75 total
Offender sentenced to time served (3 years) and 3 years probation for 31-year parental child abduction.
The offender pleaded guilty to abducting his 21-month-old son in 1987 in violation of a custody order and fleeing to the United States, where they lived under false identities for 31 years.
The mother had no knowledge of her son's whereabouts or well-being during this time.
The court accepted a joint submission for a sentence equivalent to three years in custody (time served) but rejected the proposed two-year probation term, imposing three years of probation instead to ensure the offender receives necessary counselling.
Cocaine evidence excluded under s. 24(2) due to unreasonable and degrading strip search violating s. 8.
The accused was arrested for drug trafficking and subjected to a strip search at the police station.
The accused brought an application to exclude the cocaine seized from his residence, arguing the strip search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.
The court found that the police failed to follow the Golden framework and their own policies, conducting the search in a non-private area and leaving the accused completely naked.
The court concluded this was a serious breach of s. 8.
Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the evidence, finding that the deliberate and cavalier police conduct outweighed the truth-seeking function of the trial.
A finding of racial profiling does not require proof that police officers deliberately lied.
The appellant was convicted of firearms offences following a traffic stop and arrest.
The primary issue on appeal was whether the stop and arrest were tainted by racial profiling, which would render the firearm evidence inadmissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
The trial judge found Charter breaches (ss. 8 and 9) due to an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds but admitted the evidence, concluding no racial profiling because he found the officers were not "lying" about their motivations.
The Court of Appeal (majority) held that the trial judge erred in applying the test for racial profiling by focusing on whether officers deliberately lied, failing to adequately consider unconscious bias.
A new trial was ordered.
The dissenting judge argued the trial judge correctly applied the law and considered all factors.
The court denied bail to a defendant charged with serious domestic violence and firearm offences.
The defendant, charged with multiple firearm and domestic violence offenses, was in a reverse onus bail hearing.
The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds, citing the serious nature of the allegations, the defendant's criminal record including prior domestic violence convictions and breaches of release orders, and the discovery of a loaded firearm.
The proposed supervision plan by the defendant's mother and grandmother was deemed insufficient given the defendant's history of non-compliance and the severity of the charges.
The court found a substantial likelihood of the defendant committing further offenses and that release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, despite COVID-19 concerns in custodial settings.
The defendant's application for bail was denied, and he was ordered detained.
A recidivist offender was sentenced to four years in custody for two masked convenience store robberies, while his co-accused received time served.
Akwasi Edusei and Tavoy Brown were sentenced for convenience store robberies.
Edusei was convicted of two robberies, disguise with intent, and possession of stolen property.
Brown was convicted of possession of stolen property and breach of court orders.
The court considered Edusei's extensive criminal record, the vulnerability of convenience store victims, and masked robberies as aggravating factors, with youth as the sole mitigating factor.
Brown's sentence was based on a joint submission.
Edusei received a global sentence of four years, with credit for pretrial custody including enhanced credit for lockdown conditions.
Brown received a 90-day concurrent sentence, largely covered by pretrial custody.
The court dismissed the accused's bail review application, finding that the proposed release plan and COVID-19 delays did not constitute a material change in circumstances.
The accused, Marvin Small, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging his continued detention by a Justice of the Peace.
He argued for a material change in circumstances based on the proposed addition of electronic monitoring, a new surety (KN), an increased monetary pledge from his girlfriend (TT), and trial delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The court found that neither TT nor KN were suitable sureties, rendering electronic monitoring ineffective.
The increased monetary pledge did not address the core concern of surety supervision.
Furthermore, the COVID-19 related delays were largely duplicative of arguments made at the initial bail hearing.
Consequently, the court found no material change in circumstances, dismissed the application, and maintained the accused's detention.
The court granted a bail review for an accused facing serious firearm charges, finding the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.
The applicant, A.F., sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds for serious firearm and drug-related offences.
The court found a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the extensive delay in the preliminary inquiry, the withdrawal of a more serious charge, and an enhanced release plan including electronic monitoring.
The court acknowledged the heightened risk to inmates from COVID-19 and the applicant's health concerns and period of unexplained segregation.
