Catherine A. McIntosh

The plaintiff moved to strike the jury notice in a 10-year-old personal injury action due to ongoing delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiff proposed a virtual, non-jury trial in tranches for earlier, more expeditious, and less costly resolution.

The defendants opposed, arguing for a "wait and see" approach to preserve their substantive right to a jury trial.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that the continued delay constituted real and substantial prejudice, especially given the action's tortured history and the uncertainty of civil jury trial resumptions.

The court emphasized that striking the jury notice was a proportionate response to mitigate delays and provide timely access to justice, aligning with appellate guidance that delay alone can justify striking a jury notice.

The plaintiff in a personal injury action moved to strike the defendants' jury notice, arguing complexity due to chronic pain claims and potential injustice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the case was not unusually complex and that juries are capable of assessing credibility in chronic pain cases, especially with proper judicial instruction on the reality of chronic pain as established by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's arguments that recent jury verdicts in chronic pain cases demonstrated inherent injustice or that the civil jury system was being inappropriately used by insurers.

A personal injury trial, which had been estimated to last 5-6 weeks, was declared a mistrial after 4.5 weeks due to grossly inaccurate trial duration estimates provided by counsel.

The court emphasized the critical importance of accurate estimates for the efficient administration of justice, juror experience, and access to justice for other litigants.

Despite repeated warnings and attempts to manage the schedule, the trial could not be completed within the confirmed timeframe.

The judge found that the pace of the trial, coupled with counsel's shifting strategies and "desperation" to conclude, made a fair and just completion impossible, necessitating the regrettable decision to declare a mistrial to prevent further waste and uphold the integrity of the justice system.

In this personal injury action, the plaintiff objected to the admissibility of defence surveillance video as substantive evidence during an ongoing civil jury trial.

The plaintiff argued that the video had low probative value, was potentially prejudicial, and that some portions were not disclosed in a timely manner under Rule 30.09.

The court dismissed the objection, finding the surveillance video prima facie relevant to the plaintiff's condition and abilities, and that its probative value was not outweighed by prejudicial effect.

The court granted leave for late disclosure under Rule 30.09, noting ample opportunity for review.

The ruling allowed the defendants to tender the video as substantive evidence, subject to specific qualifications regarding the exclusion of overly intrusive or misleading segments and directions on presentation to the jury.

The plaintiff in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident brought a preliminary motion to exclude photographs of vehicle damage at trial.

The plaintiff argued the photographs were irrelevant since liability was admitted, and that admitting them without expert biomechanical evidence would invite unguided speculation by the jury that minor vehicle damage equates to minor injury.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the photographs were relevant to causation and admissible without expert evidence, as causation is a matter of common sense.

The court noted that a jury instruction would be given to clarify that serious injuries can still result from low-impact collisions.

In a personal injury action, the defendants objected to the plaintiff's proposed witness sequence, which intended to call a physiotherapist, Gloria Gilbert, as the first witness, followed by the plaintiff.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff should testify first to provide context for her subjective chronic pain claims.

The court dismissed the defendants' objection, allowing the plaintiff to call Ms. Gilbert first, provided the plaintiff excluded herself from the courtroom during Ms. Gilbert's testimony.

The court emphasized a litigant's right to present their case as counsel deems advisable, finding no compelling reason to interfere with the modest deviation from usual practice, especially since Ms. Gilbert was presented as a "participating expert" whose testimony would not inherently depend on the plaintiff's prior evidence.

In a personal injury action, the plaintiff objected to the defendants' attempt to introduce evidence and arguments suggesting that the plaintiff's receipt of collateral benefits was relevant to her motivation to work and her actual disability.

The court sustained the plaintiff's objection, ruling that such considerations were speculative and lacked relevance to the determination of disability.

The decision emphasized that while collateral benefits are relevant for calculating offsets, they should not be used to imply a lack of motivation to work or to undermine claims of disability.