Joseph M. Fragomeni

Daniel Currant pleaded guilty to production of cannabis marihuana and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Police seized over 1 kg of cocaine, nearly 4 kg of cutting agent, and 351 cannabis plants.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity and high purity of cocaine, and mitigating factors such as his guilty plea, lack of prior record, and health issues.

Despite his cocaine addiction, the court found his motivation was financial gain.

The Crown sought 8 years, the defence 4 years.

The court imposed a sentence of six years in a penitentiary, less four months credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in a total remaining sentence of five years and eight months.

Orders for forfeiture, s. 109 prohibition, and DNA were also issued.

The plaintiffs, minority shareholders, commenced an action against the defendants for declarations and orders related to oppressive conduct, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of funds from the sale of a pharmacy.

The defendants were noted in default, and the matter proceeded as an undefended trial.

The court found the defendants' conduct to be oppressive and a marked departure from ordinary standards of decent behaviour, supporting an award of punitive damages.

The plaintiffs were granted declarations of shareholding, trust, and fiduciary duty, and awarded their share of the sale proceeds, punitive damages, and costs.

The Respondent husband brought a motion to vary a temporary spousal support order and to seek child support from the Applicant wife.

The court dismissed the motion to vary spousal support, finding that the issue was res judicata as the arguments had been previously considered by Justice Trimble, and in any event, no material change in circumstances had been established.

The court emphasized the high onus required to vary interim orders.

The Applicant wife agreed to pay child support for the two children of the marriage, and an order was issued for $266 per month, without prejudice to future adjustments at trial.

The plaintiffs sought orders for payment of funds into court and a vesting order against the defendants' property (26 Merrittonia Street) to secure potential judgment for breach of contract related to a failed real estate transaction for a different property (14 Annual Circle).

The plaintiffs had also registered a Caution against the Merrittonia property.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to discharge the Caution, declare no plaintiff interest in the property, and seek leave to issue a third-party claim.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, finding they had no interest in the Merrittonia property to support a Caution or vesting order, and their claim was for damages, not a specific fund.

The court granted the defendants' cross-motion, ordering the discharge of the Caution and granting leave for the third-party claim.

This case involved a dispute between parents (Plaintiffs) and their son (Defendant) regarding financial advances made for a Jeep purchase, a property in Melancthon, and the purchase and renovation of 217 Victoria Street, Shelburne.

The Plaintiffs sought repayment of these funds, asserting they were loans, while the Defendant contended some advances were gifts and claimed compensation for his renovation work on 217 Victoria Street.

The court found that the advances for the Jeep and 217 Victoria Street were repayable loans.

However, it was not satisfied that the funds advanced for the Melancthon property were definitively loans, acknowledging the possibility they were gifts.

The Defendant's claim for renovation work was largely dismissed due to insufficient evidentiary support and lack of certainty in quantification.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding them liable for selling a defective used tractor to the respondent.

At trial, the deputy judge relied heavily on an unsworn, unsigned letter from a mechanic who did not testify, to conclude the tractor was unsafe.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the trial judge erred in law by accepting the hearsay letter for the truth of its contents without affording the appellants the opportunity to cross-examine the author.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, Fattah Abdel, was charged with possession of money obtained by an indictable offence and transferring money with intent to conceal or convert it, knowing it was derived from a designated offence, contrary to section 462.31(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that Abdel received illicit funds totaling $348,751.57, which were obtained through an email hacking fraud committed against Air Palace and Rotor Maxx.

Abdel deposited these funds into a company account he controlled and then quickly dispersed them via bank drafts to pay off his personal and business debts.

He provided conflicting and false explanations for the funds' origin to his business partners.

The court found Abdel guilty on both counts, concluding that he either had actual knowledge that the funds were illicit or was wilfully blind to their illicit nature, given the unusual transaction, his desperate financial circumstances, and his deceptive actions.

This case involved two consolidated actions concerning construction and renovation work.

Northridge Homes Ltd. sued Manjit and Harjinder Sandhu for payment and a construction lien.

Separately, subcontractors CAAJ Construction Inc., 225043 Ontario Inc., and 2142043 Ontario Inc. sued the Sandhus and Northridge for payment and liens.

The court found a valid contract between Northridge and the Sandhus, and that Northridge's lien was timely and valid.

Most of the Sandhus' claims for set-off due to deficiencies were rejected due to lack of proof and failure to plead them.

The court awarded Northridge $32,401.84 and the subcontractors their full claimed amounts, declaring valid liens against the Sandhus' property.

The plaintiff condominium corporation commenced an action in Small Claims Court for unpaid common expenses.

It subsequently sought to transfer the action to the Superior Court of Justice to claim additional relief, including an oppression remedy, a compliance order, and damages exceeding the Small Claims Court monetary limit.

The defendants opposed the transfer, arguing the plaintiff had already taken significant steps in the Small Claims Court.

The court granted the motion, finding that despite the delay, the plaintiff should be permitted to pursue its claim in its full dimensions, though the defendants were awarded costs thrown away.

The plaintiff, a wholesale art supplier, brought an uncontested trial against the defendant for failing to return 21 consigned paintings or remit the proceeds of their sale.

