J.R. McIsaac

The court sentenced an offender for firearm and drug trafficking offences arising from the operation of a large marihuana processing and distribution enterprise.

The offender possessed a handgun with accessible ammunition in his bedroom at the location used for drug processing and packaging.

The court held the firearm functioned as a tool of the drug trade and imposed consecutive sentences for the drug trafficking and firearm offences, rejecting the joint submission for a fully concurrent global sentence.

The offender’s request for additional credit based on alleged stringent bail conditions was denied.

The court granted a DNA order and ordered forfeiture of large sums of cash and 70% of the offender’s residence as offence‑related property and proceeds of crime.

During a murder jury trial, the Crown applied to admit a witness’s videotaped police statement and prior preliminary inquiry testimony as substantive evidence under the K.G.B. framework after the witness recanted portions of his earlier account and repeatedly claimed memory loss while testifying before the jury.

The court found the necessity requirement satisfied because the witness adopted an obstructive stance and attempted to shield the true events despite earlier detailed accounts of the shooting.

Reliability was established through procedural safeguards including a videotaped interview, oath, warnings regarding penal consequences for false statements, and the witness’s availability for cross‑examination.

Additional corroborative circumstances, including forensic evidence and the witness’s belief that surveillance cameras captured the event, further supported reliability.

The court admitted both the videotaped statement and the preliminary hearing evidence as substantive evidence before the jury.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased concerning his belief that the accused had orchestrated a prior theft of his money.

The defence objected on the basis that the statements would introduce prejudicial and untestable allegations of bad character.

The court held that the deceased’s statements were admissible as evidence of the declarant’s state of mind and were relevant to establishing potential motive and context for confrontation between the deceased and the accused.

However, the court limited the scope of admissibility to the deceased’s belief itself and excluded statements recounting the accused’s alleged response about the stolen money.

The jury would receive a limiting instruction restricting the use of the evidence to motive rather than proof of bad character.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the accused brought a mistrial application after concerns were raised that some jurors appeared to have difficulty staying awake during lengthy testimony related to a successful K.G.B. application involving a recanting eyewitness.

Following an inquiry of the jury, one juror acknowledged momentarily nodding off while others reported occasional difficulty maintaining focus.

The court held that a mistrial is a remedy of last resort requiring proof of concrete prejudice to the trial process.

The evidence did not establish that jurors missed significant evidence or that the integrity of the proceedings had been fatally compromised.

The application for a mistrial was therefore dismissed.

Following a jury conviction for second degree murder, the court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility under s.745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought an 18‑year period while the defence argued for the statutory minimum of 10 years.

The court considered the offender’s criminal record, involvement in drug trafficking, illegal firearm possession, and conduct surrounding the offence, including returning to deliver a final fatal shot after the victim had fallen.

Although the victim had been the initial aggressor and armed with knives, the offender’s criminal lifestyle and aggravating conduct warranted a significant increase above the minimum.

A period of 16 years of parole ineligibility was imposed.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit a lengthy videotaped police interrogation of the accused.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to oppressive interrogation tactics and further alleged a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter based on a police comment suggesting consulting counsel would be a mistake.

Applying the confessions rule and relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court found that statements made during the first portion of the interview were voluntary but that later portions raised concerns about potential oppression after repeated assertions of the right to silence and fatigue.

The court also found no Charter breach arising from the officer’s comment.

Only the portion of the statement up to 1:05 a.m. was ruled admissible.

Following sentencing for offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court addressed the Crown’s request for forfeiture of property seized in connection with the offence, including cash, a cellular phone, and a motor vehicle.

The offender contested only the forfeiture of the vehicle.

The court found the circumstances materially similar to those considered in persuasive appellate authority and concluded that forfeiture was appropriate under s. 16 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The vehicle was therefore ordered forfeited along with the other seized items.

An insolvent developer applied for interpretation of a subdivision agreement and standby letter of credit securing municipal works in a development project.

The developer argued that the municipality could use proceeds from the letter of credit to pay unsecured trade creditors who had supplied goods and services before the developer’s insolvency.

The court held that the agreement limited the municipality’s entitlement to prospective costs associated with completion or rectification of municipal works and did not authorize retroactive payment to unsecured creditors.

The court rejected reliance on the autonomy doctrine governing letters of credit, noting that permitting such retroactive payments would be fraudulent where the bank had not secured those obligations.

The application for the requested interpretation was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for flight from a peace officer under s. 249.1 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the trial judge reached an unreasonable verdict by failing to properly consider his evidence denying criminal intent and by failing to address a defence of reasonable excuse.

The appellate court held that the only available defence raised by the evidence was absence of mens rea, as the record contained no evidence supporting a reasonable excuse.

The court found that the trial judge correctly understood that the Crown was required to prove an intention to evade police beyond a reasonable doubt and reasonably rejected the appellant’s testimony as contradictory and fabricated.

The trial judge’s credibility findings and conclusions were supported by the evidentiary record.

Following sentencing for multiple sexual offences, the court initially imposed an incorrect Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order of 20 years.

Because the offender had been convicted of more than one designated offence, the Criminal Code required a mandatory lifetime SOIRA order.

The Crown brought an application to correct the error after sentencing.

