Janet M. Simmons

The appellant was convicted of having care and control of a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit.

He appealed to the summary conviction appeal court, which dismissed his appeal.

He then sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly applied the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, noting that although the appellant initially had no intention to drive, he was found in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition, and his intention had changed.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision quashing their committal to stand trial for manslaughter and instead committing them to stand trial for second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reviewing judge that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences from the evidence in favour of the defence.

The reviewing judge correctly assessed the sufficiency of the evidence to determine the appropriate remedy.

The Crown appealed an order quashing the validation of service ex juris on the respondent foreign corporations for summonses relating to fraud charges.

The Crown argued that mailing the summonses from Canada constituted service in Canada and that the Provincial Offences Act and Criminal Code authorized such service.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that in penal proceedings, a summons cannot be served outside Canada without express statutory authorization, which neither the Criminal Code nor the Provincial Offences Act provides.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was convicted in absentia in France for serious drug offences and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

He was subsequently convicted of unrelated drug offences in Canada.

France requested his extradition to serve his sentence.

The appellant appealed his committal order and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order, arguing that the delay in extradition proceedings constituted an abuse of process and that his surrender would violate his mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and application, finding no evidence of state misconduct or manipulation to support an abuse of process claim.

The Court also held that the Minister reasonably applied the Cotroni factors in determining that extradition was appropriate despite the possibility of domestic prosecution.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, challenging the trial judge's acceptance of the respondent's evidence regarding corporate costs, work orders, and profit margins.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was sufficient documentary evidence filed at trial to support the respondent's claim and the trial judge's findings.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment concerning a property boundary and adverse possession dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the boundary issue, properly accepted the respondents' expert evidence, and made no reversible error regarding adverse possession.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment, attempting to obstruct justice, and breach of recognizance.

On the scheduled trial date, the trial judge ruled that the appellant's counsel was no longer on the record due to a prior endorsement, forcing the appellant to proceed unrepresented.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in interpreting the prior endorsement and that counsel remained on the record.

The Court held that the appellant's right to be represented by counsel was violated, requiring a new trial without the need to demonstrate actual prejudice.

The appellants appealed an order permitting the respondents to amend their statement of claim to increase the prayer for relief, but denying the appellants the right to deliver a jury notice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the discretionary decision concerning terms imposed on the amendment of pleadings constitutes an interlocutory order, over which the court has no jurisdiction.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of sexual assault and four counts of administering a stupefying substance, receiving a global sentence equivalent to 10 years imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a breach of trust and that the sentence was outside the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to decide the breach of trust issue because the sentence was entirely fit given the significant aggravating features, including the 15-year span, multiple victims, and significant planning.

The appellant insurer sought contribution from the respondent insurer for a $2.75 million settlement paid to a student injured at a university judo club.

Coverage under the respondent's policy depended on whether the club was a 'member club' of the provincial judo association at the time of the accident.

Although the club had not paid its annual fees, the Court of Appeal found that under the association's by-laws, membership continues until formal suspension or expulsion.

Since no such action was taken, the club remained a member, and the respondent's policy provided coverage.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for administering a stupefying substance and sexual assault, as well as his 22-month sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to stay the charges due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, misapprehending expert toxicological evidence regarding the effects of GHB and alcohol, and finding that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no unreasonable delay and that the trial judge's findings regarding the complainant's incapacity to consent due to intoxication were supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of marijuana production, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity after police executed a search warrant at her residence.

The police breached the front door without knocking and announcing their presence, which the trial judge found violated s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the police acted in good faith and exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the evidence, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis.

The 15-month sentence was also upheld as fit for a large-scale grow operation.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision quashing a by-law that prohibited commercial parking lots and private parking enforcement agencies from issuing private parking tickets.

The application judge had found the by-law ultra vires, reasoning that trespassers are not 'consumers' under the consumer protection licensing power in s. 150(2) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge applied an overly restrictive interpretation of 'consumer protection'.

Applying a broad and purposive approach, the Court found that 'consumer' includes any person with whom a licensed business transacts, engages, or deals directly, including alleged trespassers from whom the business seeks to extract payment.

The City of Toronto appealed a declaration that its 2004 Amending By-Law, which prohibited commercial parking lots from issuing private parking tickets for unauthorized parking, did not apply to Imperial Parking Canada Corporation (Impark).

Impark argued that its signage created a contract whereby it consented to parking even if proper advance payment was not made, subject to a higher daily rate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that Impark's signs explicitly offered consensual parking, meaning the by-law, which only applied to vehicles parked without consent, did not apply to Impark's fee collection activities.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to admit fresh evidence on appeal regarding the arresting officer's misconduct and cocaine habit.

The Crown conceded that the fresh evidence met the Palmer test and could reasonably have affected the verdict by impacting the trial judge's assessment of the officer's credibility and motive.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of sexual touching and invitation to sexual touching of a child.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying solely on the 'unnaturally close' relationship between the appellant and the child to reject the appellant's evidence and find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court held the verdicts were unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and substituted verdicts of not guilty.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for an assault involving stomping on an unconscious complainant's face.

The trial judge had found that an independent witness's testimony regarding the stomping was uncontradicted.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by failing to consider the contradictory testimony of the appellant's brother.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's interpretation of a will regarding a house.

The testatrix's marriage contract provided that her husband could live in the house after her death but would make no claim against her estate.

The Court of Appeal found the will ambiguous and considered extrinsic evidence, concluding that the testatrix left the house in trust consistent with the marriage contract, but subject to that, the house fell into the residue for her son.

The appeal was dismissed, and each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

The Regional Municipality of Peel appealed a trial judgment finding it solely responsible for flood damage to the plaintiffs' homes caused by sewer backups during heavy rainfalls in 1995 and 1996.

The Region argued that the City of Brampton's storm sewer system was deficient and contributed to the flooding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the flooding was caused by a failure of the sanitary sewer system, which the Region took over responsibility for in 1974.

There was no evidence that Brampton's storm sewer system was negligently operated or caused the flooding.

The appellant pleaded guilty to production of marijuana and was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by giving minimal credit for his guilty plea and imposing a sentence that was a marked departure from similar cases.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the appellant maintained the drugs were for personal use, the operation lacked commercial indicia, and his prior drug record was limited to possession.

The court also found the trial judge erred in treating the guilty plea as an 11th-hour plea.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to 12 months' imprisonment.