Gregory M. Mulligan

The plaintiffs, parents of the defendant's estranged spouse, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of a $43,246.36 loan made to their son-in-law.

The loan, provided for condominium renovations, lacked formal documentation, and repayment terms were disputed.

The defendant opposed the motion, highlighting credibility issues in the affidavits and the linkage to ongoing family law proceedings where his spouse had agreed to assume part of the debt.

The court dismissed the motion, finding significant conflicting evidence and credibility issues that required cross-examination, which is not permitted under Simplified Procedure Rules for affidavits, making a summary judgment inappropriate.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision to certify four additional common issues in two related class actions brought by former employees regarding the distribution of a pension plan surplus.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding the viability of the cause of action under s. 8(10) of the Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985, finding it was not plain and obvious that the employer-administrator was not in a conflict of interest.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to amend the class definition in one of the actions to remove restrictive and vague language.

This endorsement addresses costs following the dismissal of the applicant's habeas corpus application with certiorari in aid.

The Attorney General of Canada (AGC), as the successful party, sought $5,000 in costs, arguing the applicant's arguments lacked merit and necessitated significant expenses, including transcripts.

The applicant contended for no costs or minimal costs, emphasizing the importance of access to justice for habeas corpus.

The court considered the principles from *Wood v. Atlantic Institution (Warden)*, balancing the general rule that costs follow the cause with the need to avoid creating a barrier to accessing habeas corpus.

Applying *Rule 57.01* factors, including complexity and the importance of the issues, the court fixed costs at $5,000, all inclusive, payable by the applicant to the AGC.

The offender pleaded guilty to producing marijuana after police found 29 plants in his home, which he shared with his 13-year-old daughter.

He grew the marijuana for personal use to manage chronic pain and sold surplus to friends.

The Crown initially sought a mandatory minimum sentence of six months but withdrew its notice, rendering a constitutional challenge moot.

The court considered the offender's lack of a criminal record, guilty plea, remorse, and positive rehabilitation efforts.

The court imposed a suspended sentence and 18 months of probation.

The applicant pleaded guilty to producing marijuana and cannabis resin.

The Crown initially sought a mandatory minimum sentence but later withdrew its notice, rendering the applicant's constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum provision moot.

The applicant argued the court should still hear the challenge based on the Borowski principles.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot challenge, noting that a similar constitutional issue was already under appellate review, the provision did not create an inflationary floor for sentencing, and hearing the application would unduly consume judicial resources.

The appellant bank appealed an interlocutory order adjourning its summary judgment motion.

The motion judge had adjourned the motion to hear oral evidence regarding whether the bank knew or should have known that the respondent's brother was using a line of credit, secured by the respondent's condominium, for his own benefit contrary to a trust agreement.

The appellant argued that under Hryniak v. Mauldin, the motion judge was required to determine if there was a genuine issue for trial based solely on the paper record before ordering oral evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Hryniak does not restrict a motion judge's inherent equitable jurisdiction to adjourn a motion and hear oral evidence to determine if a genuine issue for trial exists.

The offender, an Aboriginal woman with no prior criminal record, was convicted of trafficking in Oxycodone.

A Gladue Report detailed her history of intergenerational trauma, substance abuse, and significant efforts at self-rehabilitation prior to her involvement with the criminal justice system.

The court applied Gladue and Ipeelee principles, finding that a custodial sentence would severely disrupt her rehabilitation and her role as a mother.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 18 months of probation and 100 hours of community service.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for leave to appeal, the successful plaintiff sought costs of $3,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued the amount was excessive and suggested $1,000, noting their own costs would have been $1,893.

The court considered the principles of proportionality and the reasonable expectations of the losing party, fixing costs at $2,000 all inclusive.

The 77-year-old plaintiff advanced over $1,000,000 to her adult daughter and son-in-law over a two-year period following a reconciliation.

The funds were used to pay off a mortgage, purchase a new home, install a pool, and included a transfer of shares.

After the parties had a falling out and the plaintiff moved out of the shared home, she sued for the return of the funds, claiming they were loans or held on resulting trust.

The court applied the Pecore principles and found that the defendants successfully rebutted the presumption of resulting trust, proving on a balance of probabilities that all advances were unconditional gifts.

The plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment, moving expenses, occupation rent, and punitive damages were also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found him incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant, who suffers from a primary psychotic disorder, argued he was capable.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's application of the two-part test under the Health Care Consent Act.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the court upheld the Board's finding that the appellant lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decision due to his lack of insight into his illness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to stay an Ontario negligence action arising from injuries allegedly sustained at a hotel in Alberta.

