Keeley Margaret Marie Holmes

The offender was convicted of second degree murder after killing the victim and disposing of his body by throwing him off a bridge.

The Crown sought a 16-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 10 to 12 years.

The court considered the egregious circumstances, including the offender's attempts to rob the victim and conceal the body, balanced against his community support and tentative rehabilitation steps.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 13.5-year period of parole ineligibility.

The accused, charged with historical sexual offences against his son, brought a Mills application for the production of the complainant's counselling records.

The Crown brought a Seaboyer application to adduce evidence of sexual acts involving the complainant and his sister in the accused's presence.

The court dismissed the Mills application, finding the counselling records lacked detail and were not likely relevant.

The court granted the Seaboyer application, ruling that the sexual acts in the accused's presence constituted the subject matter of the charge and were not presumptively excluded under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, Marko Tubic and Kenneth Clifford, were charged with first-degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of a Vetrovec witness, Abdul-Aziz Ahmed, corroborated by forensic and surveillance evidence.

The court found the Vetrovec witness's testimony required extreme caution due to inconsistencies and motives to lie.

However, independent confirmatory evidence supported material aspects of his testimony regarding a physical altercation and the disposal of the victim's body.

The court found reasonable doubt as to whether the victim was alive when thrown over the bridge, thus precluding a first-degree murder conviction based on that specific act.

However, considering Tubic's extensive post-offence conduct (cleaning, disposing of body, hiding evidence, attempting to use victim's bank card), the court inferred intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, finding Marko Tubic guilty of second-degree murder.

Kenneth Clifford was found not guilty, as there was reasonable doubt regarding his involvement in the death or the plan to dispose of the body, and his post-offence conduct indicated distress rather than complicity.

The applicant, charged with firearm offences, applied to vary his bail conditions to delete the house arrest requirement after nearly two years of compliance.

The Crown opposed the variation.

The court recognized the applicant's good track record but noted the seriousness of the charges.

The court crafted a compromise, modifying the house arrest condition to allow the applicant to leave the residence with written permission from his surety, subject to a curfew and other conditions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting certain text messages from the complainant as *res gestae* statements and improperly using them in the reasons for judgment.

The court found no error in admitting the texts as relevant to the complainant's state of mind immediately after the alleged assault, and as *res gestae* statements for their truth, given that the timing and situation negated the possibility of concoction.

The court also determined that the trial judge did not improperly use the texts to bolster the complainant's credibility, but rather considered them appropriately in the context of chronology and emotional state.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Daniel Palmer, appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor (J.P.), who was his youth advisor.

The trial judge found Palmer guilty, disbelieving his testimony and concluding that the elements of sexual exploitation, including sexual purpose, were met.

Palmer argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in assessing mens rea by not considering J.P.'s testimony about punitive intent, and improperly considered a defence concession.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding sexual purpose, which does not require the accused's sexual gratification, and properly assessed the evidence and mens rea.

The offender was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing his female friend to death.

The Crown sought a 14-year parole ineligibility period, while the defence sought the statutory minimum of 10 years.

The court found significant aggravating factors, including intimate partner violence, breach of trust, the savage nature of the killing, and the offender's prior record for domestic violence.

However, the offender's severe mental illness at the time of the offence significantly reduced his moral blameworthiness.

Balancing these factors, the court set the period of parole ineligibility at 12 years.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought to admit his protected statements made during a court-ordered psychiatric assessment for the truth of their contents to support a not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCRMD) defence.

He also challenged the constitutionality of section 672.21(3)(e) of the Criminal Code, arguing that its interpretation, which prohibits the literal admission of such statements for their truth, violates his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, holding that common law evidentiary rules, including the hearsay rule and confessions rule, apply to protected statements.

While preposterous statements are admissible as original evidence of mental state, and protected statements can be used to challenge the basis of an expert's opinion or for credibility if the accused testifies, they are not admissible for the truth of their contents in an NCRMD hearing without meeting specific common law exceptions.

The court found this interpretation consistent with parliamentary intent to balance truth-seeking and accused protection, and not in violation of Charter sections 7, 11(c), 11(d), or 12.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder after stabbing the victim 34 times in his basement.

The defence conceded the accused killed the victim but argued he was not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code due to severe paranoid delusions and schizophrenia.

The court found the accused suffered from a disease of the mind but rejected the NCR defence, concluding the defence failed to prove the delusions caused the killing or rendered the accused incapable of knowing the act was morally wrong.

The court also excluded similar fact evidence of the accused's prior violence against women.

Finding a reasonable doubt on the element of forcible confinement required for first-degree murder, the court convicted the accused of second-degree murder.

The defendant, B.G., was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault, touching for a sexual purpose of a person under 14, inviting a person under 14 to touch him for a sexual purpose, and uttering a threat to cause death, all against his daughter, N. The court imposed an 8-year custodial sentence, with all counts served concurrently, after considering aggravating factors such as the position of trust, the young age of the victim, the prolonged and intrusive nature of the abuse, physical violence, and death threats.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record and employment history.

