Gregory M. Mulligan

The plaintiffs brought a motion to sever a minor’s claim from a global $700,000 motor vehicle accident settlement and to set aside the settlement on the basis that the minor later developed catastrophic psychological impairments after witnessing the accident.

The settlement had been concluded in 2010 but court approval for the minor’s claim was never obtained as required by Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that settlements involving minors are not binding without judicial approval and that the evidentiary record did not support severing the minor’s portion from the global settlement.

Given the lack of court approval, absence of apportionment of the settlement funds, and the disbursement of most of the funds by former counsel, the court set aside the entire settlement.

The defendant’s request to order the return of the funds was declined because former counsel was not a party to the proceeding.

The accused applied to exclude firearms evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, alleging the warrant was invalid and violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The challenge relied on the Garofoli framework and argued that the Information to Obtain relied on insufficiently credible and corroborated confidential source information and that redactions impaired full answer and defence.

After considering the redacted ITO, a judicial summary of confidential information, and cross‑examination of the affiant, the court held the issuing justice could reasonably have authorized the warrant.

The court found the confidential source information sufficiently compelling and corroborated by police investigation.

In the alternative, even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under the s. 24(2) Grant analysis.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 25(19)(e) of the Family Law Rules to set aside a contempt order made after she failed to attend the hearing.

She asserted that her former counsel advised her that attendance was unnecessary because the hearing date had been moved.

The court held that a party who reasonably relies on incorrect advice from counsel may be considered "unable" to attend within the meaning of the rule.

Given the quasi‑criminal nature of contempt findings and the absence of the applicant’s evidence at the original hearing, the court set aside the contempt finding, fine, and costs order and directed that the issue could be reheard on a full evidentiary record.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code seeking leave to cross‑examine the complainant about prior sexual activity with him and with other individuals.

The proposed questioning arose in the context of numerous text messages between the parties that appeared to reference sexual relations during the period when they lived together.

The court held that cross‑examination regarding alleged prior consensual sexual activity between the complainant and the accused was relevant to credibility and necessary to provide context for the text message evidence.

However, proposed questioning about the complainant’s sexual activity with other individuals was excluded as irrelevant and as improperly engaging the prohibited “twin myths.” Leave was therefore granted only in relation to prior sexual activity between the complainant and the accused.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant.

The applicant argued the search violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and sought exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

After considering the evidentiary record, including cross‑examination of the investigating detective and submissions from both parties, the court found no basis to exclude the evidence.

The application to exclude the fruits of the search warrant was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of assault causing bodily harm arising from a violent attack involving a bottle that injured two victims.

The offences occurred approximately sixteen years before sentencing, during which time the offender relocated, established employment, maintained a stable relationship, and demonstrated rehabilitation.

The court considered Gladue principles given the offender’s Indigenous background, as well as the long delay between the offence and sentencing and the offender’s significant rehabilitative efforts.

Balancing denunciation and general deterrence against rehabilitation and the restraint principle under s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, the court declined to impose custodial or conditional sentence imprisonment.

A suspended sentence with probation and community service was imposed along with ancillary orders.

Following the dismissal of a motion to set aside a settlement and release, the court addressed the issue of costs.

One defendant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis, while other defendants declined to pursue costs.

The self-represented plaintiff opposed the request, largely attempting to reargue the underlying motion and alleging unethical conduct by opposing counsel.

The court applied the reasonableness principle under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found the requested amount reasonable.

Costs of $8,300 all-inclusive were awarded to the defendant and ordered deductible from settlement funds otherwise payable to the plaintiff.

Sentencing decision following convictions after a non-jury trial for historic physical and sexual abuse of a child by a father figure over a prolonged period between 1987 and 1992.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the dominant sentencing objectives for repeated sexual abuse of a young child in a position of trust, relying on appellate guidance addressing persistent abuse of vulnerable children.

Aggravating factors included the complainant's young age, the prolonged and repetitive nature of the abuse, the offender's parental role, the profound long-term impact on the complainant, and the offender's lack of remorse.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years' imprisonment, together with DNA, weapons prohibition, s. 161, SOIRA, and no-contact orders.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent successfully brought a motion against three non-party corporations seeking financial disclosure required by a business valuator to determine the applicant’s income.

After the motion succeeded and disclosure was ordered subject to a confidentiality agreement, the parties returned to court to resolve disputes over the confidentiality terms and costs.

Both sides sought substantial indemnity costs and relied on offers to settle under Rule 18 of the Family Law Rules.

The court found that neither party met the burden of proving that the result was as favourable as their respective offers and therefore assessed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Applying the factors in Rule 24 and considering the respondent’s substantial success on the disclosure motion, the court ordered the non-parties to pay costs.

In a civil jury trial, the plaintiff brought a motion seeking to question sworn jurors for potential bias relating to abortion after the jury panel had already been selected and sworn.

The plaintiff relied on survey evidence suggesting Canadians hold strong views on abortion and argued that questioning jurors was necessary to identify potential prejudice.

The court held that civil juries are presumed capable of setting aside personal views through the trial process and judicial instructions, and that there was insufficient evidence of widespread bias that would justify such questioning.

The court emphasized the discretionary nature of challenges for cause in civil proceedings and warned that permitting such questioning could create delays and open the floodgates to inquiries on many personal characteristics.

The motion was dismissed.

The self-represented plaintiff moved to set aside a full and final release executed as part of a settlement agreement resolving claims arising from an alleged water and sewage leak following a cable installation.

