James Stribopoulos

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm contrary to section 267(b) of the Criminal Code.

The offence involved a single forceful punch delivered without warning to the victim's face outside a bar, resulting in a fractured jaw in two places requiring surgery, a minor concussion, and significant physical, emotional, and financial harm.

The victim suffered two months with his jaw wired shut, was unable to speak or eat solid foods, lost employment, and required ongoing medical and dental treatment.

The accused was 19 years old at the time of the offence, had no prior criminal record, and demonstrated remorse and rehabilitation efforts post-arrest.

The court balanced aggravating factors (premeditated nature of the assault, severity of injuries) against mitigating factors (youth, clean record, genuine remorse, rehabilitation efforts) in determining an appropriate sentence.

The accused was charged with two impaired driving offences arising from a motor vehicle found stuck in snow on Highway 410.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence to establish that the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

The court found that while the inference that the accused was the driver was probable, the Crown failed to discharge its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alternative rational inferences existed, such as the accused being a passenger while the actual driver sheltered in a nearby tow truck.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm contrary to section 255(2) of the Criminal Code.

The offence occurred when the accused, with a blood alcohol level of 140 mg/100 mL, rear-ended a pizza delivery driver's parked vehicle, causing the victim to suffer severe injuries including traumatic lacerations to internal organs, broken ribs, a punctured lung, and a hemothorax.

The victim required multiple surgeries and blood transfusions, and suffered significant ongoing physical, psychological, and financial consequences.

The court imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment, balancing the serious nature of the offence and the need for general deterrence and denunciation against the accused's youth, good character, lack of prior record, genuine remorse, and guilty plea.

The accused, a 24-year-old Antiguan national, pled guilty to importing 4,322 grams of cocaine into Canada concealed in false-bottomed suitcases.

She travelled with her three-year-old daughter and co-accused Teesha Thomas, who was also carrying cocaine.

The accused was arrested at the border and has been in pre-trial detention since May 9, 2015.

The Crown sought seven years imprisonment; the defence sought five years.

The court imposed a sentence of 66 months (5.5 years) imprisonment, with credit for 223 days of pre-trial detention at an enhanced rate, resulting in a further 55 months to be served.

The court also imposed a DNA order, a 10-year firearms prohibition, and a $200 victim fine surcharge payable within two years.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the defendant drove into a commercial plaza parking lot in Brampton where he was stopped at a fixed-point sobriety check stop.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the detention, the grounds for the approved screening device demand, and the voluntariness of statements made in the breath room.

The court found the detention was authorized under the Highway Traffic Act and common law, the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption based on bloodshot eyes and odour of alcohol on the breath, and the defendant's statements were voluntary given the multiple cautions provided and the fair manner in which the breath technician conducted the proceedings.

Expert toxicological evidence established the defendant's blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving.

The defendant was found guilty.

A child protection matter involving three children where the Children's Aid Society sought disposition orders following findings that the children were in need of protection.

The mother's relationship with a person with a serious criminal history and allegations of child sexual abuse posed significant risk to the children.

The mother repeatedly violated court orders by facilitating contact between the children and this individual.

The court granted sole custody of two older children to the father and made the youngest child a Crown ward without access, prioritizing continuity of care and the child's long-term stability and permanence.

The Crown brought an application to recall Constable Bell to provide additional evidence regarding the location and circumstances of a vehicle stop.

The defence raised a Charter argument regarding arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, arguing the stop occurred on private property without legal authority.

The Crown sought to recall the witness to elicit evidence relevant to this Charter issue, which had not been specifically particularized in the defence's notice of application.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that while the defence was not at fault for failing to provide specific notice due to inadequate disclosure, it had an ongoing obligation to alert the Crown once the issue became apparent.

The court balanced procedural fairness to both parties and permitted the Crown to recall the witness to address the Charter claim.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging a violation of section 11(b) of the Charter (right to be tried within a reasonable time) and seeking a stay of proceedings.

The trial commenced on September 22, 2014, but was adjourned to February 26, 2015 due to underestimation of trial time.

The defendant's section 11(b) application was heard on February 26, 2015, and the court reserved judgment.

The application was dismissed on July 8, 2015.

The court found that the total delay of approximately 25 months should be apportioned as follows: delay subject to waiver (6 months), inherent time requirements (8 months and 1 week), actions of the defence (4 months), and institutional delay (7 months).

The institutional delay fell below established guidelines, and the defendant failed to establish actual prejudice resulting from the delay.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The trial addressed five key issues: whether dangerous driving was proven; whether the arrest and breath demand were lawful; whether the right to counsel was violated; whether evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter; and whether impaired driving was proven.

