Helen A. Rady

The applicant sought removal of the respondent as estate trustee and a passing of accounts relating to an estate that included a disputed cottage property.

The respondent agreed to pass accounts only from the date he became succeeding trustee, arguing the estate had otherwise been fully administered earlier.

The court considered s. 55 of the Trustee Act and the principle that an executor of an executor assumes the obligations of the prior executor where administration remains incomplete.

Because the estate administration was not complete at the time of the prior executor’s death, the respondent was required to account from the date of that death.

The court ordered the respondent to pass accounts covering the period from the prior executor’s death to June 30, 2014.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend the statement of claim to substitute a named individual for a previously unidentified “John Doe” defendant and to add another individual as a new defendant after the limitation period had expired.

The court considered Rules 5.04 and 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure together with the discoverability principle under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The evidentiary record showed only minimal efforts by the plaintiff to identify the additional proposed defendant prior to the expiry of the limitation period.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate due diligence in attempting to discover the proposed defendant’s identity and that the amendment could not be justified on the basis of discoverability or misnomer.

The request to add the additional defendant was dismissed, while the substitution of the identified individual for “John Doe” was permitted on consent.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle by drug under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that a toxicology report detecting only a cannabis metabolite (CO‑THC) and not the psychoactive component THC established that he could not have been impaired at the relevant time.

The court held that urine analysis was not determinative and did not necessarily exclude impairment, particularly where other evidence—including erratic driving, police observations, admissions of marijuana use, and a drug recognition expert’s evaluation—supported impairment.

The trial judge had properly weighed the toxicology evidence and was entitled to rely on the drug recognition evaluation and other observations.

No reversible error was found in the trial judge’s reasoning.

The defendant tobacco companies brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' proposed class actions as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants breached their contracts by participating in smuggling duty-free tobacco back into Canada, avoiding higher domestic prices.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of the alleged smuggling long before commencing the actions in 2009 and 2010.

The court dismissed the motions, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the plaintiffs discovered the constituent elements of their claims, particularly given the defendants' consistent denials of involvement in smuggling.

Media organizations sought certiorari to quash a provincial court judge’s order imposing a partial publication ban and denying access to a video exhibit tendered during a guilty plea for obstruction of justice arising from a detention-centre death.

The applicants argued that the provincial court judge lacked jurisdiction and that the order failed the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The Superior Court held that the judge presiding over the guilty plea had jurisdiction to consider and grant a publication ban related to the proceeding before him.

The court found that the partial ban appropriately balanced open court principles with the fair trial rights of co‑accused facing related charges.

The court concluded that the order was necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk to the proper administration of justice and that no error of law appeared on the face of the record.

On a summary judgment motion, a law firm and solicitor sought dismissal of a third party claim alleging breach of authority, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, conspiracy, and interference with contractual relations in the context of a long‑running family shareholder dispute involving a commercial property and related mortgage financing.

The responding parties alleged that the solicitor improperly influenced a shareholders’ meeting, interfered with financing negotiations with a credit union, and failed to accept a proposed mortgage extension, ultimately contributing to losses following power of sale proceedings.

The court held that the pleadings did not properly allege conspiracy against the solicitor and that, as a matter of law, a lawyer generally owes no duty of care or fiduciary duty to non‑clients who are adverse parties in litigation.

The evidence showed no reasonable reliance by the responding parties, no disclosure of privileged information, and no causal link between the solicitor’s conduct and the alleged losses.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against the solicitor and his firm.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside an order to continue obtained by the plaintiff on requisition.

The parties had previously agreed to schedule a case conference to discuss how the action should be reconstituted following the original plaintiff's death.

Despite this agreement and knowing the issue was contentious, the plaintiff's counsel obtained the order to continue without notice.

The court found that the plaintiff's counsel failed to act in good faith and candour by obtaining the order while the issue was scheduled for a case management hearing.

The motion was granted and the order to continue was set aside.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a labour arbitration award which found the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to hear grievances regarding the hospital's pension contribution deductions.

The arbitrator had concluded that the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the pension plan administrator, not the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found the arbitrator's decision was justified, transparent, and intelligible, noting the arbitrator properly considered the collective agreement, agreed facts, and relevant jurisprudence including the Weber essential character test.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action against the Dow defendants for an alleged price-fixing conspiracy in the market for polyether polyol products.

The court reviewed the requirements for certification under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, in light of recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on indirect purchaser claims.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action, there was an identifiable class, common issues existed with a plausible methodology for proving class-wide loss, a class action was the preferable procedure, and the plaintiff was a suitable representative.

The motion for certification was granted.

The appellants, former students of Grenville Christian College, appealed a decision refusing to certify their class action for institutional abuse.

The motions judge had found that all certification criteria were met except for the preferable procedure, concluding that individual issues would overwhelm common ones.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge made a palpable and overriding error by failing to properly analyze the access to justice barrier and by incorrectly assuming common issues would need to be relitigated.

