James Stribopoulos

The accused was charged with procuring, advertising sexual services, receiving material benefit, and uttering threats.

A preliminary issue arose regarding the applicability of s. 276 of the Criminal Code to evidence of the complainant's past sexual activity.

The Crown argued s. 276 applied, asserting that the procuring charge implied a lack of consent, effectively making the sexual activity sexual assault (a listed offence under s. 276).

The defence argued s. 276 did not apply as none of the charged offences are listed in s. 276(1), nor are they predicate or included offences.

The court ruled that s. 276 was not applicable, distinguishing between "control" in procuring and the vitiation of consent required for sexual assault, and noting Parliament's deliberate exclusion of sexual services offences from s. 276(1) in recent amendments.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's assessment of evidence and the failure to find a violation of the appellant's s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search or seizure.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's factual findings regarding the officer's actions at a RIDE check-stop and concluding that a minor incursion into the vehicle by an officer to detect alcohol odour is a reasonable and lawful screening measure, not constituting an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.

This pre-trial ruling addresses whether the repeal of section 634 of the Criminal Code, which eliminated peremptory challenges in jury selection, operates retrospectively or prospectively.

The accused argued that the amendment affects a substantive right and should apply prospectively, allowing him to exercise peremptory challenges.

The Crown contended it was purely procedural and should apply retrospectively.

The court, acknowledging conflicting judicial opinions, found the elimination of peremptory challenges impacts a substantive right by removing the parties' ability to influence jury composition and enhance confidence in impartiality.

Consequently, the repeal was deemed to operate prospectively, permitting the accused to exercise peremptory challenges as his right vested before the repeal's effective date.

The accused was found guilty by a jury of two counts of importing cocaine and one count of conspiracy to import firearms.

The accused orchestrated the importation of eight kilograms of cocaine using couriers and conspired to import 40 to 50 handguns from the United States into Canada.

The court found numerous aggravating factors, including the accused's leadership role, the quantity of drugs and firearms, and a calculated profit motive.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of 16 years' imprisonment, reduced to 12 years and 10 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest bail.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the 41-month and 19-day delay between his arrest and the jury's verdicts violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court calculated the total delay and deducted periods of defence delay, including time before the scheduling of the preliminary inquiry and time resulting from an abandoned Garofoli application.

The court also found that exceptional circumstances, specifically a lack of judicial resources due to illness and a family death, justified a further 7.5-month deduction.

The net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, and the application was dismissed.

The applicant, an 18-year-old with no criminal record, sought a review of a detention order following his arrest for a gunpoint carjacking and firearms offences.

The reviewing judge admitted fresh evidence consisting of a more stringent release plan involving GPS monitoring and new disclosure weakening the Crown's case on the most serious charges.

The court found that the applicant's detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice under the tertiary ground and ordered his release on strict conditions, including house arrest and GPS monitoring.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and human trafficking offences, sought disclosure of police occurrence reports and statements related to four prior incidents the Crown intended to introduce as similar-fact evidence.

The Crown argued the materials were 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code, requiring the accused to bring a production application under s. 278.3.

The court held that because the Crown intended to use the evidence as part of its case, it was constitutionally obligated under Stinchcombe to disclose the materials without requiring a production application.

The applicant, a candidate in a federal election, sought an injunction to prevent the respondent municipality from enforcing its election sign by-law against him and from organizing candidates' debates without his participation.

The applicant argued that city staff were unlawfully removing his compliant signs.

The court dismissed the application, finding that exempting the applicant from the by-law would be untenable and unfair to other candidates, and that the prospect of the city organizing an exclusionary debate was highly speculative.

No costs were awarded.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment in an action arising from a failed real estate transaction.

The defendants, who had agreed to purchase the plaintiffs' home unconditionally, failed to close the transaction, alleging they were induced by a misrepresentation regarding the lot size.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding there was no misrepresentation and that the defendants simply regretted their purchase after a downturn in the real estate market.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs for damages representing the difference in sale price and carrying costs.

The applicant, an airport worker charged with conspiracy to import cocaine, brought an application under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained through wiretap authorizations and search warrants.

The applicant argued that the affidavits supporting the authorizations and warrants lacked reasonable and probable grounds and investigative necessity.

The court reviewed the authorizations and warrants, applying the Garofoli standard and amplifying the record where necessary.

The court found that the authorizations and warrants were validly issued and supported by sufficient grounds, including intercepted communications, surveillance, and informant information.

The application was dismissed.

The accused applied for the production of third-party records from a school board and a children's aid society relating to two complainants.

Having previously found the records likely relevant, the court proceeded to the second stage of the O'Connor application to determine whether production should be ordered.