The court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving and excess blood alcohol concentration, but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, despite a blood alcohol concentration of 2.5 times the legal limit.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a RIDE spot-check on December 9, 2011, the defendant was arrested and provided breath samples showing blood alcohol concentrations well in excess of the legal limit.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 10(a), 10(b), and 8 of the Charter.

The court found that the defendant's Charter rights were violated and excluded all evidence obtained following the violations pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

Both charges were dismissed.

The offender was sentenced for sexually assaulting an unconscious, intoxicated friend and breaching a probation order.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender's prior criminal record, the extreme vulnerability of the victim, and the offender's unaddressed alcoholism.

A total sentence of 39 months' imprisonment was imposed, reduced by 19.5 months of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a net sentence of 19 months and 2 weeks.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results obtained through an approved screening device at the roadside and an approved instrument at the police division.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, arguing the officer lacked reasonable grounds to demand the roadside breath test and that the samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds for the initial demand but determined the Crown failed to establish that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable due to an unjustified twenty-minute delay at the roadside.

Without the statutory presumption of identity, the Crown could not prove the defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving, and the charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with multiple offences arising from a shooting at a residential home in Brampton on February 9, 2012.

Between 8 and 10 shots were fired into the Dos Santos family home using a restricted firearm belonging to the accused.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the accused's connection to a person with apparent motive (Z.A., who had been arrested after threatening the family) and his exclusive control over the firearm used.

The accused testified in his defence, denying involvement and suggesting his younger brother Danish may have been responsible.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as internally inconsistent and found him guilty of most charges, finding that the only rational inference from the circumstantial evidence was that the accused committed the shooting.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and breach of probation.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on eyewitness testimony that the accused was positioned on top of an unconscious woman in a park, DNA evidence showing the complainant's DNA on the accused's penis, and statements allegedly made by the accused.

The accused testified that his contact with the complainant was innocent and that her DNA came to be on his penis through a prank involving a tissue.

The court found the accused guilty, determining that the eyewitness evidence, the accused's incriminating statements, and the DNA evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had intercourse with the unconscious complainant.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the seizure of her breath samples on Charter grounds and argued that the samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the Crown discharged its burden of establishing reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, including the failed roadside screening device test.

The court also found that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant brought a Charter application challenging the admissibility of statements made during police interrogation.

The defendant claimed that the police violated his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact his lawyer of choice before questioning him.

The Crown argued there was no breach or, alternatively, that any breach should not result in exclusion of evidence.

The court found that the police failed to afford a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel of choice by placing only a single phone call and waiting less than half an hour on a Saturday night.

The court further found that any purported waiver of the right to counsel was invalid because the defendant was not provided with the required Prosper warning.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial commenced on January 13, 2014, and continued on April 16, 2014.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the total delay exceeded two years, only slightly more than nine months resulted from institutional or Crown delay, which fell within the Morin guidelines for the jurisdiction.

The court found that the defence was responsible for a fair amount of early delay, and while the accused suffered some prejudice in the form of stress and anxiety, this was insufficient to warrant a stay of proceedings.

The accused pleaded guilty to importing approximately 959 grams of cocaine into Canada, contrary to section 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The sentencing court was required to balance the extremely serious nature of cocaine importation with the unique circumstances of the Aboriginal offender, including his traumatic childhood marked by parental alcoholism and violence, his lifelong struggle with substance abuse, and his limited connection to his Aboriginal heritage.

The court applied the principles established in Gladue and Ipeelee, recognizing that while the offence was serious, the offender's level of culpability was sufficiently diminished by his Aboriginal background and circumstances to justify a sentence below the ordinary range of three to five years imprisonment.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

At trial, the defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of her right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found two distinct breaches of the defendant's right to counsel: a four-minute delay in informing her of her rights, and a more serious violation of her right to counsel of choice when police failed to disclose that a contact was attempting to arrange for a lawyer and instead rushed her to speak with duty counsel.

The court excluded evidence of the refusal to provide a breath sample under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the serious nature of the violations and their impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on the merits.

The court also dismissed the impaired driving charge, finding the admissible evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings based on a violation of his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from charge to scheduled trial was approximately 22.5 months.

The court found that the combined institutional delay and delay caused by Crown actions totaled 12.5 months, exceeding the Brampton guideline of 8-9 months by 3.5 months.

The court also found actual prejudice to the accused, including stress, anxiety, and significant financial hardship to his family resulting from the need to pay counsel twice due to the case not being reached on the first scheduled trial date.

The court granted the application and ordered a stay of proceedings.