The plaintiffs argued Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter or alternatively should assume jurisdiction under the forum of necessity doctrine because the Alberta limitation period had expired.

Applying the principles from Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, the court found no presumptive connecting factors establishing a real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The defendant corporation was domiciled and carried on business in Alberta, and the alleged tort occurred there.

The court held that the expiry of the limitation period in Alberta did not justify invoking the narrow forum of necessity doctrine and stayed the Ontario action.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assessment Review Board changing the tax class of its property from farm land to vacant commercial land.

The respondent moved to dismiss the application on the basis that the applicant failed to exhaust its statutory right of appeal under s. 43.1 of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court agreed, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the judicial review because the applicant bypassed the statutory leave to appeal process.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant Minister appealed a motion judge's order regarding the interpretation of a previous costs order made by a deceased judge.

The previous order required the respondent to pay costs to the Minister from proceeds received from her insurer.

The motion judge interpreted this to mean costs were only payable if the matter proceeded to trial, not if it settled.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding no logical basis for the motion judge's interpretation, and ordered the respondent to pay the costs from her settlement proceeds.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Chief Coroner's decision not to hold a discretionary inquest into the death of his son, who died by suicide while on constant watch in a hospital psychiatric department.

The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable and that the Chief Coroner's remarks about the efficacy of lay juries raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Chief Coroner reasonably concluded that the hospital had already addressed the specific contributors to the death and there was no evidence of systemic failure.

The court also held the Chief Coroner's remarks represented professional judgment and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant parents appealed a summary judgment order making their child a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.

The parents argued that the motion judge erred by failing to recognize a gap in the children's aid society's case regarding available support programs, failing to provide adequate reasons, and improperly admitting a parenting capacity assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the parents failed to present a comprehensive plan of care to address their need for 24-hour supervision.

The court held that the motion judge's reasons adequately explained why the child would not be safe in the parents' care and why access should be terminated, and that the assessment was properly admitted.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board granting the respondent landlord an above-guideline rent increase based on capital expenditures for balcony repairs.

The tenant argued the Board erred in law by failing to properly determine if the expenditures were necessary to restore physical integrity, failing to provide adequate analysis, and failing to apply issue estoppel based on a previous 2012 application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, as it properly applied the legal test, made factual findings that the work was different from the previous application, and adequately supported its conclusion that the repairs were necessary eligible capital expenditures.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board refusing to grant an extension of time to request a review of an earlier order.

The earlier order awarded the respondent tenant compensation for lost property and rent abatement following an eviction without notice.

The appellant argued he was denied natural justice because he did not receive notice of the hearing, as the documents were served on his paralegal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that service on the legal representative was proper under the Board's Rules and the Board's refusal to extend time was reasonable.

The applicant was arrested for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police observed him engaging in suspected hand-to-hand drug transactions from his rental vehicle.

A subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle at the police station yielded 5.5 grams of crack cocaine.

The applicant brought a Charter motion to exclude the evidence, alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 9 rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and that the search was a lawful search incident to arrest.

The court further noted that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The applicant was arrested for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police observed him engaging in suspected hand-to-hand drug transactions from his rental vehicle.

Following his arrest, police towed the vehicle to the station and conducted a warrantless search, discovering 5.5 grams of crack cocaine hidden in the visor.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 9 rights, arguing the police lacked reasonable grounds for arrest and that the search was unlawful.

The court dismissed the application, finding the officers had objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest based on their observations and experience, and that the subsequent vehicle search was a lawful search incident to arrest.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to 36 counts arising from a prolonged pattern of drugging and sexually assaulting 18 vulnerable victims, many of whom were sex-trade workers, while secretly videotaping the assaults.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as the primary sentencing objectives, emphasizing the offender's planning, exploitation of vulnerability, abuse of professional pharmaceutical knowledge, and the unprecedented scale of the offending.

Expert psychiatric evidence diagnosed paraphilic coercive disorder and sexual sadism, with low recidivism risk only if treatment and sobriety were maintained.

A global sentence of 18 years was imposed, reduced by enhanced pre-sentence custody credit to 14 years remaining, with ancillary DNA, weapons prohibition, and lifetime SOIRA orders, but the Crown's application to delay parole eligibility was dismissed.