Brian Edward Chambers

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' jury notice due to significant delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, arguing that the ongoing adjournments were causing prejudice, including the erosion of her claim for past income loss.

The defendants opposed, asserting the right to a jury trial and advocating for a "wait and see" approach.

The court granted the motion, finding that the current and anticipated delays in civil jury trials in the Central East Region, coupled with the possibility of an earlier judge-alone trial, justified striking the jury notice.

The court emphasized that delay in obtaining a civil jury trial date can, by itself, constitute prejudice, aligning with recent Court of Appeal guidance.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of a 911 call and a police statement made by the accused’s spouse concerning a stabbing incident.

Because the couple married after the events but before trial, the spouse was incompetent to testify for the Crown under s. 4(1) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Crown argued the statements should be admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule on the basis of necessity and reliability.

Applying the framework from Hawkins and Couture, the court held that the spousal incompetency rule must remain analytically distinct from hearsay analysis and that admitting the statements would undermine the rule’s underlying rationale of protecting marital harmony and preventing conscription of a spouse into the prosecution.

The proposed evidence was therefore inadmissible.

The Crown applied under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act to prohibit disclosure of counselling notes and patient records seized from the accused during a search warrant execution, arguing disclosure would encroach on the privacy interests of complainants who had shared intimate personal information.

The accused opposed the application, asserting the records were his own work product necessary for the operation of his practice and for making full answer and defence.

The court held that s. 37 was intended to apply to information generated by the state or third parties, not to materials created and owned by the accused.

Relying on principles concerning ownership of medical records articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada, the court concluded the physical records belonged to the creator.

The application to prohibit disclosure was dismissed and the accused was entitled to the return of the seized materials.