James Stribopoulos

The accused was charged with importing and possessing child pornography after police intercepted a child sex doll and conducted a controlled delivery to his home, followed by the execution of a search warrant.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging multiple s. 8 breaches.

The court found that while the search warrant was validly issued, the police breached s. 8 by conducting the controlled delivery without judicial authorization, as it exceeded the implied license to knock.

Furthermore, the police deliberately disregarded the search warrant's specific instructions to enter through a south-facing basement door, instead entering through the front door, conducting a safety search of the entire multi-unit home, and searching the garage.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the evidence, emphasizing the need to dissociate from the police's deliberate disregard for the limits of their search warrant authority.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

She was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of her running vehicle after an argument with her boyfriend.

The trial judge found she failed to rebut the presumption of operation and that there was a realistic risk she would set the vehicle in motion.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge engaged in speculative reasoning and misapprehended the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were reasonable, grounded in the evidence, and that the reasons for judgment were adequate.

Three accused were tried for various drug-related offences following a controlled delivery of a package containing cocaine imported from Suriname.

The package was intercepted by the CBSA and picked up by Williams using fake identification.

Williams transferred the package to Allen, who fled from police.

Nwankwo was later arrested reaching into the trunk of Allen's car where the package was stored.

The court found Williams not guilty on all counts, as the Crown failed to prove he knew the package contained cocaine.

Nwankwo was found guilty of conspiracy to possess cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Allen was found guilty of conspiracy to import, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to possess, but not guilty of a separate possession charge relating to cocaine found in his residence.

The accused brought an application to sever charges of sexual assault and assault from charges of assault, mischief, and criminal harassment, all involving the same complainant.

The accused argued that trying the counts together would cause prejudice by inviting propensity reasoning.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the charges were factually and legally intertwined, the evidence was not complex, and a limiting instruction to the jury would adequately address any risk of prejudice.

The applicant brought a motion to compel the sale of a jointly owned property in the context of ongoing family litigation.

The respondent opposed the sale, arguing it would be contrary to the children's best interests and that she wished to purchase the applicant's interest if successful in her equitable claims at trial.

The court granted the motion, finding that the property was not the principal residence of either party, the applicant was incurring significant carrying costs, and the sale would not negatively impact the children.

The court ordered the property sold and the net proceeds paid into court.

The applicant, facing extradition to the United States on charges of human smuggling, applied for release on bail.

The United States alleged the applicant led a scheme to smuggle Indian nationals into the US from Canada.

The court found that the applicant failed to justify his release on the primary ground, as he posed a significant flight risk given his tenuous immigration status in Canada, lack of assets, and the strong case against him.

The court also found detention was necessary on the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and breaching a recognizance after a five-year-old child was found severely beaten in a wooded area.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's motive stemming from a deteriorating relationship with the child's mother, his opportunity to commit the crime, pattern bruising on the child matching the accused's shoes, and the child's DNA found under the accused's fingernails.

The court applied the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the accused committed the assault.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude two handguns found in his pockets during a search incident to arrest.

The arresting officer arrested the accused based on his association with a target of a firearms investigation and his departure from an apartment building shortly after tactical officers arrived to execute a search warrant.

The court found the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest, rendering the arrest unlawful and violating s. 9 of the Charter.

Consequently, the search incident to arrest violated s. 8.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the firearms under s. 24(2), finding the police conduct was negligent and significantly impacted the accused's liberty and privacy interests.

The accused, G.D., faced historical sexual abuse charges.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to the complainant, his niece, during two telephone conversations, without proving voluntariness under the confessions rule.

The accused argued the complainant was a "person in authority" because he believed she was a parole officer and could initiate criminal proceedings.

The court examined the "person in authority" requirement, particularly in light of R. v. Hodgson, and concluded that for the confessions rule to apply, the recipient of the statement must actually be an agent of the state or capable of influencing the prosecution, in addition to the accused's reasonable belief.

Since the complainant was not acting on behalf of investigating authorities, her status as a private citizen meant the confessions rule did not apply.

The Crown sought a pre-trial ruling on the admissibility of uncharged discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, A.N., who is charged with second-degree murder.

The evidence included A.N. selling marihuana to J.W. (the co-accused who testified for the Crown) on the days leading up to the homicide, and A.N.'s alleged participation in an earlier knifepoint robbery with J.W. The court ruled that evidence of marihuana sales was admissible as part of the narrative to explain the relationship and J.W.'s possession of the knife.