Balancing these factors against the seriousness of the charges and the applicant's history of non-compliance, the court was persuaded that the stringent release plan, coupled with electronic monitoring, would sufficiently address public safety and confidence in the administration of justice.
The bail review application was granted.
Bill C-75 amendments restricting preliminary inquiries do not apply retrospectively to an accused who has already elected.
The Crown brought a motion to vacate a preliminary inquiry scheduled for October 1, 2019, and to require the defendant to re-elect pursuant to amended Criminal Code provisions that came into force on September 19, 2019.
Bill C-75 fundamentally changed the preliminary inquiry regime by restricting preliminary inquiries to offences punishable by 14 years or more of imprisonment.
The defendant's offences did not meet this threshold.
The central issue was whether the new amendments applied retrospectively to cases already in progress or only prospectively to future cases.
The court held that the presumption against retrospective application applies, that the amendments affect substantive rights (the right to a preliminary inquiry and the right to elect), and that there was no clear legislative intent to rebut this presumption.
The Crown's motion was dismissed.
Three youths were convicted of robbing an escort using an imitation firearm based on eyewitness and circumstantial evidence.
Three young persons were charged with robbery with a firearm, use of an imitation firearm during robbery, and related offences arising from a September 28, 2017 armed robbery of an escort at the Holiday Inn in Oakville.
The Crown's case relied heavily on eyewitness testimony from the victim, corroborating evidence from an adult co-accused, hotel security video surveillance, cellular phone records and extraction reports, and a hearsay statement from a hotel guest.
The defence challenged the identification of the accused and the reliability of the Crown's witnesses.
The court found that the Crown established identity beyond a reasonable doubt through a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence, including credible eyewitness testimony, forensic cellular analysis, and video surveillance.
However, the court found reasonable doubt as to whether an actual firearm or an imitation firearm was used.
The court sentenced the offender to four years for heroin trafficking, staying fentanyl charges under Kienapple but treating fentanyl's presence as aggravating.
The defendant, Pankaj Bedi, was convicted of multiple drug trafficking and possession charges.
The court conditionally stayed fentanyl trafficking charges based on the Kienapple principle, as the Crown did not provide evidence of the quantity of fentanyl or the accused's knowledge of its presence.
The sentencing judge considered aggravating factors, including the quantity of heroin and the presence of fentanyl as an inherent danger, and mitigating factors such as the accused's remorse, rehabilitation efforts, and compliance with bail conditions.
Credit was given for pre-trial custody and house arrest.
The defendant was sentenced to four years in the penitentiary for trafficking heroin, reduced to an effective sentence of 44 months after credit for pre-trial custody and house arrest.
Serial killer sentenced to life imprisonment with concurrent 25-year parole ineligibility periods following guilty pleas.
The accused pleaded guilty to eight counts of first-degree murder for the killings of eight men over a seven-year period.
The Crown sought consecutive periods of parole ineligibility totaling 50 years under section 745.51 of the Criminal Code, while the defence sought concurrent periods totaling 25 years.
The court weighed the horrific nature of the crimes, the impact on the victims' families and the LGBTQ community, and the accused's age of 67.
Given the accused's early guilty plea, which spared the community a traumatic trial, and the fact that he would be 91 years old before being eligible to apply for parole, the court ordered the 25-year parole ineligibility periods to run concurrently.
The court upheld the strip search as reasonable, dismissing the section 8 Charter application.
The applicant, charged with drug trafficking, brought a Charter s. 8 application to exclude evidence obtained during a strip search, alleging excessive force and improper conduct.
The court found that while the applicant was briefly completely undressed, a minor deviation from *Golden* guidelines, the force used was the minimum necessary given the applicant's non-compliance and safety concerns.
The application was dismissed as no Charter infringement was found.
Bail revoked on secondary and tertiary grounds due to serious firearms offences and strong Crown case.
The Crown applied for a review of a bail order releasing the respondent, who was charged with 22 offences including firearms offences and dangerous driving following a shooting and police chase.
The reviewing judge admitted new evidence consisting of the respondent's parole officer's notes, which showed a history of non-compliance.
