Ian A. MacDonnell

A self-represented applicant sought mandamus compelling a justice of the peace to issue process on a private information alleging fraud over $5,000 against a lawyer involved in mortgage enforcement proceedings.

The justice of the peace had refused to issue process after concluding the evidence did not disclose a prima facie case of fraud under s. 507.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court held that mandamus with certiorari in aid is available only where a jurisdictional error is established.

Although the justice of the peace improperly considered the Crown’s intention to withdraw the charge if process issued, the decisive finding that there was no evidence of dishonesty meant no prima facie case existed.

The refusal to issue process was therefore within jurisdiction and the application was dismissed.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking to exclude cocaine discovered in the rear cargo area of his vehicle during a traffic stop.

The accused alleged that police arbitrarily detained him and conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle, breaching ss. 9 and 8 of the Charter.

The court found the stop was lawfully conducted under s. 216 of the Highway Traffic Act for the purpose of investigating unlicensed driving and related road safety concerns.

The judge accepted the officer’s evidence that the cocaine was observed through the tinted rear window in plain view, rather than discovered during a physical search.

As no Charter breaches occurred, the application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

A clinic sought leave to intervene in a summary conviction appeal brought by an accused convicted of disobeying a court order under s. 127 of the Criminal Code.

The proposed intervention related only to the interpretation of a permanent injunction previously issued against demonstrators outside the clinic’s premises.

The court accepted that the clinic had a significant interest in the interpretation of the injunction but found that its proposed submissions were substantially the same as those the Crown would advance.

Given the limited scope for third‑party intervention in criminal proceedings affecting liberty interests and the lack of distinct submissions, the court concluded that intervention was unnecessary.

The motion for leave to intervene was dismissed.

During a criminal trial, the court ruled on the admissibility of statements made by the accused and evidence obtained following his arrest for firearms and drug offences.

The accused alleged Charter breaches under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b), arguing the arrest lacked reasonable grounds and that police questioned him after he requested counsel.

The court held the arrest was supported by objectively reasonable grounds and the search incident to arrest was lawful, making the seized key admissible.

Spontaneous admissions of ownership of drugs were also admissible, though a statement about residence obtained through questioning after the right to counsel was asserted was excluded.

Responses given to a booking sergeant were excluded to preserve trial fairness, despite being obtained during routine booking procedures.

Sentencing following convictions for a planned jewellery store robbery involving firearms where an employee was shot and seriously injured.

The offender was found guilty of multiple offences including robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault, using a firearm to commit aggravated assault, discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, masked robbery, and firearms possession offences while under prohibition orders.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the premeditated nature of the robbery, the offender’s extensive criminal record, and his disregard for firearms prohibition orders.

A global sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment was determined appropriate prior to credit for pre-sentence custody.

After applying 1.5:1 credit for 29 months of pre-sentence custody, the effective remaining sentence was reduced to approximately 8 years and 4.5 months.

Following convictions for attempted murder and related firearm and violence offences arising from a brief but violent incident, the court imposed a global penitentiary sentence.

The offender abducted and confined the complainant at gunpoint in retaliation for a dispute with her partner and attempted to shoot her, but the firearm malfunctioned.

The court reviewed appellate jurisprudence on sentencing ranges for attempted murder and assessed aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including the offender’s criminal record, the absence of physical injury, and the psychological impact on the victim.

Applying the totality principle and granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, the court determined that a 10‑year global sentence was appropriate before credit.

After credit of 35 months for pre‑sentence custody, the effective sentence imposed was 85 months' imprisonment.

Following a jury trial, the accused was convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life to his infant child but the jury was unable to reach verdicts on related aggravated assault and assault counts.

At sentencing, the issue arose whether the court could determine under s. 724 of the Criminal Code whether the trauma inflicted on the child was intentional, which would constitute an aggravating circumstance.

The court held that a sentencing judge may determine relevant factual issues not resolved by the jury, provided the facts essential to the verdict are accepted and any aggravating circumstance is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Based on medical evidence and the accused’s after‑the‑fact conduct, the court concluded the trauma was intentionally inflicted.

The finding was included as part of the factual basis for sentencing.

The offender was convicted by a jury of failing to provide the necessaries of life to his infant child after failing to obtain urgent medical treatment following severe head trauma.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender intentionally inflicted the trauma and knowingly failed to seek medical assistance for approximately 40 hours while the child displayed symptoms of serious brain injury.

The child suffered catastrophic and permanent disabilities, including blindness, cognitive impairment, seizures, and physical disability.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were the paramount sentencing objectives given the offender’s knowledge of the injury and his decision to prioritize self‑interest over the child’s safety.

A penitentiary sentence was imposed after credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, including MDMA, ketamine, and marihuana, as well as possession of proceeds of crime.

Police executing a search warrant found large quantities of drugs, packaging materials, scales, and currency, indicating mid‑level trafficking activity.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 4.5 years, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence.

The court held that while denunciation and deterrence were primary objectives for drug trafficking offences, the offender’s lack of prior record, genuine remorse, significant rehabilitation, and strong community support justified restraint.

Applying the conditional sentencing framework in force at the time of the offences, the court imposed a community‑based conditional sentence of imprisonment.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge had excluded Intoxilyzer results under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a breach of s. 8 arising from the administering officer’s failure to consider the possibility of residual mouth alcohol when conducting an approved screening device test at a R.I.D.E. checkpoint.

The appeal court held the trial judge applied the wrong legal test for determining reasonable and probable grounds, failing to properly assess the subjective and objective components outlined in governing jurisprudence.

