Helen A. Rady

The appellant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board, arguing an error of law regarding the quantum of rent.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal, asserting the Board member made findings of fact, not law, which are not reviewable on appeal.

The court, applying principles distinguishing questions of law from fact, determined that the Board's decision on the agreed rental amount was a factual finding.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction as it did not raise an extricable question of law.

The plaintiff, a former band administrator, sued the First Nation and two councillors for wrongful dismissal, mental distress, and defamation.

The defendants alleged just cause for termination, counterclaiming for misappropriation of funds.

The central issue was the authenticity of the plaintiff's employment contract, which she claimed justified her self-reimbursements for vacation pay, CPP, EI, and pension deductions.

The court found the plaintiff's version of the contract to be a forgery, concluding that her actions constituted theft and just cause for termination.

The defamation claim failed due to lack of evidence of publication by the named defendants.

The plaintiff's claims were dismissed, and the First Nation's counterclaim for $18,644.58 was allowed.

Three defendants sought costs against their co-defendant after successfully moving for summary judgment to dismiss his crossclaims.

The plaintiffs had previously agreed to dismiss their claims against the moving defendants without costs, but the co-defendant refused to consent to dismissing his crossclaims because the plaintiffs would not limit their $8,000,000 claim to his $2,000,000 insurance policy limits, exposing him to personal liability.

The court found it inequitable to impose costs on the co-defendant, noting he was compelled to let the court determine the matter, and ordered that each party bear its own costs.

The applicant sought leave to commence a class action under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act, alleging the respondent mining company failed to disclose a material change regarding the introduction of cement grout pack supports which allegedly caused a decline in production.

The court reviewed the evidence, including expert reports and fact witness affidavits, and found that the overwhelming weight of the evidence demonstrated that cement grout packs were not introduced during the relevant quarter.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's threshold test from Theratechnologies, the court concluded the proposed action had no reasonable prospect of success at trial and dismissed the motion for leave.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for an order compelling the plaintiff to undergo an independent psychiatric examination.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing it was brought too late and would jeopardize the trial date.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the insurer had possessed the plaintiff's medical records for a considerable time and had already benefited from independent examinations in the accident benefits context.

The court concluded that ordering the examination so close to trial would prejudice the plaintiff and diminish the prospect of a meaningful pre-trial.

The defendants moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's personal injury claims arising from his arrest, arguing the plaintiff failed to serve expert reports on the standard of care and causation.

The court dismissed the motion primarily due to its late timing, as it was brought shortly before the scheduled trial.

Additionally, the court noted that expert evidence might not be strictly necessary, as the standard of care could potentially be determined from video evidence and causation could be inferred without scientific proof.

The moving parties sought an extension of time under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to bring a motion to set aside or vary a decision dismissing their request to stay sanctions imposed by the Ontario Securities Commission for insider trading.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties failed to form the requisite intention to appeal within the four-day window, provided no satisfactory explanation for the delay, and that an extension would prejudice the public interest in protecting capital markets.

The court also found no apparent merit to the underlying motion.

The moving parties sought to introduce new evidence on a motion to vary a decision refusing to stay an order of the Ontario Securities Commission.

The new evidence related to steps taken by IIROC regarding the moving parties' conditional registration in Quebec.

The Divisional Court struck the new evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test for fresh evidence as it was not relevant to the decisive issue of whether the motions judge erred in refusing the stay, and it did not meet the reliability criterion.

The appellant physician appealed a penalty decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario revoking his medical license.

The Committee found he engaged in unwanted touching of hospital employees and coercive sexual activity with a 17-year-old camp counsellor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's motion to adduce fresh evidence and upheld the penalty, finding the revocation was a reasonable outcome given the serious nature of the misconduct, the need to protect the public, and the lack of evidence regarding the risk of future misconduct.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision regarding a complaint that his union breached its duty of fair representation concerning overtime grievances.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the Board did not record the proceedings and proceeded by way of consultation rather than a full hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of procedural fairness and concluding that the Board's substantive decisions and remedial orders were reasonable.

The appellant appealed an order confirming a Master's reference report in a construction lien action.

The Master found an oral contract for home renovations, which the appellant anticipatorily breached, and awarded damages and costs to the respondent.

The appellant argued procedural fairness was denied when the Master refused to admit an amended Scott Schedule filed out of time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact or error of law, and held that the Master's refusal to admit the schedule did not affect the outcome as she relied on the appellant's expert witness instead.

Homeowners brought an action against a builder alleging defects in the concrete foundation of their home.

The litigation stalled due to ongoing disputes over the terms under which the defendant’s engineers could inspect and test the foundation.

