Janet M. Simmons

The appellant appealed from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board holding that he continued to pose a significant threat to the safety of the public and ordering his detention in a medium secure unit.

The appellant argued the Board erred by not ordering a further review within six months and by keeping him in a medium secure unit despite his progress.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the treating psychiatrist did not definitively recommend a six-month review and the Board's decision to maintain medium security was reasonable given ongoing concerns about elopement and potential reoffending.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge misapprehended evidence regarding his continued abuse of a victim after being released from jail for a similar offence.

The appellant also argued the judge failed to give proper weight to an expert report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the sentencing judge erred as alleged, the overall sentence imposed was fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, challenging the trial judge's finding regarding his criminal responsibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's determination that the appellant was not criminally responsible.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the trial judge.

The appellant appealed an order striking her statement of claim against the university and its officials for negligent advice.

The motion judge found the claim was in pith and substance an academic dispute.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the negligence claim regarding advice on deregistration was part and parcel of the academic dispute.

The court declined to transfer the proceeding to the Divisional Court for judicial review.

The respondents' cross-appeal was allowed to amend the motion judge's order, which had inappropriately fettered the Divisional Court's discretion to consider the defence of delay.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing an application under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The parties agreed that the matter needed to be remitted to a trial judge for a proper hearing under section 20(4) of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against his stepson, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her findings of guilt and in rejecting expert psychiatric evidence that suggested his risk could be managed in the community under a long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly assessed the risk management evidence and was entitled to conclude that the community supervision plan, including the Circles of Support and Accountability program, lacked the necessary resources to safely manage the appellant's risk.

The appellants appealed an order annulling their assignments into bankruptcy under s. 181 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion judge had found that the assignments were filed without obtaining leave as required by a prior receivership order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that an assignment in bankruptcy constitutes a 'proceeding' under the prior order and that the leave requirement did not offend the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States, arguing that the demanding state did not produce reliable evidence because the means of knowledge of a special agent were not disclosed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the record provided detailed information about the special agent's means of knowledge through electronic and physical surveillance, which demonstrated the reliability of the evidence and confirmed the appellant's identity.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for a declaration that a proposed visitation centre at Mount Pleasant Cemetery was not permitted under the City of Toronto Zoning By-Law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the proposed visitation centre, which includes a chapel, visitation rooms, and reception facilities, constitutes an 'associated use' under the by-law and falls within the definition of 'cemetery services' under the Cemeteries Act.

The appellant wife appealed and the respondent husband cross-appealed a trial judgment regarding the quantum and commencement date of spousal support, pre-judgment interest, and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding that the trial judge's awards were discretionary and disclosed no error in principle, misapprehension of evidence, or plain error.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that certain disputed claims, including a claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising from a long-term supply agreement, were subject to arbitration.

The appellant argued the claims were not referable to specific provisions of the agreement and that the application judge usurped the arbitral tribunal's role.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass the claims and that the application judge merely determined the claims were not clearly outside the scope of the arbitration clause.

Following a successful appeal by the City of Toronto on a single issue, the Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement.

Because several issues from the original application remained undetermined and were remitted to the Superior Court, the Court of Appeal set aside the application judge's costs order and reserved the costs of both the original application and the appeal to the judge determining the remitted issues.

An employee of the appellant's subsidiary was injured at work and settled a claim for $1,350,000.

The appellant sued its excess insurer for the $350,000 amount above its primary coverage.

The appellant argued the umbrella policy provided 'claims made' coverage, while the insurer argued an endorsement limited it to an 'occurrence' basis.

The trial judge found the endorsement superseded the general policy provisions and required an occurrence during the policy period.

The Court of Appeal upheld this interpretation, finding the endorsement operated as a coverage trigger rather than an exclusion, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision allowing an action to proceed in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by ignoring a British Columbia forum selection clause in the parties' contract and by failing to apply the real and substantial connection test.

Applying the test, the Court found the contract was made, performed, and breached in British Columbia, and there was no real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The action was stayed.

The appellants, a father and stepmother, appealed their convictions for the first and second degree murder of their five-year-old daughter, respectively.

The stepmother also appealed her 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that post-offence conduct (including dismemberment and concealment of the body) was properly admitted as evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's refusal to grant a judge-alone trial without Crown consent under s. 473(1) of the Criminal Code, affirming that the statutory requirement for a jury trial in murder cases should only be overridden in the clearest of cases where standard safeguards are insufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The stepmother's sentence was upheld due to the horrific nature of the crime and her egregious post-offence conduct.

The appellant was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of driving with a blood alcohol level over 80mg.

The trial judge found the appellant honest but rejected his evidence regarding alcohol consumption, relying on breathalyzer results.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons failed to meet the functional test in Sheppard, as they did not explain the basis for the conviction or whether the breathalyzer results were improperly used to assess credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Ministry of Labour appealed the acquittal of an employer charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act after a worker suffered a serious hand injury on a cold-rolling steel mill.

The employer argued it complied with the guarding requirement in section 25 of the Industrial Establishments Regulations by using a push bar and an operating control, and that the worker's deliberate failure to follow procedures caused the accident.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the push bar and operating control did not constitute a guard or 'other device' under the Regulation.

The Court further held that employee misconduct is not a defence to the strict liability offence of failing to guard a machine, and the employer failed to establish a due diligence defence.

A conviction was entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for robbery and unlawful confinement arising from a home invasion.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the complainant's eyewitness identification evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the reliability of the recognition evidence and supporting circumstantial evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the six-month sentence was lenient given the nature of the home invasion.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and his summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter motion for unreasonable delay and in assessing eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the 11 to 12 months of institutional delay did not violate section 11(b), noting that the Morin guideline is not a strict statute of limitations.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's reliance on eyewitness identification, finding the verdict was not unreasonable.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.