However, the court found the evidence of the earlier knifepoint robbery inadmissible, concluding its probative value was outweighed by its significant moral and reasoning prejudice, as it was not essential to the narrative and, if anything, tended to support the defence's position regarding mens rea.

The accused was charged with second degree murder following the death of his friend, who was found beaten to death in his rented room.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and the direct evidence of the accused's ex-wife, who testified that the accused confessed to the killing during a drunken phone call.

The court accepted the ex-wife's testimony, finding it corroborated by cell phone records and non-public details of the crime scene.

Despite evidence of the accused's intoxication, the court found he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder given the brutality of the assault and his subsequent actions to conceal the crime.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, moved for an injunction to block the impending sale of the corporation's sole real estate asset to a third party.

The plaintiff had previously initiated an oppression action against the majority shareholders and directors, alleging mismanagement and conflicts of interest.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the propriety of the sale.

However, the court dismissed the motion because the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm, as any potential losses were quantifiable and could be compensated through a damages award against the directors personally.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences against his estranged wife, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to elicit evidence that the complainant was having an extramarital affair.

The accused argued this evidence was necessary to explain why he ceased having a sexual relationship with her, contextualizing his defence.

The court held that evidence of the accused's belief that the complainant was having an affair was admissible as it was relevant to his credibility and inextricably interwoven with the narrative.

However, evidence of whether the affair actually occurred was inadmissible, as its probative value was marginal and substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect on the complainant's privacy and the proper administration of justice.

During a trial for attempted murder and aggravated assault, a key Crown witness refused to be sworn and testify.

The Crown brought an application under section 715(1) of the Criminal Code to admit the witness's testimony from the preliminary inquiry.

The accused opposed the application, arguing he did not have a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry because he subsequently obtained new impeachment materials.

The court held that the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine and that admitting the prior testimony would not occasion unfairness, provided the newly discovered impeachment materials were also admitted into evidence.

The Crown's application was granted subject to conditions.

The offender was convicted of two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after accelerating to 117 km/h in a 70 km/h zone and colliding with a left-turning vehicle.

The collision caused catastrophic, permanent traumatic brain injuries to a teenage passenger and serious injuries to the driver.

The Crown sought three years' imprisonment, while the defence sought six months.

The court weighed the profound impact on the victims against the offender's youth, lack of prior record, genuine remorse, and the fact that the victim driver's unsafe left turn contributed to the collision.

The offender was sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment and a three-year driving prohibition.

The accused, a taxicab driver, was charged with second degree murder after running over an intoxicated passenger with his minivan.

The incident was captured on a residential surveillance camera.

The accused testified that he accidentally struck the victim while looking for oncoming traffic.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence as irreconcilable with the video footage and internally illogical.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally drove his vehicle at the victim in anger and possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

Following a fifteen-day trial where the applicant was successful in her claims for spousal and child support, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant sought full recovery costs of $346,216.55 based on offers to settle that were more favourable to the respondent than the trial outcome.

The court found that the applicant's offers engaged Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules, entitling her to full recovery costs.

However, finding the claimed amount extraordinarily large, the court fixed costs at a fair and reasonable amount of $175,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the accused on a charge of first degree murder and committing him only for second degree murder.

The accused was alleged to have committed a drive-by shooting.

The reviewing judge found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the circumstantial evidence, which was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of planning and deliberation.

The application was granted, and the matter was remitted with a direction to commit the accused to stand trial for first degree murder.

The parties separated after a seven-year marriage.

The applicant sought child and spousal support, arguing the respondent's income should include substantial funds he regularly received from his grandfather's company.

The respondent argued the applicant was intentionally unemployed and that the funds were gifts.

The court imputed a part-time income of $18,000 to the applicant, finding she could work despite her childcare responsibilities for their autistic child.

The court imputed $246,000 annually to the respondent, finding the family gifts were a settled pattern that entrenched their lifestyle.

The court ordered significant ongoing support and arrears, vested the respondent's interest in the matrimonial home in the applicant to satisfy an equalization payment, and ordered a charge on the respondent's condominium as security for support due to his history of deceit and risk of absconding.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He argued that the police violated his right to counsel of choice under s. 10(b) of the Charter by failing to wait a reasonable amount of time for his preferred lawyer to call back and by improperly influencing him to speak with duty counsel instead.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court agreed, finding that the police failed to take reasonable steps to contact his counsel of choice and interfered with his right by suggesting he speak with duty counsel.

The court excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter, noting a systemic problem with police failing to respect the right to counsel of choice, and dismissed the charge.