Ancillary orders for DNA, lifetime Section 109 and SOIRA orders, and a Section 161 prohibition were also issued.

The accused pleaded guilty to indecent assault and gross indecency committed against a child victim between 1970 and 1973 when the victim was 10 to 13 years old.

The Crown sought five years imprisonment; defence counsel sought a mid to upper reformatory sentence of 12 months to 2 years less one day.

The court imposed a four-year penitentiary sentence, finding that denunciation and deterrence were the predominant sentencing objectives.

The court rejected the defence position, noting the accused's lengthy criminal history of child sexual abuse, the persistent and invasive nature of the abuse, the profound impact on the victim, and the accused's continued risk to reoffend despite prior convictions and incarceration.

The accused, Richard Pereira, charged with first-degree murder, brought a directed verdict application to reduce the charge to second-degree murder.

The court found sufficient evidence for first-degree murder based on forcible confinement under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code, but insufficient evidence for planned and deliberate murder under s. 231(2).

The application was dismissed, and the charge of first-degree murder based on forcible confinement proceeded.

The applicants, jointly charged with extortion, applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was approximately 20 months.

The court found that the applicants were responsible for defence delay because they were unavailable for the first block of trial dates offered, bringing the net delay below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

Although the applicants demonstrated initiative in trying to expedite the proceedings, the court concluded that the case had not markedly exceeded its reasonable time requirements.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault arising from an attack on a vulnerable victim with Asperger Syndrome at a shopping mall.

The Crown applied for a publication ban on the victim's identity pursuant to section 486.5 of the Criminal Code.

The court granted the publication ban, finding that it was in the interest of the proper administration of justice to protect the victim's identity and privacy, balancing the victim's vulnerability and the risk of harm against the principles of open court and freedom of the press.

The accused, Trae Worrie, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought a ruling to permit the jury to consider his protected out-of-court statements to forensic experts for the truth of their contents, in support of his not criminally responsible (NCR) defence.

The Crown opposed, arguing the statements should only be used to assess the basis of expert opinions, not for their truth.

The court ruled that while the accused consented to the use of the statements for the NCR defence, his exculpatory statements were inadmissible for the truth of their contents unless the Crown sought to admit them.

The statements could be used for the limited purpose of assessing the basis of expert opinions and as original evidence of mental state (e.g., preposterous statements indicating delusions).

The offenders, Romario Brissett and Devar Francis, were convicted by a jury of living off the avails of juvenile prostitution and exercising control over a minor for prostitution.

The Crown sought sentences of 2.5 years concurrent with 5 years for both.

The offenders sought 5 months consecutive or time served.

The court rejected the application of new mandatory minimums not in effect at the time of the offence and declined to apply the reasoning from R. v. Jackson regarding systemic racism for African-Canadian offenders due to lack of direct connection to the offenders' circumstances.

The court also rejected the argument for reduced sentences based on immigration consequences, finding the proposed sentences disproportionate.

Romario Brissett was sentenced to four years' incarceration, and Devar Francis was sentenced to three years' incarceration, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant sought disclosure of school counselling records and Children's Aid Society records created following allegations of sexual assault made by a complainant.

The applicant argued the records were likely relevant to credibility and to establishing potential motive to fabricate.

The court applied the two-stage test under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code.

While the court found the likely relevance threshold was met for the school counselling records, it determined that the best interests of justice test was not satisfied due to the availability of alternative sources of evidence and the high privacy interest in therapeutic records.

However, the court ordered production of the child welfare agency records for judicial review, finding a diminished expectation of privacy in those records and that they were not created in the context of a therapeutic relationship.

An applicant sought to terminate his Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) registration order after serving 11 years of a 20-year mandatory registration requirement.

The applicant had pleaded guilty to sexual interference involving his step-daughter between ages 9 and 14, with over 50 sexual encounters occurring over time.

The applicant argued that the impact of continued registration, including stress, anxiety, and fear of disclosure, was grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The Crown opposed termination.

The court applied the statutory test under section 490.016(1) of the Criminal Code and rejected the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet the high threshold of demonstrating gross disproportionality between the impact on the offender and the public interest in protecting society through effective prevention and investigation of sexual offences.

The applicant, charged with attempted murder following a drive-by shooting, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on a new release plan involving an additional surety and electronic monitoring.

However, the court dismissed the application, finding the proposed sureties unsuitable and concluding that detention was necessary under both the secondary and tertiary grounds due to the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offence, and public safety concerns.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having over 80 ml of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

A police officer observed the accused's vehicle with no lights on, approached him at a gas station, and formed suspicion of impairment based on odour of alcohol, slurred speech, and staggering.

The officer made an approved screening device demand, but the accused inhaled rather than exhaled twice.

The officer arrested the accused for impaired operation.

The Crown relied on breath samples obtained approximately 65 minutes after the initial observation.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt due to incomplete and vague evidence, and that the breath samples were not obtained as soon as practicable due to an unexplained 9-minute delay for a phone call and a 13-minute gap at the police division.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.