The plaintiff argued that the settlement, reached during discovery negotiations for $80,000, should be rescinded because she was physically disabled, in pain, and unable to obtain legal advice at the time of signing.

The defendants opposed and sought judgment enforcing the settlement.

The court held that lack of independent legal advice alone is not a basis to invalidate a settlement and found no evidence of incapacity, coercion, or unconscionability.

The settlement negotiations were conducted over several hours with offers and counteroffers initiated by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff acknowledged understanding the release when signing it.

The court concluded the release was binding and enforced the settlement.

The defendant employer brought a motion seeking leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing its motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The underlying motion sought to fix a reasonable notice period while dismissing claims for bad faith, punitive damages, and intentional infliction of mental suffering.

The court held that the motions judge reasonably concluded that the evidentiary record raised genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding the circumstances of the termination and potential mental suffering damages.

Applying rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the order sufficient to justify leave.

Leave to appeal the costs order was also refused given the small quantum at issue and the motions judge’s broad discretion in fixing costs.

The offender was convicted following trial of sexual exploitation of a young person in a position of trust and of mischief for interfering with a motor vehicle.

The sexual relationship began when the complainant was 15 and continued for approximately two years, involving numerous acts of intercourse and a significant age disparity.

The court considered aggravating factors including prolonged abuse of trust, repeated sexual acts, lack of insight or remorse, and the lasting psychological harm described in victim impact statements.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of prior criminal record, stable employment history, and a psychiatric assessment indicating a low risk of reoffending.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed a custodial sentence.

Following earlier estate litigation and an unsuccessful appeal concerning the beneficiaries of an estate and a notice of objection to the issuance of a certificate of appointment of estate trustee, the respondents sought further costs against the applicant.

The applicant had failed to withdraw his notice of objection despite explicit direction from the Court of Appeal and required additional steps by the respondents to have the registrar remove it.

The court considered the costs discretion under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the applicant’s conduct justified a costs award, the court found it did not rise to the level of sanctionable behaviour warranting elevated costs.

Costs were therefore awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

The mother brought a motion to change seeking sole custody and a variation of the father's access schedule to accommodate the child's minor hockey schedule.

The parties had previously entered into a separation agreement providing joint custody and alternate weekend access with the father, who resided a significant distance away.

The court held that the agreement's flexibility clause did not permit the mother to unilaterally cancel the father's access to accommodate extracurricular activities.

Given the limited parenting time available to the father and the absence of evidence that the child could not continue playing hockey if some games were missed, the court declined to vary the regular access schedule.

The court maintained the existing access arrangement with a limited exception for a specific tournament weekend and granted the father alternating March Break access beginning in 2014.

Following a jury trial where the plaintiffs recovered damages for general damages and future care but failed on claims for wage loss, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $247,000, while the defendants argued for partial indemnity costs around $105,300.

Applying the principles of reasonableness under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that substantial indemnity was not justified because there was no reprehensible conduct by the defendants.

The court emphasized that costs must be fair and proportionate to the result achieved.

Partial indemnity fees of $100,000 and disbursements of $50,000 inclusive of HST were awarded.

Sentencing following conviction after a non‑jury trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, possession of cocaine, and possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000.

Police executing a search warrant at a motel room seized 11.18 grams of crack cocaine, 3.21 grams of cocaine, digital scales, a debt list, and cash.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record for drug trafficking offences spanning decades and had served multiple prior custodial sentences.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for trafficking in crack cocaine while considering mitigating factors including a difficult personal background and relatively small quantities of drugs.

Enhanced credit for pre‑trial custody under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code was denied because the offender’s remand detention arose from other charges.

A custodial sentence was imposed with credit for time served.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend a statement of claim to seek a declaration of an equitable mortgage over the defendants’ property and to obtain a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL).

The defendants opposed the CPL, arguing the claim was raised outside the limitation period and that registering a CPL years after the action commenced would cause prejudice because the property had been used to secure financing for their defence.

The court held that the proposed amendment flowed from the existing pleading and did not constitute a new cause of action, and therefore leave to amend should be granted under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, the court declined to issue a CPL, finding that the plaintiff delayed more than three years before seeking the remedy and that granting it would cause significant prejudice to the defendants.

Costs were awarded to the defendants.

The applicant, charged with drug offences, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at his motel room.

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) was deficient, the no-knock entry was unreasonable, and his rights were breached when he was questioned before being advised of his right to counsel.

The court found the ITO established reasonable grounds based on corroborated confidential informant tips, and the no-knock entry was justified by exigent circumstances.

While the pre-caution questioning breached the applicant's rights, the court applied the Grant framework and concluded the physical evidence should not be excluded, as society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits outweighed the fleeting breach.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of cocaine, and possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000 following execution of a search warrant at a motel unit.

Police located crack cocaine and cocaine packaged in multiple baggies, a digital scale with cocaine residue, numerous small baggies, debt lists, multiple cell phones, and over $1,500 in small-denomination currency.

The accused was the sole occupant of the small, cluttered motel unit and his vehicle was parked outside throughout police surveillance.

The court held that constructive possession was established based on circumstantial evidence demonstrating knowledge and control over the drugs.

Considering the packaging, paraphernalia, expert evidence on trafficking indicators, and cash denominations, the court concluded the drugs were possessed for the purpose of trafficking and that the currency represented proceeds of crime.