Gregory M. Mulligan

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct involving two former spouses in a first-degree murder trial.

The proposed evidence included allegations of jealousy, controlling behaviour, criminal harassment, and assault.

The Crown argued this similar fact evidence would assist in proving motive, identity, and the elements of first-degree murder.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Handy and concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence, particularly moral and reasoning prejudice, outweighed its probative value.

The Crown's application to admit the evidence was dismissed.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to introduce third party suspect evidence suggesting another individual may have committed the homicide.

The defence argued that the third party had the opportunity to commit the offence and had connections with individuals associated with the deceased.

The Crown opposed the motion, submitting the proposed theory was speculative and unsupported by evidence linking the third party to the crime.

Applying the principles governing third party suspect evidence, including the requirement of a sufficient evidentiary nexus, the court held that the proposed theory lacked an air of reality and would invite speculation.

The prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

Following an application by a landlord seeking a declaration that a tenant was in breach of a lease and that a renewal option was void for uncertainty, the court previously determined that the issues could not be resolved on affidavit evidence and required a trial.

The tenant sought costs of approximately $30,792.74 on a partial indemnity basis, while the landlord argued that costs should either be reserved to the trial judge or reduced due to unresolved arrears issues.

Applying the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the tenant achieved sufficient success to justify an immediate costs award.

However, the claimed costs were reduced to reflect issues yet to be adjudicated at trial.

On a pre-trial discovery motion arising from a civil action for injuries sustained in a shooting at the defendant's residence, the moving defendant sought answers to refusals, undertakings, a further discovery, and production of videogame consoles and passwords.

The court applied the stricter relevance standard under Rule 31.06 and ordered production of the plaintiff's game consoles, related passwords, and answers to questions about videogame use, finding that the information could be relevant to damages and cross-examination of psychological experts.

The court refused to compel answers about the plaintiff's alcohol and marijuana use at his own home and about an unrelated 2006 stabbing, holding those matters were not relevant to the pleaded issues.

The court also required the plaintiff to answer a question about the gun at the defendant's residence and required the plaintiff's father to answer limited questions about his own use of the consoles, but not about the plaintiff's upbringing or prior issues with gangs, alcohol, or drugs.

In a first degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit numerous ante‑mortem statements made by the deceased to friends and family describing the accused’s conduct and the deteriorating relationship between them.

The court reviewed the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the traditional “state of mind” exception and the principled hearsay exception requiring necessity and threshold reliability.

While acknowledging the risk of moral and reasoning prejudice associated with prior discreditable conduct and repetitive hearsay, the court held that most statements were relevant to motive, animus, planning and deliberation, and the criminal harassment component of constructive first degree murder.

The court excluded certain statements lacking sufficient reliability or probative value but admitted the majority of the evidence as part of the unfolding narrative of the relationship.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and indignity to human remains after killing a young woman and dismembering and disposing of her body parts in the community.

At sentencing, the court considered the jury’s recommendation regarding parole ineligibility, the offender’s character, and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Significant aggravating factors included the methodical dismemberment of the body, concealment and disposal of remains, deception of investigators, and lack of demonstrated remorse.

Applying the principles from the Supreme Court of Canada regarding parole ineligibility for second degree murder, the court determined that the statutory minimum of ten years was insufficient.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility set at seventeen years, with a concurrent sentence for indignity to human remains.

The court delivered reasons for sentence following criminal proceedings against the accused.

The sentencing hearing took place in the Superior Court of Justice in the Central East Region.

Counsel for the Crown and the defence made submissions regarding the appropriate penalty.

The decision sets out the court’s reasons for determining the sentence to be imposed on the accused.

The plaintiff contractor sued the defendant homeowners for unpaid invoices relating to a home renovation and addition.

The parties had not signed a written contract.

The plaintiff argued the agreement was a 'cost plus' contract, while the defendants argued it was a fixed price contract based on an initial verbal estimate.

The court found the agreement was a cost plus contract, noting the defendants had previously paid an invoice detailing materials, sub-trades, and contractor profit without objection.

However, the court reduced the plaintiff's claim by $5,000 due to the plaintiff's failure to bill labour accurately and provide timely invoices as costs escalated.

The defendants' counterclaim for delay-related expenses was dismissed.

The applicant landlord brought an application seeking a declaration that its tenant was in breach of a commercial lease and that the renewal option was void for uncertainty.

The court found that the renewal option, which provided for rent at 'current rates', was not void for uncertainty as it could be determined by the court or an arbiter.

On the issue of whether the tenant was in default of rent and common expenses, the court found there was a genuine issue regarding the proper calculation of arrears and directed a trial to determine the amounts owing.

The accused was arrested and interviewed by police after making statements to undercover officers.

The Crown did not intend to introduce the police interview.