Despite a prior court order permitting inspection, the plaintiffs repeatedly imposed additional conditions and ultimately refused access, preventing the testing from occurring.

The court found that the plaintiffs had created impediments to the inspection and that the action could not proceed without the testing.

The court ordered that the plaintiffs’ own engineers extract the core samples and deliver them to the defendant’s experts for testing and required the plaintiffs to pay costs thrown away due to the failed inspection.

The plaintiffs in a certified price-fixing class action moved to amend the class definition to shorten the class period and exclude indirect purchasers of products containing hydrogen peroxide.

The remaining defendants did not oppose the amendment but argued it constituted a dismissal or discontinuance entitling them to costs, and requested the appointment of a new representative plaintiff.

The court granted the amendment, finding that the Supreme Court of Canada's trilogy on indirect purchasers justified the change.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments for costs, holding that the amendment fell under section 28(1)(b) of the Class Proceedings Act and was not an adjudication on the merits.

The debtors filed Notices of Intention to Make a Proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

They brought a motion seeking administrative consolidation of their proceedings, approval of DIP financing with a super priority charge, administration and D&O charges, approval of a stalking horse sale process, and an extension of time to file a proposal.

The court granted all the requested relief, finding that the DIP financing and charges were necessary for the debtors to continue operations and that the stalking horse sale process was fair, transparent, and the best alternative to maximize value for stakeholders.

The defendant insurance broker moved under Rule 6.01 to have the plaintiff's professional negligence action tried together with her related motor vehicle tort action.

The plaintiff had sued the broker for failing to advise her of enhanced income replacement benefits following a collision.

The court granted the motion, finding that both actions involved common issues regarding the plaintiff's future income loss and that trying them together was necessary to avoid the potential for double recovery.

In related securities class actions, the plaintiffs sought approval of a cy près distribution of residual settlement funds to the Canadian Foundation for Advancement of Investor Rights (FAIR Canada) and the discharge of the settlement administrator.

The remaining funds were too small to distribute economically to class members, making further direct compensation impracticable.

The court considered whether FAIR Canada was an appropriate recipient in light of concerns raised in prior jurisprudence about potential indirect benefits to class counsel.

Rejecting a strict disqualification approach, the court held that the proper test is whether a reasonable person would conclude that any real benefit accrues to counsel.

Finding no such benefit and a rational connection between the organization’s mandate and the interests of the class, the proposed cy près distribution was approved.

The defendant brought a motion on the eve of trial seeking leave to amend his statement of defence to plead misrepresentation and promissory estoppel based on an email allegedly sent by the plaintiff’s representative before execution of a personal guarantee.

The plaintiff opposed the amendment, arguing the proposed defence was untenable because the guarantee was a full recourse guarantee containing an entire agreement clause and executed with independent legal advice.

The court acknowledged concerns about the merits of the proposed defence and the timing of the motion, but emphasized that amendments should generally be permitted unless non-compensable prejudice results.

The court found the email raised a sufficiently arguable issue regarding the defendant’s understanding of the guarantee.

Leave to amend was therefore granted so that the issue could be adjudicated at trial.

The defendants brought a motion to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages, and to compel the plaintiff to attend independent medical assessments by a neurologist and a psychiatrist.

The plaintiff opposed bifurcation and the psychiatric assessment, but agreed to a neurological and psychological assessment.

The court dismissed the motion for bifurcation, finding no persuasive evidence that it was in the interest of justice and noting it would likely increase costs and delay.

The court also declined to order a psychiatric assessment, finding that a psychological assessment was more appropriate given the plaintiff's treatment history and to avoid needless delay and expense.

The defendants brought a motion to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages, and to compel the plaintiff to attend a psychiatric assessment.

The court dismissed the request for bifurcation, finding no clear advantage or cost savings, as causation touched equally on liability and damages.

The court also declined to order a psychiatric assessment, noting the plaintiff had only seen a psychologist and her psychiatric condition was not in issue.

A psychological assessment was deemed appropriate instead, and the trial was adjourned.

The defendant dentist brought a motion for partial summary judgment in a dental malpractice action, arguing that claims relating to treatment before a specified date were statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs had originally commenced an action concerning later dental treatment but later amended the pleading to include earlier procedures and alleged failures to treat additional teeth.

The court held that the amendments asserted new causes of action rather than merely providing further particulars of the original claim.

Applying the discoverability principles under ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, the court found the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of the potential negligence years earlier based on communications with subsequent dental specialists.

The claims relating to treatment before the specified date were therefore outside the limitation period.