Helen A. Rady

The applicant pharmacist sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which confirmed an order requiring him to complete a communication skills program following a patient complaint.

The applicant argued he was not given notice that the tone of his response to the complaint would be considered, and that the ordered program was not a specified remediation program under the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision reasonable, as the committee was entitled to consider the applicant's response without further notice, and the ordered program was sufficiently specified.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario finding that it had discriminated against the respondent in terminating his employment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the Tribunal had not yet decided the question of remedy in the bifurcated proceeding.

The Court also held that the parties must exhaust the reconsideration process available at the Tribunal before seeking judicial review.

The appellant, a registered car dealer, appealed a decision of the Licence Appeals Tribunal directing the revocation of his registration.

The tribunal based its decision partly on the appellant's continuing assertion of innocence regarding a sexual assault conviction and the negative credibility findings made by the criminal trial judge.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the tribunal erred in law by treating the appellant's exercise of his right to assert innocence and appeal his conviction as aggravating factors.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted tribunal for a fresh hearing.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal, which dismissed its request for an increase in its chicken processing quota.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal's factual determination regarding the date of rebasing was supported by evidence and reasonable.

The Court also held that the applicant could not rely on a contract it had expressly abandoned before the Tribunal, and that the Tribunal was not required to provide reasons for declining to depart from its usual policies.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing his complaint that the landlord illegally entered his rental unit and invaded his privacy by taking photographs.

The Divisional Court found no error of law, noting the entry was authorized under section 27 of the Residential Tenancies Act for inspection purposes.

The court held that taking photographs during a lawful entry does not inherently infringe privacy rights if done for a proper purpose, such as preparing for an upcoming Board hearing.

The applicant sought judicial review of a university tribunal's decision upholding her required withdrawal from a family medicine residency program.

She argued that the university's unilateral decision to amend her schedule, deleting a four-week geriatric medicine rotation and continuing her in family medicine, was procedurally unfair.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the schedule change was a substantive academic decision within the university's discretion, made to better support the struggling student and ensure patient safety.

The court found no procedural unfairness or legitimate expectation that the schedule would not change.

The applicant sought a declaration that funds in jointly held bank accounts formed part of the deceased's estate under a resulting trust.

Applying the presumption governing gratuitous transfers to independent adult children, the court held the respondents rebutted the presumption on a balance of probabilities through objective and documentary evidence showing a longstanding intention to benefit the respondent daughter by survivorship.

The court declined to strike challenged affidavit evidence, but accorded it little weight.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought relief from a forfeiture order under s. 20(4) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act in relation to residential property found to have been used as offence-related property in a marijuana trafficking investigation.

The court held that the applicable standard of proof was the civil balance of probabilities and applied the statutory criteria requiring a true and valid interest, apparent innocence of complicity, and proof of all reasonable care.

The court found the applicant had not established a true and valid interest because the evidence overwhelmingly supported nominee ownership for her father, and her credibility was significantly undermined by false mortgage and tax-related representations.

Although the court was not prepared to find likely complicity on the record, it concluded the applicant exercised no reasonable care in screening or supervising tenants.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff was evicted from a seniors' housing complex located on provincial land adjacent to a First Nation reserve.

She sued the federal and provincial Crowns, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and vicarious liability for the actions of First Nations constables and the OPP's failure to intervene.

The federal Crown moved to strike the claim under Rule 21, and the provincial Crown moved for summary judgment under Rule 20.

The court granted both motions, finding that the federal Crown owed no private law duty of care or fiduciary duty to the plaintiff and was not vicariously liable for First Nations constables.

The court also found no genuine issue for trial against the provincial Crown, as the OPP owed no private law duty of care to the plaintiff in these circumstances.

The plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

Following a jury trial where the defendant was found 100% at fault and the jury awarded $1,053 for general damages and $38,500 for past wage loss, the defendants brought a threshold motion arguing the plaintiff did not suffer a permanent serious impairment.

The trial judge granted the threshold motion, finding the plaintiff's evidence lacked credibility and was undermined by surveillance footage and medical records showing significant pre-existing chronic pain and narcotic use.

The court concluded the low-impact collision did not materially contribute to a diminution in her function.

The plaintiff moved to amend its statement of claim in a construction contract action to add a related corporate entity as a defendant after a limitations defence was raised.

The court held that on a pleadings motion the evidentiary threshold is low, and the record disclosed a live issue of fact and credibility concerning when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the identity of the proper contracting party.

Given the admission in the existing statement of defence, the payment history, and the inconsistent use of corporate identities, the amendment was permitted with leave to the added defendant to plead the limitation period.

The court also held the amendment was supportable as correction of a misnomer because the litigation finger was clearly pointed at the intended defendant and no prejudice was shown.

The defendants moved to transfer a civil action from Toronto to London arising from alleged wrongful arrests, unlawful detention, Charter breaches, negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, and assault and battery by London police.