The judge revoked bail, finding that the respondent's detention was necessary on both the secondary ground (public safety) and the tertiary ground (maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice), given the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offences, and the respondent's history of breaching court orders.
Dangerous offender designation denied due to predictive limits; long-term offender designation and 10-year LTSO imposed.
The Crown brought an application to designate the offender as a dangerous offender following his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon stemming from a pre-planned attack on a fellow inmate.
The offender was already serving a 15-year sentence for prior violent offences.
The court declined to designate him a dangerous offender, finding that psychiatric evidence could not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that his violent conduct was intractable, given the impossibility of predicting his risk 15 years into the future when his current sentences expire.
Instead, the court designated him a long-term offender, imposing a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order and a determinate sentence of 2.5 years consecutive for the predicate offences.
Accused's statements about prior cocaine dealing to undercover officer ruled admissible to assess confession reliability.
During a murder trial involving a Mr. Big undercover operation, the Crown sought to introduce statements the accused made to an undercover officer about his prior involvement in the cocaine trade.
The defence objected, arguing the evidence was highly prejudicial bad character evidence.
The court applied the framework for propensity evidence and found that the evidence was highly probative to the jury's assessment of the reliability of the accused's confession, as it provided context regarding his sophistication and vulnerability to inducements.
The court ruled the evidence admissible, concluding its probative value outweighed the risk of prejudice, which could be managed with a limiting instruction.
The court admitted a loaded handgun found during an unlawful arrest, concluding the serious nature of the offence outweighed the Charter breaches.
The accused was charged with firearms-related offences after police conducted a traffic stop and subsequent arrest.
The central issue was whether the accused was subjected to racial profiling.
The court found that while the initial traffic stop was lawful and not racially motivated, the subsequent arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds and violated the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.
However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of the Charter breach against society's strong interest in prosecuting serious firearms offences on the merits.
Accused's leg shackles ordered removed during pre-trial motions due to insufficient evidence of security risk.
During pre-trial motions for a murder trial, the accused sought an order to have his leg shackles removed while in the courtroom.
The Crown opposed the request for security reasons, citing alleged gang affiliation, a prior incident in the cells, and staffing pressures.
The court found insufficient evidence that the accused posed a flight or safety risk to justify the continued use of shackles, emphasizing the presumption of innocence.
The court ordered the shackles removed.
Entrapment application dismissed; dial-a-dope investigation based on tip was bona fide and not random virtue testing.
The defendant pleaded guilty to trafficking heroin and possession of proceeds of crime following a dial-a-dope investigation.
He subsequently applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the police conduct constituted entrapment through random virtue testing.
The court found that the police were engaged in a bona fide investigation of a targeted individual based on an informer tip, and that the undercover officer merely provided an opportunity to commit the offence without inducing it.
The application for a stay was dismissed.
The one-year mandatory minimum sentence for importing a Schedule II substance for trafficking is unconstitutional.
Adrian Duffus challenged the mandatory minimum sentencing provision in s. 6(3)(a)(i) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) for importing a Schedule II substance (marijuana), arguing it violated s. 12 of the Charter as cruel and unusual punishment.
The court found that while the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate to Duffus's specific circumstances, it was grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable hypothetical scenarios involving small amounts of marijuana imported for sharing, without financial gain, or by offenders with exceptional personal hardships.
Applying the Oakes test, the court declared the one-year mandatory minimum imprisonment for importing a Schedule II substance for trafficking unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Duffus was subsequently sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for importing 5 kilograms of marijuana, considering mitigating factors.
The court committed the co-accused to stand trial on drug trafficking charges based on circumstantial evidence.
The Crown charged two accused jointly with two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, with the first accused facing an additional count.
At a preliminary inquiry, both accused contested committal, arguing insufficient evidence of knowledge and control.
The court applied the test from R v Arcuri, examining circumstantial evidence including extensive police surveillance of hand-to-hand transactions, large quantities of cash and drugs found in a locked apartment, drug paraphernalia, and documentary evidence linking both accused to the premises.
The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused to trial on the joint possession counts and the first accused on the additional count.