Applying the principles from McNeil, the court balanced the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainants' privacy interests.

The court ordered the production of the records, subject to redactions for plainly irrelevant and highly sensitive personal information.

The accused, charged with historical domestic violence offences, brought an application under the common law O'Connor framework for the production of third-party records relating to two complainants.

The records were held by a school board and a children's aid society.

The court found that the accused met the first-stage threshold of demonstrating that the records were likely to be relevant to the complainants' credibility, given the unfolding of the allegations and the potential influence of a school social worker.

The court ordered the records produced for judicial inspection.

The accused, charged with four robberies, brought a pre-trial application to exclude text messages recovered from his cellphone.

The texts, exchanged with a co-perpetrator, discussed obtaining a vehicle and committing robberies.

The accused argued the texts were more prejudicial than probative, particularly one referencing a plan to rob a bank.

The court dismissed the application, finding the texts highly probative of identity and lacking any improper prejudicial effect.

Certain texts referencing uncharged drug offences were redacted on consent.

The plaintiff, Unique Lighting & Control Corp., sued Green Services Canada Ltd. and its officers, John Green and Patricia Green, for unpaid lighting supplies.

The individual defendants (John and Patricia Green) moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against them, arguing no basis for personal liability.

Unique Lighting, the responding party, also sought summary judgment against Green Services and John Green.

The court dismissed the claims against John Green and Patricia Green, finding no grounds to pierce the corporate veil, establish a breach of trust, or prove unjust enrichment.

However, summary judgment was granted in favour of Unique Lighting against Green Services for the outstanding debt of $51,239.00, plus prejudgment and post-judgment interest.

No costs were awarded due to the mixed results.

The applicant brought a motion for habeas corpus, alleging that the adjournment of her bail hearing to a later date violated her s. 11(e) Charter right to reasonable bail without just cause.

The Crown opposed, citing issues with conducting contested bail hearings in video remand court.

The court found that insufficient regard was paid to accommodating the applicant's request to proceed with a bail hearing on the day of the motion, and that her continued detention was not justified.

Exercising its inherent supervisory jurisdiction under the Charter, the court ordered the applicant's release on her own recognizance with conditions, finding that to do otherwise would breach her s. 9 and 11(e) Charter rights.

A mother (plaintiff) and daughter (defendant) were co-owners of two residential properties.

The plaintiff sought a declaration of sole ownership or a reduced interest for the defendant in one property, alleging unjust enrichment due to disproportionate contributions.

The defendant denied this, asserting joint ownership and an agreement for equitable expense division across both properties.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action, finding her account less credible and that she failed to establish the preconditions for unjust enrichment, as the division of expenses was based on an agreement and both parties benefited equally from property appreciation.

After trial, the offender was sentenced for possessing child pornography, with the accessing conviction conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle because both offences arose from the same wrongful conduct.

The court reviewed aggravating and mitigating factors, including the size and nature of the collection, dated related record, remorse, lengthy delay, supportive family, and absence of reoffending over nine years.

Applying the governing principles for child pornography sentencing, the court found the otherwise fit range to be six to eight months' imprisonment.

The court then modestly reduced sentence to 179 days to account for severe collateral immigration consequences to a long-term permanent resident, while maintaining proportionality.

Ancillary probation, s. 161, SOIRA, and DNA orders were also imposed.

The defendants, Krylov & Company and Devry Smith Frank LLP, successfully obtained summary judgment against the plaintiff, Zaka Ullah Khan, who had alleged fraud and conspiracy.

This endorsement addresses the costs of that motion and the action.

The court declined to award costs to Krylov & Company, finding their failure to provide the plaintiff with requested documents was instrumental in precipitating the unnecessary action, and instead ordered them to pay the plaintiff's disbursements.

Devry Smith Frank LLP, having no responsibility for the action's commencement, was awarded partial indemnity costs from the plaintiff.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude a loaded handgun discovered during a traffic stop.

The police officer claimed the stop was for driving without headlights, but the court rejected this evidence, finding the officer conducted an unlawful investigative detention based on a mere hunch.

The court found violations of the accused's rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the handgun and the officer's testimony under s. 24(2), emphasizing the deliberate nature of the police misconduct and the need to dissociate the justice system from such Charter infringements.

The plaintiff, Zaka Ullah Khan, initiated an action against two law firms, Krylov & Company and Devry Smith Frank LLP, alleging fraud and conspiracy regarding the settlement of his personal injury tort action.

The plaintiff claimed the actual settlement amount was higher than what he received and that the defendants misappropriated funds.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing an absence of evidence to support the plaintiff's claims.

The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no genuine issue for trial as the plaintiff's allegations were based on unsubstantiated beliefs and lacked evidentiary foundation.