Ian R. Smith

The appellant, a federal offender, had his accelerated day parole suspended by his parole officer's supervisor.

He challenged the suspension by way of habeas corpus in the Superior Court.

The application judge declined jurisdiction, finding that the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) provided a complete, comprehensive, and expert procedure for reviewing the administrative decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the CCRA's statutory review and appeal regime falls within the exception to habeas corpus jurisdiction articulated in May v. Ferndale Institution.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of domestic abuse against his wife, including assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault, and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to warn the jury against propensity reasoning regarding the multiple counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the evidence on each count was admissible context for the others and that a limiting instruction would have required explaining the proper uses of the evidence, which would have operated against the appellant's interest.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the global sentence was fit given the aggravating domestic context.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud on the public, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, failed to instruct herself on the dangers of unconfirmed evidence, and rendered inconsistent verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision rested on independent evidence establishing the appellant's intent to defraud by inflating revenue figures.

The court also found the verdicts were not inconsistent, as the fraudulent intent was formed after the loans were made but before the public relied on the false financial statements.

The Crown's appeal of the acquittals was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant was convicted of two unrelated counts of first degree murder following a joint trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on statements obtained during a 'Mr. Big' operation and testimony from unsavoury witnesses.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to sever the counts and in denying a mistrial application after a witness blurted out highly prejudicial, inadmissible evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by concluding the absence of similar fact evidence militated against severance.

The Court held that the risk of impermissible propensity reasoning was overwhelming and ordered a new trial with the counts severed.

The accused was acquitted of multiple charges, including robbery and sexual assault, arising from attacks on sex-trade workers.

The trial judge found the identification evidence of three victims to be unreliable and concluded the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed, arguing the evidence was overwhelming and the trial judge erred in his approach to similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown's right of appeal is limited to questions of law alone, and the trial judge's assessment of the reliability and weight of identification and similar fact evidence is a question of fact.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that acquitted the respondent of driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The appeal judge had found insufficient evidence that the respondent's breath sample was received 'directly' into the approved instrument as required by s. 258(1)(c)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the provision does require the sample to be received directly into the instrument, but found there was ample circumstantial evidence from the breath technician to support the trial judge's conclusion that this requirement was met.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The appellant police officers sued the respondents for malicious prosecution after assault charges against them were stayed.

The respondent Bapoo counterclaimed for assault and breach of his s. 7 Charter rights.

The trial judge dismissed the malicious prosecution claim and awarded Bapoo damages under s. 24(1) of the Charter for the unauthorized use of force, despite finding the officers did not act with mala fides.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim but set aside the Charter damages, holding that liability for a constitutional tort requires proof of wilfulness or mala fides.

The court also adjusted the costs awards, finding the trial judge's characterization of the appellants' testimony as perjury was inappropriate.

The appellant sued her father for damages arising from childhood sexual abuse.

The father had previously been convicted of criminal offences based on the same conduct.

At the civil trial, the father adduced evidence from his two sons, who claimed they had committed the abuse, not him.

The trial judge accepted this evidence and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in permitting the father to relitigate the underlying facts of his criminal conviction.

The evidence of the sons was not 'fresh evidence' as it was known prior to the criminal trial, and allowing the relitigation constituted an abuse of process.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge made serious errors of law regarding the defence of mistaken belief in consent within a marriage.

However, the appeal from the acquittal was dismissed because the trial judge had found the accused credible, which required an acquittal under the rule in W.(D.).

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal regarding costs, setting aside the costs order against the Crown as there was no evidentiary basis for a finding of misconduct.

The prosecution appealed the dismissal of its application for prohibition and certiorari to halt a securities prosecution.

The prosecution alleged the trial judge lost jurisdiction by interfering with its case presentation, failing to rule on evidence admissibility, and failing to restrain uncivil attacks by defence counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge has inherent trial management power to direct the order of evidence and defer evidentiary rulings.

While defence counsel's conduct was uncivil and improper, the trial judge's response did not deprive him of jurisdiction or prevent a fair trial.

The applicants sought judicial review of orders made by the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario directing that a hearing proceed in camera and restricting the attendance of counsel for interested persons.

