James C. MacPherson

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault and sexual assault against his pregnant girlfriend.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's explanation that the contact was accidental on the assault charge.

On the sexual assault charge, the trial judge found the complainant's evidence was corroborated by a witness.

The appellate court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence of five years imposed upon conviction for fraud over $5,000.

The appellant argued that the sentence was excessive, particularly in light of civil penalties levied by the Canada Revenue Agency arising from the same events.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge was entitled to increase the sentence to reflect the appellant's history of fraud convictions, including two prior convictions for which he received three-year sentences each.

The court found that civil penalties levied against the appellant's company were of limited relevance to the criminal sentencing.

The appellant appealed a 17-year parole ineligibility period imposed upon his conviction for second degree murder.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge failed to properly consider that authorities had removed him from medication that was helpful to him, which contributed to his anti-social attitude culminating in the murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge expressly addressed this issue and concluded that the mitigating factors were greatly outweighed by numerous and serious aggravating factors.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice for conviction on charges including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a restricted firearm with readily accessible ammunition, break and enter with intent to steal a firearm, breach of an undertaking, and breach of a probation order.

The original global sentence was 5½ years less credit for 30 months served.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence too harsh, particularly given the appellant's age (19 years old), his substantial rehabilitative efforts while in custody, his genuine remorse, and his motivation to reunite with his young son.

The court reduced the global sentence to four years by reducing the consecutive sentence for break and enter with intent to steal a firearm from 30 months to 12 months.

The appellant appealed a conviction and sought to have a no-contact condition removed from his probationary term.

The condition prohibited him from contacting his mother, the victim of the offence.

The Court of Appeal held that it could not remove the condition without the victim's consent.

The victim did not respond to contact attempts.

The court advised the appellant that he could raise the issue with his probation officer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant abandoned his appeal against conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant did not attend the hearing of his sentence appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had confirmed his mailing address to which appeal materials were sent, but his phone number was out of service and he was not in custody.

In these circumstances, the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder in the death of Orin Felix and attempted murder of Trevor Hunter following an altercation between two groups outside a bar.

The appellant appeals on grounds relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct evidence and a corrective instruction regarding the appellant's testimony about a witness named Latoya Dejonge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's handling of the post-offence conduct evidence or the corrective instruction, and concluding that the trial remained fair despite some unfortunate judicial decisions.

The appellant appealed her sentence of 12 years for manslaughter in the stabbing death of her sister-in-law.

The appellant was tried on a charge of second-degree murder but was convicted of manslaughter.

The sentencing judge imposed a 12-year sentence, characterizing the offence as aggravated manslaughter.

The appellant, through duty counsel, challenged three factual findings made by the sentencing judge: that the appellant stabbed the deceased in the neck, that the stabbing would cause bodily harm, and that the deceased was holding her baby at the time of the stabbing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit and proper.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and marihuana, conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances, and participating in a criminal organization.

The principal issue on appeal concerned the admissibility of communications found on a Blackberry seized from a co-accused.

The trial judge had ruled the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Marakah, the Crown conceded the appellant had standing and that the seizure violated his Charter section 8 rights.

The appellate court applied the Marakah framework and determined the evidence must be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the serious breach of privacy rights and substantial impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated February 21, 2018, seeking an absolute discharge or a new hearing.

The appellant argued that he no longer posed a significant danger to public safety due to improved insight into his mental illness, medication compliance, and stable employment and housing.

However, the court found the Board's concerns about recent cocaine use were reasonable given the appellant's history of manic episodes preceded by cocaine use and associated medication non-compliance.

The court allowed the appeal on the basis of transcription errors in the Board's reasons, which confused the appellant with another hospital patient and relied on irrelevant material.

A new hearing was ordered to take place as the appellant's annual review hearing in February 2019.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation by a Superior Court judge and sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment concurrent on both counts, plus two years' probation, a lifetime weapons prohibition, a lifetime SOIRA order, and a DNA order.

The appellant appealed the convictions on four grounds: uneven scrutiny of witness credibility, improper application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn, failure to address the Crown's failure to call certain witnesses, and improper admission of similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed her sentence for abduction of a child in contravention of a court order.

The appellant had removed her twin children from school in violation of a court-ordered access schedule, driving aggressively to evade the complainant (the children's father).

She pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence.

On appeal, she argued the sentencing judge erred by considering her prior wrongdoing as an aggravating factor and by emphasizing general deterrence over her specific circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge was entitled to consider the appellant's course of conduct in determining whether a discharge would be contrary to the public interest, and was entitled to find that a conditional discharge was not appropriate given the aggravated manner of the offense.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of H.E. on a charge of sexual assault against his wife.

The trial judge had accepted the complainant's testimony regarding the assault but acquitted the accused based on a reasonable doubt about whether he possessed the required mens rea, citing factors including the complainant's delay in reporting and continued sexual relations with the accused.

The appellate court found that the trial judge committed reversible errors by considering an honest but mistaken belief in consent defence that was not raised at trial, by relying on a shared mistaken belief about marital rights that cannot form the basis for such a defence, and by considering factors that were irrelevant to the accused's state of mind.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his sentence for manslaughter following a guilty plea in the death of his 53-day-old son.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: that the sentencing judge unfairly minimized the mitigating effect of the guilty plea; that the judge unduly relied on the appellant's failure to disclose a head injury to medical personnel; that the judge misapprehended the agreed statement of facts regarding the force used; and that the judge erred in declining to award pre-sentence credit beyond the 1.5:1 ratio for harsh detention conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle and that the sentence was fit.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and using an imitation firearm in the commission of that offence.

He was sentenced to six months' incarceration for robbery and 12 months' consecutive for the firearm offence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on four grounds: the admissibility of dog tracking evidence, the trial judge's use of post-offence conduct evidence (flight from police), the trial judge's treatment of evidence regarding the appellant's intoxication, and a misapprehension of evidence regarding the appellant's location.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of sexual assault against his step-granddaughter.

The trial judge found that the appellant sexually assaulted the complainant on multiple visits over a nine-year period, characterizing the assaults as part of an ongoing course of conduct.

The complainant acquiesced to the appellant's demands out of fear and therefore did not consent.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by drawing a negative inference from the absence of medical evidence regarding the appellant's physical capability, and that the trial judge failed to apply the third step of the W.(D) test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellant Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge on the respondent who pled guilty to importing hashish contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The trial judge had found s. 6(3)(a) of the CDSA and its combined effect with Criminal Code s. 742.1(c) to be unconstitutionally overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, rendering the respondent eligible for a conditional sentence.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day and 18 months' probation.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that given the respondent's changed circumstances, time already served, and community service completed, reincarceration was not warranted, and requested the sentence be stayed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to time served, with the probation order remaining in effect.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and assault, as well as his sentence of life imprisonment with 17 years parole ineligibility.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence from Dr. John Bradford concluding that he suffered from severe treatment-resistant schizophrenia at the time of the offence and met the threshold for a not criminally responsible (NCR) defence under Criminal Code section 16.

The Court of Appeal rejected the fresh evidence, finding that while the diagnosis might be credible, Dr. Bradford's conclusion regarding moral wrongfulness was grounded in medical rather than legal definitions.

The court noted that the appellant's conduct before, during, and after the killing, as well as his own statements, were inconsistent with an NCR defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the 17-year parole ineligibility period was not found to be unfairly imposed or too harsh.

The appellant A.R. appealed his conviction on six counts of sexual assault, two counts of uttering threats, and two counts of assault arising from allegations of domestic violence against his ex-wife between 2011 and 2013.

He received a global sentence of four years.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and alleged differential scrutiny of witness testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and gave adequate reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence on each count.

The sentence appeal was not addressed as it was contingent on the conviction appeal being allowed.