The court held that although s. 490.012(4) of the Criminal Code did not apply, the court possessed inherent jurisdiction to correct a patent error relating to a statutorily mandated ancillary order.

The court issued a fresh lifetime SOIRA order and awarded the offender $200 in costs for compelled additional court attendances caused by the prosecutorial and judicial error.

The accused applied to exclude evidence obtained following a roadside stop and arrest, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

Police stopped a rented minivan under Highway Traffic Act authority during a proactive burglary investigation and detected the odour of fresh marihuana emanating from the vehicle, leading to arrest and discovery of large quantities of marihuana, cash, and a firearm through subsequent searches.

The court held the traffic stop was lawful and not an arbitrary detention, and that the odour of fresh marihuana together with surrounding circumstances provided reasonable grounds for arrest.

Searches of a box, the vehicle, the residence, and the accused were found lawful or supported by valid warrants, though a brief delay in providing right-to-counsel advice constituted a modest s.10(b) breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the evidence and allowed the prosecution to proceed.

The accused brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code seeking to admit evidence of prior consensual sexual activity with the complainant involving a “threesome” that occurred approximately three years before the alleged sexual assault.

The defence argued the prior incident supported an honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The court held that the proposed evidence, while relating to a specific instance of sexual activity, was not relevant to a live issue at trial because the competing positions were complete consent versus incapacity, leaving no air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief.

The court further found that the limited probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice, including undermining the complainant’s dignity and inviting impermissible reasoning.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought declarations that a trail crossing several private properties constituted a public highway, or alternatively an access road protected under the Road Access Act.

The court examined historical evidence, municipal expenditures on maintenance, and longstanding public use to determine the legal status of the roadway.

It held that the road became a public highway through implied dedication and municipal acceptance, applying the principle of “once a highway, always a highway.” The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the road had a 66‑foot width and instead determined the historical roadway width was 1.4 metres.

Barriers placed by neighbouring landowners preventing passage were ordered removed.

The offender was sentenced following convictions for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

Evidence established that the offender had operated a large-scale marijuana trafficking enterprise for approximately fourteen years, distributing significant quantities and accumulating substantial illicit proceeds.

The sentencing court treated the offender’s admissions of long-term trafficking as aggravating circumstances under s.725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and emphasized denunciation and general deterrence given the scale and organized nature of the operation.

Charter breaches identified during pre‑trial proceedings were found to be technical and did not justify sentence reduction.

The court imposed a penitentiary sentence, consecutive terms for the offences, a substantial fine to strip illicit gains, and a victim surcharge.

A contractor brought a construction lien claim for unpaid amounts relating to tile installation in a newly constructed home, while the homeowners counterclaimed for damages arising from defective workmanship.

The court considered whether the contractor could continue the action under the Business Names Act, whether the work met the contractual requirement of being completed in a workmanlike manner according to standard practices, the proper measure of damages, and whether the lien was filed in time.

Leave to maintain the proceeding under the Business Names Act was refused due to failure to establish the statutory requirements and evidence that the defendants had been misled.

The court found portions of the tile installation defective, particularly the kitchen floor due to inadequate bonding, and awarded substantial damages on the counterclaim for full replacement of the floor and related components.

The lien was also found to have been filed outside the statutory time limit.

Following a successful trial in which the plaintiff established that a property transfer between a debtor and her parents constituted a fraudulent conveyance designed to defeat a creditor, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court held that the defendant’s litigation conduct, including implausible testimony denying the fraudulent nature of the conveyance, justified elevated costs.

The court also considered whether costs could be awarded against non-parties who had funded and effectively controlled the litigation.

Applying principles governing non‑party costs liability, the court found that the parents were the real parties behind the defence and that it was just to hold them responsible.

Costs of $60,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST were awarded against the defendant and the non‑party parents.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board affirming a Committee of Adjustment's authorization of minor variances for a neighbouring commercial property.

The applicant argued the Board member erred in law by failing to properly address the tests for a 'minor' variance, 'desirability', and 'impact' under s. 45(1) of the Planning Act, and that the reasons were insufficient.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no errors of law, that the Board member's reasons were adequate, and that the matter did not raise an issue of general importance warranting the court's attention.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment that denied them a $10,000 fee for preparing a Professional Marketing Package to obtain mortgage financing.

The trial judge found the appellants were acting as unregistered mortgage brokers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants were 'carrying on business' as mortgage brokers and that it would be contrary to public policy to allow an unregistered broker to enforce payment of a fee under the Mortgage Brokers Act.

The applicant hospital sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision upholding a grievance by a social worker (OPSEU member) who claimed permanent status in a Court Support Worker position.

The position had been temporarily vacated by a nurse (ONA member) who took a short-term acting manager role.

The Divisional Court found the arbitrator's decision unreasonable because he reversed the onus of proof, ignored compelling evidence that the assignment was temporary, and breached natural justice by failing to give notice of the hearing to the ONA.

The arbitrator's decision was set aside and the matter remitted to a new panel.

The tenant brought a motion to set aside the dismissal of her appeal, which had been dismissed after she failed to attend a hearing.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the tenant had done nothing for two months despite knowing the landlord was seeking a dismissal.

The tenant was ordered to vacate the property and pay fixed costs of $3,200.