The Court certified the class action and awarded costs to the appellants.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' application for judicial review, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicants argued no costs should be awarded as the proceeding was of broader public interest.

The court rejected this argument, finding the issue was entirely personal to the applicants' positions as cottage owners.

The court awarded the respondent costs of $12,500, reducing the requested amount of $16,565.50 to reflect the respondent's lack of success on a jurisdictional issue raised during the hearing.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying his claim for compensation following two assaults by another resident in his apartment building.

The Board denied the claim based on the appellant's credibility, reliability, reckless behaviour, and extensive criminal record, finding he had put himself in harm's way.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's consideration of the appellant's criminal record and behaviour under section 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act was reasonable.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board, arguing that the presiding member breached procedural fairness by conducting an independent investigation into property listings.

The Divisional Court found that while the member did conduct an independent investigation, he disclosed this fact to the parties during the hearing and they proceeded without objection.

The Court held that the parties waived the potential apprehension of bias and dismissed the appeal without costs.

The applicants, cottage owners in Rondeau Provincial Park, sought a declaration that the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 applied to their land leases with the Crown, thereby invalidating a regulation terminating their leases in 2017.

The Divisional Court first determined it had jurisdiction to hear the application as it involved the validity of a regulation.

On the merits, the court held that the Residential Tenancies Act does not expressly bind the Crown, nor does the benefit/burden exception apply.

Consequently, the regulation terminating the leases was valid and the application was dismissed.

The representative plaintiff in a proposed class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the Canadian aftermarket oil and air filter market sought court approval of a settlement resolving the litigation.

The settlement provided for payment of $350,000, subject to an opt-out threshold, with a distribution protocol requiring significant purchase thresholds for direct recovery and a cy-près allocation to a consumer organization for remaining funds.

The court considered the risks of continuing litigation, including evidentiary issues, uncertainty regarding proof of conspiracy and price impact, and the pending Supreme Court of Canada decision concerning indirect purchaser rights.

Concluding that the settlement represented a fair, reasonable, and pragmatic resolution given the litigation risks, the court approved both the settlement and the reduced contingency fee arrangement.

In a motor vehicle personal injury action scheduled for jury trial, the plaintiffs’ counsel brought a motion seeking to be removed as solicitor of record.

The motion arose after disputes regarding fees, allegations by the client that counsel had acted improperly, and a breakdown of the solicitor‑client relationship.

Applying the principles from R. v. Cunningham regarding withdrawal of counsel, the court considered whether withdrawal would harm the administration of justice given the approaching trial date.

The court found that the client had lost confidence in counsel and that the solicitor‑client relationship had irretrievably broken down.

Counsel was permitted to withdraw, subject to providing trial preparation materials to the court, and the trial remained scheduled peremptory on the plaintiffs.

Motion seeking court approval of a proposed settlement and class counsel fees in a securities class proceeding.

The action alleged that a forestry company and its officers issued materially misleading financial statements and prospectus disclosures, contrary to Canadian generally accepted accounting principles, which artificially inflated share prices.

The claims included negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and statutory causes of action under the Securities Act and the Canada Business Corporations Act.

After arm’s‑length negotiations and mediation, the parties reached a $1.9 million settlement funded by the defendants’ insurer.

The court held the settlement was fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, and approved both the settlement and reduced contingency fees.

The defendants brought a motion to sever the issue of the plaintiff's standing to bring the action, seeking to have it determined in advance of trial.

The plaintiff opposed the motion.

The court reviewed the principles governing bifurcation, noting that a litigant has a basic right to have all issues resolved in one trial and that severance should only be ordered in the clearest of cases.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issues were interconnected, severance would likely lead to appeals and delay, and the motion was brought late in the proceedings after significant resources had already been expended.

In a proposed class proceeding, the plaintiffs sought court approval of a third party litigation funding agreement that would bind the plaintiffs and class members.

Notice of the agreement was provided to the defendants and large shareholder members of the class, and no party opposed the motion.

The court considered prior jurisprudence regarding litigation funding agreements and noted that the proposed agreement contained a scaled and capped commission structure addressing concerns previously raised about third party funding arrangements.

The court found the agreement consistent with the principles articulated in earlier cases and noted it represented a cost saving compared with the Class Proceedings Fund.

The agreement was approved.

Following dismissal of an application as abandoned, the respondent municipality sought partial indemnity costs fixed at $750.

The self‑represented applicant opposed costs, arguing that her former solicitor’s conduct caused the abandonment, raising concerns about the court’s earlier reasons, and asserting that she was a public interest litigant.

The court held that the challenges faced by self‑represented litigants are not a recognized basis to avoid cost consequences.

It further found that the applicant’s public interest litigant argument had already been determined and was res judicata.

As the applicant failed to persuade the court to relieve against the deemed dismissal under Rule 38.08(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, costs were ordered to follow the event.