J. Douglas Cunningham

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment fixing time-limited spousal support at $550 per month.

The wife, who was qualified in Early Childhood Education, refused to seek employment in her field, instead pursuing a lengthy and unrealistic educational program to become a teacher.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the time limit, as the husband should not bear the costs of an unrealistic educational program.

The quantum was also upheld, as the parties were in similar after-tax positions and the wife had exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The respondent, an 80-year-old woman, slipped and fell on an icy municipal sidewalk after disembarking from a city transit bus.

She sued the appellant city in both negligence and breach of contract.

The trial judge found the negligence claims statute-barred but allowed the contract claim, holding that section 266 of the Insurance Act did not preclude it.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while section 266 does not automatically foreclose genuine actions in contract where a motor vehicle is merely incidental, the respondent's claim was essentially a disguised negligence claim.

As there was no independent contractual obligation imposing liability, the action was statute-barred and the appeal was allowed.

The appellant housing co-operative appealed a decision dismissing its application to evict the respondent for breaching its lock and pet by-laws.

The trial judge had dismissed the application on the basis that the by-laws were unreasonable.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and erred in principle by failing to defer to the democratically enacted by-laws of the co-operative.

The Court held that absent bad faith or overwhelming unreasonableness, courts should not substitute their views for those of a co-operative's membership.

The appellant appealed an order made on a motion to transfer an action to the Small Claims Court.

The motion judge had ordered that the successful party at trial would have their costs of the action to the date of transfer in the cause.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order, finding that the motion judge lacked jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act to order costs payable in another court or to fetter the discretion of the Small Claims Court trial judge regarding costs.