The defence brought an application to introduce specific exculpatory portions of the police interview, arguing they amplified the accused's earlier statements to the undercover officers.

The Crown opposed, arguing the statements were hearsay, self-serving, and would allow the accused to avoid cross-examination.

The court granted the application, finding the statements were an amplification of the earlier undercover interview and that the Crown would not be unfairly disadvantaged as it could introduce other parts of the interview.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of drug trafficking involving fentanyl and buprenorphine.

The court considered a joint sentencing submission recommending a global sentence of four years and one and a half months, with significant credit for pre-trial custody leaving a custodial term of two years less a day.

The sentencing judge reviewed the offender’s Gladue report detailing Indigenous background factors, intergenerational residential school trauma, addiction issues, and mental health challenges.

The court emphasized that Gladue principles must inform sentencing while recognizing the seriousness of fentanyl trafficking and the offender’s prior criminal record.

The joint submission was accepted and ancillary orders including a DNA order and lifetime weapons prohibition were imposed.

The defence brought a pre-trial application seeking an order to make an opening statement to the jury immediately after the Crown's opening address, rather than at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the discretion should not be exercised, especially since the defence would not undertake to call evidence.

The court balanced the risks of an early statement against fairness issues and the special circumstances of the case, including the defence's intention to concede guilt on a secondary count to focus the jury on the primary count of second-degree murder.

The court granted the application, finding an early, targeted opening by the defence appropriate.

The applicant sought a charge against the respondents' property to secure repayment of a $200,000 family loan advanced toward the purchase of a residence containing a granny flat for her use.

The court interpreted the parties' written agreement and promissory note, which expressly required the borrowers to grant reasonable security on request.

Despite the existence of an earlier gift letter to the mortgage lender and the respondents' matrimonial dispute, the court held the applicant was entitled to security over the very property acquired with her contribution.

An order charging the property in favour of the applicant for $200,000 without interest, on demand terms mirroring the 2012 agreement, was granted.

On a Crown bail review, the court considered whether a Justice of the Peace erred in releasing the respondent on a reverse-onus basis on charges including sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and breach of recognizance.

The court held that the proposed surety plan did not amount to true 24/7 house arrest, contained material supervision gaps, and failed to adequately address public and complainant safety.

The court further found inadequate consideration of the respondent's prior breach record, evidence of additional breaches, and the strength of the Crown's case on the current breach allegation.

Tertiary grounds were rejected, but detention was ordered on secondary grounds and the release order was vacated.

The defendants moved to stay or dismiss a long-term disability action based on the plaintiff's failure to pay a prior full indemnity costs award made payable forthwith, and alternatively sought security for costs.

The plaintiff cross-moved to vary the costs order to permit instalment payments, relying on impecuniosity.

The court held the plaintiff was not entitled to vary the prior order, emphasizing the reprehensible conduct underlying the elevated costs award, the delay in offering partial payment, and the late disclosure of litigation indemnity coverage.

The action was stayed pending payment of the outstanding costs award, but security for costs was refused because of access to justice concerns and the existence of a $100,000 indemnity agreement.

Following a ten-day jury trial where the plaintiff was awarded $18,076, the parties made submissions on costs.

The defendants had made a pre-trial offer to settle of $25,000, which the plaintiff did not beat, engaging Rule 49.10.

The court declined to deny the plaintiff costs under the simplified procedure or small claims rules, finding the ordinary procedure was reasonable.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court awarded the plaintiff $34,000 for pre-offer costs and the defendants $62,000 for post-offer trial costs, resulting in a net costs award of $28,000 payable by the plaintiff to the defendants.

The Baker defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default against them, and Sage Electric Limited brought a cross-motion for default judgment.

The Baker defendants had been noted in default after failing to comply with an order removing their former counsel of record.

The court found that the order removing counsel was irregular because it substituted the mandatory word 'shall' for the permissive word 'may' found in Rule 15.04, improperly removing the court's discretion.

The court set aside the noting in default and dismissed Sage's cross-motion for default judgment as premature.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle 'over 80', arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his 'slurred' speech when finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for a breath demand.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly understood the officer's definition of slurring as 'slow and deliberate speech' and that, even if mistaken, the error was not material to the overall finding of reasonable and probable grounds based on multiple indicia of impairment.

The applicant sought a declaration that he was eligible for accelerated parole review (APR) because he committed his offences before Parliament abolished the APR process.

He was sentenced after the abolition came into force.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's expectation of liberty crystallized at the time of sentencing, not the time of the offence.

Because APR was already abolished when he was sentenced, the legislative change did not amount to retrospective punishment under section 11(i) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which confirmed his treating psychiatrist's opinion that he was incapable of consenting to or refusing antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board misconstrued the evidence.

The Ontario Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review, finding that the Board properly applied the two-part capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act and reasonably distinguished the facts from Supreme Court of Canada precedent.

The appeal was dismissed.