The Divisional Court quashed the orders, emphasizing that the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and the common law strongly favour open hearings.

The Court found that the Board failed to consider less restrictive measures to address its concerns regarding the presence of counsel while witnesses were excluded.

The applicant brought an application to quash an order of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario that granted intervenor status to the Liquor Control Board of Ontario in two stay motions.

The stay motions were based on allegations of witness tampering by an LCBO employee.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's decision to grant intervenor status was incorrect, as the LCBO had no interest in the stay motions and its intervention would distort the adversarial process.

The order granting standing to the LCBO was quashed.

The appellants, a lawyer and his law firm, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review.

They challenged the jurisdiction of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) to reprimand the lawyer for allegedly making misleading statements while representing a client.

The appellants argued that such conduct must be dealt with exclusively through quasi-criminal proceedings or by the Law Society.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Securities Act provides the OSC with a flexible range of remedial options, including administrative reprimands under s. 127.

The Court also affirmed that the OSC has jurisdiction to reprimand lawyers acting in their professional capacity, provided that solicitor-client privilege is respected.

The applicants, a lawyer and his law firm, sought judicial review to prohibit the Ontario Securities Commission from continuing proceedings against the lawyer under s. 127(1) of the Securities Act.

The Commission alleged the lawyer made misleading statements in a letter during a prospectus review.

The applicants and the Law Society of Upper Canada argued the Commission lacked jurisdiction to discipline lawyers acting in a professional capacity, asserting such power belonged exclusively to the Law Society and that the Commission's exercise of it violated the independence of the bar.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that s. 127(1) applies to lawyers and that the Commission's public interest jurisdiction to control its processes does not usurp the Law Society's role or infringe the rule of law.

The appellant challenged his sexual assault conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to conduct a voir dire before admitting alleged admissions made to the complainant and her family during a confrontation at his workplace.

The Supreme Court held that the confessions rule continues to apply only to statements made to persons in authority, grounded in concerns for voluntariness, fairness, and deterrence of coercive state conduct.

The defence generally bears the obligation to raise the person in authority issue, subject only to rare cases where the record objectively alerts the trial judge to the need for a voir dire.

On the evidence available before admission of the statements, there was nothing to suggest the complainant or her family were acting as persons in authority.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with attempting to purchase the sexual services of a person under 18.

During the investigation, he made a statement to police without being informed of his right to counsel.

The trial judge excluded the statement from the Crown's case in chief under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

When the accused testified at trial, the Crown sought to use the excluded statement to impeach his credibility during cross-examination.

The trial judge refused, and the accused was acquitted.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the proposed use of the statement for impeachment was not a material change of circumstances that warranted reconsidering the initial ruling that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissing an appeal from conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Brooke J.A. in the Court of Appeal, finding that the trial judge's extensive interventions and the admission of inadmissible opinion evidence rendered the trial unfair.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant brought a motion for an order pursuant to section 70 of the Supreme Court Act reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which had upheld his conviction for driving 'over 80'.

Upon reading the materials filed and noting the consent of the parties, the Supreme Court of Canada granted the motion, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant challenged an impaired driving conviction on the basis that police failed to comply with the informational component of s. 10(b) of the Charter by mentioning legal aid but not advising of existing 24-hour duty counsel services and the toll-free number for immediate free legal advice.

The majority held that where duty counsel services exist and are available in the jurisdiction, detainees must be routinely informed of their existence and basic means of access, absent valid waiver or urgency.

Applying the Collins framework under s. 24(2), the Court held that both the breathalyser results and the incriminating statement were obtained in the course of the Charter breach and that their admission would render the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was arrested for impaired driving and read his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The arresting officer advised him of the right to free legal advice from legal aid but failed to mention the 24-hour toll-free duty counsel number printed on the caution card.

The appellant expressed confusion about contacting a lawyer but eventually took and failed two breathalyser tests.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police breached the informational component of s. 10(b) by failing to advise the appellant of the toll-free duty counsel service.

The Court excluded the breathalyser evidence under s. 24(2), concluding its admission would render the trial unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute.