J.R. McIsaac

The court conducted a voir dire on the voluntariness of two statements made by the accused to police following arrest for theft-related offences.

The first was a spontaneous utterance made immediately upon arrest, while the second was a lengthy custodial interrogation conducted approximately eight hours later.

The accused alleged physical mistreatment during arrest and argued the later interview was involuntary due to untreated drug withdrawal and oppressive conditions during detention.

Applying the voluntariness principles from R. v. Oickle, the court admitted the spontaneous utterance but excluded the custodial interview.

The court held that the refusal to address withdrawal symptoms and the accused’s humiliating state of dress created a quid pro quo and an atmosphere of oppression raising a reasonable doubt about voluntariness.

Following dismissal of a motion by a law firm seeking leave to withdraw from representation mid‑trial due to unpaid legal fees, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful clients sought full indemnity costs while the law firm argued that no costs should be awarded or that any award should be partial indemnity with a set‑off against outstanding legal accounts.

The court held that the circumstances did not justify elevated costs and fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

However, applying equitable principles of set‑off, the court allowed the law firm to deduct the costs award from its unpaid legal account.

A construction lien action where a foundation contractor sought payment of an outstanding balance for work performed on a residential construction project.

The homeowner disputed the amount owed and advanced a set-off and counterclaim alleging deficient workmanship and breach of contract.

The court found the contractor had completed approximately 90 percent of the contracted work before being ordered off the job site following a design issue unrelated to the contractor.

The homeowner’s claims for remediation and damages were unsupported by reliable evidence and the contractor had not been given an opportunity to remedy alleged minor deficiencies.

Judgment was granted to the contractor for the invoiced amount, the lien was confirmed, and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The plaintiffs were successful at trial, receiving an award of over $2.2 million USD based on findings of active misrepresentations and material non-disclosures by the defendants.

The plaintiffs sought full indemnity costs of $960,432.26, while the defendants argued for substantial indemnity costs of $500,000.

The court found that the defendants' continued deceit during the litigation and trial constituted reprehensible conduct justifying an extraordinary award.

The court awarded the plaintiffs full indemnity costs in the fixed amount of $960,432.26.

The moving party law firm sought permission to withdraw as counsel of record for the plaintiffs mid-trial due to non-payment of legal fees and an alleged breakdown of the solicitor-client relationship.

The clients opposed the motion, arguing that withdrawal would cause significant prejudice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that despite a prior consent agreement, the court retained discretion to refuse withdrawal.

The court held that the clients would suffer serious prejudice as it was not feasible for them to self-represent in complex commercial litigation, they had already paid substantial fees, and the law firm held security on the clients' properties.

Following a successful habeas corpus and certiorari application challenging a correctional institution’s decision to reclassify the applicant from minimum to medium security, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The applicant did not seek costs despite succeeding on the judicial review application.

The court therefore declined to award costs to any party.

The judge also declined to comment on the broader argument that prisoners should never face cost consequences when bringing unsuccessful habeas corpus–type judicial review applications.

The applicant sought judicial review of a correctional decision reclassifying his offender security level from minimum to medium security.

The decision acknowledged that the Security Reclassification Scale may have been inflated due to an inaccurate count of recorded institutional incidents, but correctional authorities failed to address that concern when making the final determination.

The court held that the resulting decision lacked justification, transparency, and intelligibility under the reasonableness standard.

Because the respondent could not demonstrate that the transfer decision fell within the range of acceptable outcomes, the decision was found unreasonable.

The application was granted and the applicant was ordered returned to a minimum security institution.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit following a RIDE stop.

The trial judge excluded breath test results under s.24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of ss.8 and 9 because the officer had not personally self-tested the approved screening device before administering the roadside test.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in concluding that the officer lacked reasonable grounds and that a self-test of the device was not a legal requirement.

The appellate court further held that the trial judge misapplied the framework in R. v. Grant when excluding reliable breath evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the breath test evidence admitted, and a conviction entered with the matter remitted for sentencing.

Following a motion in civil litigation, the successful responding parties sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court considered the absence of a Rule 49 offer and found no litigation misconduct or other circumstances warranting elevated costs.

The court rejected claims of over-preparation and noted a lack of genuine compromise in negotiations by certain parties.

Costs were awarded to the successful parties on a partial indemnity basis in a fixed amount inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiffs invested $1.25 million USD in the defendants' rehabilitative shoe insert business, Barefoot Science, based on representations that the company owned its intellectual property.

The plaintiffs later discovered the principal defendant secretly owned the patents and had forged documents to protect his reversionary interest.

The court found the defendants liable for deceit, fraudulent misrepresentation, and oppression.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $2.2 million USD, varied the security agreements to capture the intellectual property, and declared the forged agreements void.

The applicant brought a motion turning on whether two lots were subject to a development restriction contained in paragraph 2(o) of a prior consent order.

Applying ordinary contractual interpretation principles, the court held the restriction was limited to lands described in Schedule A and did not include the disputed lots.