Given the accused had stated his last drink was 25 minutes earlier and no evidence suggested more recent consumption, a reasonable officer would regard the screening result as reliable.

The acquittal was therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder following a stabbing that occurred in an apartment building elevator lobby.

At sentencing, the court considered whether to increase the statutory 10‑year period of parole ineligibility under s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code, having regard to the nature of the offence, the offender’s character, and the jury’s recommendation.

The offender was a young first‑time offender who expressed genuine remorse, and most jurors recommended the minimum period.

Although the attack was vicious and involved a knife carried in anticipation of an altercation, the court concluded the offence did not justify increasing the parole ineligibility period beyond the statutory baseline.

Life imprisonment with 10 years’ parole ineligibility was imposed, along with mandatory firearm prohibition and DNA orders.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial judge had excluded Intoxilyzer breath test results on the basis that the police officer allegedly lacked reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand under the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court held that proof of reasonable grounds is not a prerequisite to the admissibility of breath test results at common law or under the Criminal Code evidentiary scheme.

Rather, the absence of reasonable grounds may support a Charter challenge and potential exclusion under s. 24(2), but does not automatically render the results inadmissible.

Because the trial judge treated the issue as an automatic bar and failed to conduct the proper Charter analysis, the acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for breaching a peace bond and breaching a bail recognizance, arguing that she had a lawful excuse for contacting members of a family despite court‑ordered no‑contact conditions.

She claimed the delivery of a letter to the protected parties constituted service of a court document and therefore justified the breach.

The court held that the letter was not legal process and did not require service, and therefore did not constitute a lawful excuse for violating the recognizance.

The appellant also challenged a DNA order imposed as part of the sentence for the bail breach.

The court held the trial judge properly exercised discretion under the Criminal Code and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to comply with the no-contact term of a bail order following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

During the trial, the Crown introduced police reports made by the complainant to authorities in Pakistan, which the trial judge relied upon to support the complainant’s credibility.

The appeal court held that the documents constituted prior consistent statements and were presumptively inadmissible unless an exception applied.

Because the defence allegation did not amount to recent fabrication, no exception permitted their use to bolster credibility.

The trial judge’s reliance on this inadmissible evidence was not harmless, given that the complainant’s testimony was the sole evidence supporting the conviction.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

After the Crown closed its case at trial, defence counsel argued that the accused had not been identified in court as the person arrested.

The trial judge, on his own initiative, reopened the Crown’s case, recalled the officer, elicited identification evidence, and convicted the accused.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge’s conduct in reopening the case and personally eliciting the missing evidence created a reasonable apprehension of bias, as it appeared the judge had assumed the role of the prosecution.

Although the evidence already led could have established a prima facie case of identity, the appearance of partiality required that the conviction be set aside and a new trial ordered.

Following a successful motion to set aside a default judgment, the self‑represented defendants sought over $34,000 in costs for work performed on the motion.

The court considered the governing principles for awarding costs to self‑represented litigants, particularly the requirement articulated in Fong v. Chan and applied in subsequent cases that a litigant must prove an opportunity cost by showing that remunerative work was foregone.

The defendants provided no evidence that they suffered such a loss of income.

The court held that without proof of opportunity cost, no allowance for counsel fees or time could be awarded to self‑represented litigants.

Only documented disbursements were recoverable.

During a second degree murder trial, the accused sought to admit the contents of an anonymous 911 call identifying another individual as the person who stabbed the victim.

The proposed evidence was hearsay and did not fall within a traditional exception, so admissibility depended on the principled approach requiring necessity and threshold reliability.

Although necessity was established because the anonymous caller could not be identified or cross‑examined, the court found the circumstances of the call lacked sufficient indicia of reliability.

Unlike emergency 911 calls made contemporaneously with ongoing events, the call occurred more than two hours after the incident and the caller deliberately avoided accountability.

The court held that admitting the evidence would effectively abandon the threshold reliability requirement for hearsay and therefore ruled the call inadmissible.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a rear-end collision.

The appeal challenged the conviction on the basis of an alleged Charter s. 8 breach relating to reasonable grounds for arrest, the reliability of expert toxicology evidence estimating blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving, and an alleged misapprehension of evidence.

The court held that the proposed Charter issue could not be raised for the first time on appeal because the evidentiary record was insufficient and there was no explanation for the failure to raise it at trial.

The court also found that the expert evidence remained capable of establishing that the appellant’s blood alcohol level was well above the legal limit and that any alleged deficiencies in a police officer’s evidence were irrelevant to the trial judge’s finding of identity based on an eyewitness.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge was entitled to depart from the parties’ joint sentencing position after hearing submissions.

The defendants brought a motion under rr. 19.08(2) and (3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a default judgment and the underlying noting in default.

The court found that the default proceedings were irregularly obtained because the requisition for noting in default was filed before the expiry of the time to deliver a defence and while the defendant had already served a notice of intention to defend and a motion to strike the statement of claim.

The court also noted that the defendant moved promptly to set aside the default once he learned of it and had not been warned of the default proceedings.

Applying the principles governing irregularly obtained judgments, the court held that the defendants were entitled to have the default judgment and noting in default set aside without demonstrating a defence on the merits.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after a sudden and unprovoked knife attack on a stranger at a public gym.

The court considered the seriousness of the offence, the victim impact, and the offender’s personal circumstances including a history of depression, substance abuse, and psychological stressors.

Psychiatric evidence indicated that while the offender had a major depressive disorder, it was likely in remission and did not significantly mitigate moral blameworthiness.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for a vicious public attack with a weapon, the court determined that a fit sentence would have been 4½ years’ imprisonment.

After granting limited enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, the court imposed a custodial sentence of 36 months.