The defendant, who had been noted in default, admitted via email that he no longer had the art or the funds.

The court found the defendant liable for breach of trust, misappropriation of trust funds, fraudulent conversion, and civil fraud.

The plaintiff was awarded $170,000 in general damages, $10,000 in punitive damages, and $7,500 in costs, along with declarations of ownership and orders for the return of the art and an accounting.

Former patients of the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health Centre in Penetanguishene brought a multi-party action against two physicians and the Crown for breach of fiduciary duty, battery, negligence, and violations of international law norms relating to torture and cruel treatment.

The patients alleged they were subjected to intensive therapy programmes involving psychological and physical torture between 1966 and 1983.

The motions judge granted partial summary judgment for breach of fiduciary duty and dismissed the defendants' motions to dismiss the action as statute-barred or barred by laches.

The appellants appealed, arguing procedural fairness violations and that the action was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred in granting partial summary judgment without proper notice and opportunity for the defendants to respond, and set aside those paragraphs.

The court remitted the matter for trial, finding genuine issues requiring trial on limitation and laches issues.

CUMIS General Insurance Company appealed a trial judgment finding that an unlicensed driver operated the respondent's vehicle without consent, either express or implied.

CUMIS argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings and failed to establish the tort of negligent entrustment.

The appellate court rejected all of CUMIS's arguments, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual conclusions.

The court also held that even if negligent entrustment exists in Ontario, it could not be established given the finding of no implied consent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim for wrongful (constructive) dismissal and related relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the employment agreement was frustrated, rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding workplace harassment and his inability to return to work within a reasonable time.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that he was constructively dismissed due to termination of employment benefits, finding that the benefits terminated on the same date the employment contract was frustrated.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that granted far-reaching relief to the respondent regarding amounts allegedly owing on a 1994 second mortgage and a 1997 judgment on the covenant.

The Court of Appeal found that the relief granted by the motion judge could not stand.

The court determined that the amounts were duplicated in the judgment, the underlying second mortgage was extinguished by power of sale proceedings, and the debt was extinguished by the bankruptcies of the deceased and one of the defendants.

The court also rejected the finding of fraudulent conveyance and found the claim regarding farm equipment proceeds to be statute-barred.

The only claim that survived was for child support arrears and unpaid costs awards relating to child support.

On appeal from a motion judge's decision to enforce a settlement agreement, the appellants challenged the motion judge's finding that a verbal settlement agreement had been reached between the respondent's counsel and the litigation administrator of the deceased defendant's estate on February 9, 2016.

The appellants argued that the motion judge erred in failing to apply Rule 49.09, in finding there was no genuine issue regarding intent to create a legally binding agreement, and in failing to consider whether the settlement should be enforced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Rule 49 did not apply as no Rule 49 offers were served, that the motion judge's finding of a binding agreement was supported by detailed reasons with no palpable and overriding error, and that the motion judge had fully considered all relevant factors regarding enforcement.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence under ss. 7, 11(d), and 24 of the Charter due to lost police evidence, including a photo line-up video and photos/videos of a search warrant execution at his apartment.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a stay or exclusion of evidence was not warranted.

Instead, the court held that less intrusive remedies were appropriate, such as prohibiting the Crown from arguing the applicant was identified in the photo line-up and allowing the absence of the search evidence to be considered in assessing reasonable doubt.

The Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert in fingerprint and palm print analysis and comparison using the ACE-V method.

The defence opposed the qualification, arguing that fingerprint analysis is not a science and that the ACE-V method is susceptible to confirmation bias and lacks fixed standards.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey frameworks for the admissibility of expert evidence.

The court found that the officer's extensive training and experience met the threshold requirements and that the evidence was sufficiently beneficial to the trial process to warrant admission, noting that defence concerns could be addressed in cross-examination.

During a trial for importing cocaine, the Crown sought to introduce expert evidence from a detective regarding drug paraphernalia and cash seized from the accused's residence.

The defence objected, arguing the evidence was irrelevant and constituted prejudicial bad character evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice ruled the evidence admissible, finding that tools of the drug trade are logically relevant to the charge of importing large quantities of cocaine, as importers typically do so for distribution.

The court concluded the evidence was highly probative and its admission would not lead to improper propensity reasoning.

The applicant sought to quash a search warrant and exclude evidence seized from his residence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misleading information and material non-disclosure.

The Crown alleged the applicant was the primary overseer for three shipments of cocaine intercepted at Pearson International Airport.

The reviewing judge applied the Garofoli standard, excising erroneous information and assessing the totality of the remaining evidence.

The court concluded that despite some omissions, the issuing justice could have found reasonable and probable grounds to authorize the warrant.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain a search warrant for his residence in a drug importation case.

The applicant argued there was no reasonable basis to believe evidence would be found at his residence and sought to cross-examine on surveillance, misrepresentations, lack of connection to the residence, and travel patterns.

Applying the Garofoli test, the court found the applicant established a reasonable likelihood that limited cross-examination would elicit testimony of probative value.

The court granted leave to cross-examine the affiant on specific, restricted areas identified by the applicant.