As a result, the respondents were not prohibited from pursuing the proposed minor variance.

The motion was dismissed, the temporary injunction was vacated, and the assessment of damages under the undertaking was referred to the local registrar.

Following a trial judgment in a historic sexual abuse action, the court determined costs and the commencement date for pre-judgment interest.

The self-represented plaintiff was awarded fixed costs of $97,000 inclusive of disbursements, with a modest $5,000 allowance for self-representation rather than the full counsel fees claimed, and the handwriting expert disbursement was disallowed as unnecessary.

Applying a practical costs-fixing approach under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court accepted the legitimacy of prior counsel accounts and considered the spirit of the Victims Bill of Rights, 1995 in fixing the self-representation component.

Pre-judgment interest at five percent was ordered from August 1, 2001, except on the future care special damages award.

On a family law motion concerning interim support and the proposed sale of the matrimonial home, the court used the applicant's 2014 line 150 income, subject only to deduction of a $12,000 car allowance, to calculate support.

The court rejected the position that dividend income accumulating but not paid out should be excluded, finding it constituted available income for support purposes.

Monthly spousal support, summertime child support, and a 60% contribution to the child's s. 7 expenses were ordered effective July 1, 2015.

The request for an immediate sale of the matrimonial home was dismissed, and arrears issues were left to the trial judge.

The plaintiff sought a declaration arising from a 50/50 partnership agreement to purchase an investment property.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff had agreed to withdraw in exchange for the return of his share of the deposit.

The court rejected that position on the evidence, finding it improbable that the plaintiff would abandon a lucrative venture and concluding that the surrounding circumstances supported the plaintiff's account.

The court granted a declaration that the plaintiff held a 50 percent ownership interest in the property, subject to payment of an amount to be determined by the local Referee, including assessment of purchase and carrying costs.

The applicant sought exclusion of evidence obtained after police entered his home following an emergency report that his young child had wandered onto a major roadway.

The court held the initial entry and protective sweep were authorized under the common law police duty framework applied in emergency child safety situations, but found later Charter breaches when the applicant was detained and questioned without being advised of his right to counsel and when the search continued after the focus shifted to criminal investigation.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework, the court found the breaches were not sufficiently serious or impactful to justify exclusion.

The application to exclude the grow operation evidence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on an over‑80 impaired driving charge.

The trial judge had found breaches of s. 8 of the Charter on the basis that the officer failed to prove calibration of the roadside screening device and failed to articulate reasonable grounds for a breath demand, and excluded breath test evidence under s. 24(2).

The appeal court held that proof of calibration is not required for reasonable grounds following a roadside fail and that the officer repeatedly articulated his belief that the offence had been committed.

The court further held that the trial judge failed to properly apply the three‑part analysis under R. v. Grant when excluding the breath evidence.

The breaches, if any, were minor and the societal interest in adjudicating impaired driving offences strongly favoured admission of the breath tests.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired operation of a motor vehicle, arguing that the trial judge improperly relied on a roadside statement by the accused to explain erratic driving observed by police.

The reviewing court assumed, without deciding, that the trial judge may have made improper use of the statement.

However, the Crown failed to meet the heavy burden of demonstrating that any such error could reasonably have affected the verdict.

The evidence of impairment was equivocal and key alleged indicators were not supported by cruiser video evidence.

The acquittal was therefore affirmed.

The applicant sought appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to pursue a summary conviction appeal from convictions for obstructing police and breach of probation.

The trial judge had relied primarily on circumstantial documentary evidence linking the accused to a rented vehicle involved in the incident after assigning limited weight to tainted identification evidence.

The court considered whether the proposed grounds of appeal were arguable and whether the interests of justice required appointed counsel.

The court found the trial judge had properly addressed identification deficiencies and reasonably relied on the rental documentation to infer identity.

Concluding the proposed appeal lacked arguable merit, the court dismissed the application for appointment of counsel.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaim relating to the enforceability of a commercial lease for premises in Mississauga.

The plaintiff argued the counterclaim was barred by the two-year limitation period.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance on summary judgment in Hryniak v. Mauldin and subsequent appellate interpretation, the court held that granting partial summary judgment would risk inconsistent findings and would not resolve the litigation as a whole.

The court concluded that the matter should proceed to trial on a full record, particularly given potential discoverability issues affecting the limitations defence.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The court sentenced an offender for firearm and drug trafficking offences arising from the operation of a large marihuana processing and distribution enterprise.

The offender possessed a handgun with accessible ammunition in his bedroom at the location used for drug processing and packaging.

The court held the firearm functioned as a tool of the drug trade and imposed consecutive sentences for the drug trafficking and firearm offences, rejecting the joint submission for a fully concurrent global sentence.

The offender’s request for additional credit based on alleged stringent bail conditions was denied.

The court granted a DNA order and ordered forfeiture of large sums of cash and 70% of the offender’s residence as offence‑related property and proceeds of crime.