Jennifer Quick

The applicants sought an amended and restated initial order under the CCAA, including approval of a stalking horse sales process, a Key Employee Retention Plan, an increased administration charge, and an extension of the stay of proceedings.

The court granted most of the requested relief, finding it necessary for the restructuring and supported by the Monitor.

However, the court dismissed the applicants' request to stay a creditor's action against three directors on their personal guarantees, ruling that section 11.03(2) of the CCAA expressly prohibits staying actions against directors on guarantees relating to the company's obligations.

The defendant brought a motion on the eve of trial seeking leave to amend his statement of defence to plead misrepresentation and promissory estoppel based on an email allegedly sent by the plaintiff’s representative before execution of a personal guarantee.

The plaintiff opposed the amendment, arguing the proposed defence was untenable because the guarantee was a full recourse guarantee containing an entire agreement clause and executed with independent legal advice.

The court acknowledged concerns about the merits of the proposed defence and the timing of the motion, but emphasized that amendments should generally be permitted unless non-compensable prejudice results.

The court found the email raised a sufficiently arguable issue regarding the defendant’s understanding of the guarantee.

Leave to amend was therefore granted so that the issue could be adjudicated at trial.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside an order to continue obtained by the plaintiff on requisition.

The parties had previously agreed to schedule a case conference to discuss how the action should be reconstituted following the original plaintiff's death.

Despite this agreement and knowing the issue was contentious, the plaintiff's counsel obtained the order to continue without notice.

The court found that the plaintiff's counsel failed to act in good faith and candour by obtaining the order while the issue was scheduled for a case management hearing.

The motion was granted and the order to continue was set aside.

The appellant appealed an order upholding a previous order that set aside its statement of defence and dismissed its counterclaim.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in interpreting Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, characterizing the motion as a collateral attack, and failing to properly weigh the appellant's self-represented status and the short duration of delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge comprehensively balanced the interests of the parties and correctly concluded the appellant had wholly failed to comply with court orders without reasonable explanation.

The applicants filed human rights applications alleging discrimination on the basis of citizenship and reprisal.

The respondents requested dismissal on the basis that the discrimination allegations were dealt with in a previous application and that the reprisal allegations, based on a civil suit and threat of litigation, were protected by absolute privilege.

The Tribunal dismissed the applications, finding that the substance of the discrimination claims had been appropriately dealt with in the prior proceeding under s. 45.1 of the Code, and that pleadings in judicial proceedings are protected by absolute privilege and cannot form the basis of a reprisal claim.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal found that the respondent had not properly proved its default judgment.

Although this issue was not raised before the motion judge, the Court held it was in the interests of justice to set aside the default judgment to allow the appellant to contest the quantum of the claim and pursue a counterclaim for rental arrears.

The appeal was allowed, the default judgment was set aside, and the motion judge's costs award was varied.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the grounds of race and citizenship by the respondent, a dairy farm owner.

The Tribunal found that the last incident of alleged discrimination occurred more than one year before the application was filed.

The Tribunal concluded that the applicant's delay in filing was not incurred in good faith, as she had received legal advice and made a strategic decision to hold onto the evidence of discrimination rather than pursuing it promptly.

The application was dismissed as statute-barred.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent the balance of a contract price for constructing and installing cabinets, while awarding the appellant damages on its counterclaim for repair costs.

The appellant argued that the respondent's failure to supply defect-free cabinets constituted a fundamental breach and that the trial judge erred in quantifying replacement costs.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to award no costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding no evidence of fundamental breach, sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's damages quantification, and that the trial judge's costs disposition was within his discretion.