification and mitigation evidence.

A third-party claim against an individual was also dismissed.

This is a complex set of appeals concerning anti-SLAPP motions.

The appellants (Catalyst parties) appealed the dismissal of two of their actions (Defamation and Wolfpack actions) and the dismissal of their partial anti-SLAPP motion against a counterclaim.

The court dismissed all appeals, upholding the motion judge's findings that the Catalyst parties' actions were strategic attempts to silence critics, lacked substantial merit against some respondents, and that the public interest in protecting expression outweighed the public interest in continuing the proceedings.

The court also upheld the costs awards against the Catalyst parties, emphasizing the deterrent purpose of anti-SLAPP legislation against abusive litigation.

The accused, Ali Lalji, was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine into Australia.

The Crown relied on evidence extracted from seized cellular phones (Cellebrite data) and the testimony of a co-conspirator.

The court first ruled section 36 of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act unconstitutional for violating Charter sections 7 and 12, as it fundamentally alters hearsay admissibility rules inconsistent with a fair trial.

Despite this, the Crown's evidence, particularly the Cellebrite data, proved Lalji's membership in the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that Lalji either had actual knowledge that the contraband was cocaine or was wilfully blind to that fact.

Lalji was found guilty as charged.

The appellant's property was sold under power of sale.

She initiated an action alleging conspiracy to defraud and moved to set aside the sale, claiming fraud and improvidence.

The motion judge dismissed all claims except for an accounting by the mortgagee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no direct or circumstantial evidence of fraud, and that the sale was not improvident, especially considering the appellant's history of default and delay.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its claims against two corporate and individual respondents under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for lack of contractual privity and other deficiencies.

The motion judge had denied leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the respondents were not parties to the alleged contract (Mandate) and that other claims were unsustainable.

The court affirmed that reviewing a document expressly pleaded and incorporated into the statement of claim does not constitute considering evidence on a Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion and upheld the discretionary refusal to grant further leave to amend.

The plaintiffs, an investment corporation and its principals, suffered losses from a failed real estate development and sought to recover their unsecured investment in priority to secured creditors.

The secured creditors (defendants) brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motions, finding complex factual issues, multiple credibility assessments, and a risk of inconsistent findings if partial summary judgment were granted.

The court concluded that the current record was not appropriate for summary judgment and that a full trial was required to resolve the intertwined issues, including allegations of knowing receipt of trust property and conspiracy.

The appellant, Annabelle Maritza Edgeworth, appealed an order which dismissed most of the claims in her action.

Her action alleged that the respondents (lawyers, an insurer, and a medical assessor) conspired to suppress a defence medical report in a prior personal injury case, leading to claims for unlawful means conspiracy, intrusion on seclusion, conspiracy to injure, and misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that a failure to comply with a procedural rule (r. 33.06) was not a "wrongful act" for unlawful means conspiracy, and the intrusion on seclusion claim failed as the medical examination was consented to.

The court also affirmed the removal of the appellant's counsel due to a conflict of interest.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and conspiracy to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The primary ground of appeal was the extraordinary delay (over four years) by the trial judge in delivering written reasons for judgment after announcing the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal found that this prolonged delay, coupled with the complexity of the case, rebutted the presumption of judicial integrity and impartiality, rendering the reasons an "after-the-fact justification." Consequently, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The plaintiff sought court approval for a class action settlement agreement with the Panasonic defendants in a price-fixing conspiracy action concerning linear resistors.

The settlement included a monetary payment of $2,350,000 and significant cooperation from the Panasonic defendants to assist in prosecuting the action against non-settling defendants.

The court approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, considering the arm's length negotiations, the benefits of cooperation, and the risks of continued litigation.

However, the court rejected a proposed term in the draft order that would allow class counsel to use settlement funds for future disbursements, citing concerns about retainer agreements and counsel's financial risks.

Heeralal Ramdeo was convicted after a judge-alone trial for kidnapping, use of an imitation firearm to commit assault, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to public peace.

The Crown alleged Ramdeo masterminded the kidnapping of Dharwant Gill to locate Paul, who had stolen drugs from Ramdeo.

Gill's testimony, though inconsistent and from an unsavoury witness (treated as Vetrovec), was corroborated by other evidence.

The court found a conspiracy proven beyond a reasonable doubt and Ramdeo's probable membership.

Ramdeo's defence was rejected as unreasonable.

He was found guilty on most counts but acquitted of uttering threats due to reasonable doubt regarding the specific content of threats.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their claims against the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG Respondents) and a libel claim against the Toronto Police Services Board (Police Respondents).

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's analysis, upholding the dismissal.

The claims against the MAG Respondents failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, citing Crown attorney immunity from negligence and a lack of pleaded intent for torts like malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office, and conspiracy.

The libel claim against the Police Respondents was struck for non-compliance with notice requirements and limitation periods under the Libel and Slander Act.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded against the appellant Mohamed Abdullahi.