Applying Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the claim arose in London, the local community had a strong interest in the subject matter, and the convenience of parties and numerous witnesses substantially favoured London.

Although the plaintiff relied on medical evidence suggesting that a London trial would exacerbate anxiety and related symptoms, the court was not persuaded that this outweighed the other factors, particularly given the plaintiff's ongoing participation in family proceedings in London.

The motion was granted and the file was ordered transferred to London.

On a refusals motion arising from a pending leave motion under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act, the court considered the proper scope of cross-examination and documentary production under s. 138.8.

The court reiterated that pre-leave examinations are narrower than discoveries and are intended to prevent speculative securities claims from turning into discovery-like rummaging through corporate and non-party records.

One question directed to a mine planner about his understanding of any accelerated introduction of cement grout support packs was ordered answered because it went to the central factual dispute.

All other disputed questions were upheld as refused on grounds of irrelevance, overbreadth, improper documentary discovery, or litigation privilege.

The moving parties sought to have the action declared deemed dismissed under Rule 48.15(6), to set aside two ex parte orders, and to dismiss the claim against an individual defendant.

The responding party brought a cross-motion to set aside the deemed dismissal after lengthy settlement negotiations had delayed service and counsel had overlooked the transitional dismissal regime.

Applying the Reid factors contextually, the court held the delay was adequately explained, the missed deadline was inadvertent, the motion for relief was prompt once the issue was discovered, and no significant prejudice was shown.

The deemed dismissal was set aside and service of the statement of claim was validated nunc pro tunc, but the venue transfer order was set aside and the attempt to dismiss the individual defendant's claim failed.

The appellant appealed a nine-month custodial sentence imposed after a guilty plea to sexual assault.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to impose the shortest sentence consistent with denunciation and deterrence and by rejecting a conditional sentence as insufficiently denunciatory.

The appeal court held that the sentencing judge expressly considered a conditional sentence, properly emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the complainant's vulnerability, and committed no error in principle.

The sentence at the upper end of the range was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code on the basis of potential racial bias and pretrial publicity.

The defence proposed multiple-choice versions of the traditional Parks question and an additional question regarding stereotypes about Black men.

The court reviewed the jurisprudence on challenges for cause, including the requirement to demonstrate a realistic potential for juror partiality.

The court declined to permit the multiple-choice format and rejected the stereotype question due to insufficient evidentiary basis.

Instead, the court approved modified questions addressing racial bias and exposure to publicity, requiring jurors to answer in their own words.

Following settlement of personal injury claims arising from a motor vehicle–pedestrian collision, a defendant sought an order apportioning the plaintiffs’ party-and-party costs between two groups of defendants.

The moving party argued the other defendants should bear a greater share because its insurer’s contribution enabled settlement and protected the others from personal exposure.

The responding parties argued that insurance considerations were irrelevant and proposed equal contribution.

The court held that it was unnecessary to determine whether insurance was a relevant factor and instead relied on the pleadings and the Negligence Act principle that where relative fault cannot be determined, parties are deemed equally at fault.

Costs were therefore apportioned equally between the taxi defendants collectively and the other defendants.

A creditor appealed a deputy registrar’s refusal to lift the automatic stay of proceedings under s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act following the debtor’s bankruptcy.

The creditor argued the underlying judgment involved conduct amounting to fraudulent misrepresentation such that the debt would survive discharge under s. 178(1)(e), and that the registrar failed to consider sound reasons to lift the stay.

The court held that the registrar correctly applied the governing principles and was not required to make new findings of fraud absent such findings by the trial judge.

Because the underlying judgment contained no finding of fraud or false pretences, and lifting the stay would give the creditor an advantage inconsistent with the statutory scheme, there was no basis to interfere.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a Rule 21 motion to strike portions of a statement of claim arising from a dispute regarding mould contamination in a newly constructed home and Tarion’s warranty decision.

The plaintiffs sought damages against Tarion and a Tarion employee, including punitive damages and an “open claim” relating to alleged long‑term health impacts.

The court held it was plain and obvious that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed against the employee because the pleadings contained no allegations of fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or independent tortious conduct.

The claim for punitive damages was also unsupported by pleaded facts demonstrating malicious or high‑handed conduct.

The request for an “open claim” was barred by statutory limits and exclusions under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The claims against the employee and the impugned remedies were struck without leave to amend.

In a leave application under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act alleging failure to disclose a material change in mining operations, the parties brought competing motions to strike expert and fact affidavits.

The respondents sought to strike the applicant’s mining expert affidavit on the basis that it improperly opined on legal issues, relied on false assumptions, and lacked independence.

The applicant sought to strike several fact and expert affidavits filed by the respondents, arguing they violated Rule 39.01(5), relied on hearsay, and attempted to shield witnesses from cross-examination.

The court held that expert evidence may rely on second-hand information and that Rule 39.01(5) does not govern admissibility of expert opinion.

The alleged conflicts and factual disputes affected weight rather than admissibility.

Both motions to strike were dismissed and no costs were awarded.