Gregory M. Mulligan

The owner of a motor vehicle brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims arising from a motor vehicle accident caused by the owner’s minor son.

The owner argued that he did not provide express or implied consent for his unlicensed son to operate the vehicle, relying on s.192 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The court applied the summary judgment framework from Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch and considered whether implied consent could be determined on the evidentiary record.

Finding the son knew he lacked permission, had never previously driven the vehicle, and had taken the keys without authorization, the court concluded there was no express or implied consent.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim against the vehicle owner.

The defendant moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims arising from a 1996 motor vehicle accident, arguing the action commenced in 2007 was statute-barred.

The plaintiff contended she did not discover the serious nature of her knee injury until 2007 when she was forced to stop working and required a total knee replacement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that determining when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known she had a serious impairment required a full trial to assess conflicting evidence and credibility.

In a high-conflict family proceeding scheduled for trial within months, the father sought an interim order permitting him to change the children's long-standing private school to public schools closer to his residence.

The mother opposed the motion, emphasizing the stability of the existing school arrangement and the pending trial addressing custody and related issues.

The court considered the importance of maintaining the status quo in interim parenting disputes and the risk of effectively predetermining custody-related issues before trial.

Given the imminent trial and the absence of compelling evidence that a change was required in the children's best interests, the court declined to alter the established schooling arrangement.

Separated parents brought competing motions seeking a determination of which parent the child should primarily reside with for purposes of school attendance.

The dispute arose in the context of a shared parenting arrangement on a rotating three‑day schedule and the impending commencement of kindergarten.

The court considered the recommendations of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and evaluated each parent’s proposed parenting plan, living arrangements, work schedules, health considerations, and the child’s stability.

Greater weight was given to the father’s ability to provide consistent school attendance, proximity to school, and flexible work hours.

The court ordered that the child primarily reside with the father during the school week, imposed restrictions on exposure to second‑hand smoke, and structured parenting time and exchanges between the parties.

A financial institution applied to vary a restraint order made under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to permit a power of sale of property and payment of its mortgage debt from the proceeds before remitting the balance to the Crown.

The Attorney General opposed the variation, arguing that the mortgagee must first establish lack of complicity or collusion in the underlying drug activity.

The court held that the restraint order permitted sale by the mortgagee but required that all net proceeds, subject only to ordinary costs of sale, be remitted to the Crown unless and until the mortgagee established its entitlement through statutory restoration proceedings.

The court declined to determine the mortgagee’s innocence on the limited record and directed that such issues be addressed in the pending forfeiture proceedings.

The requested variation was therefore refused.

The offender, a bookkeeper, pleaded guilty to theft over $5,000 for stealing approximately $395,000 from her employers over several years.

The Crown sought 4 to 6 months of incarceration, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized general deterrence for large-scale employee thefts involving a breach of trust.

Applying the factors from R. v. Bogart, the court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed 5 months of incarceration followed by two years of probation, along with restitution orders.

Following a jury trial arising from a motorcycle accident, the defendant brought a post‑verdict threshold motion under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act seeking to bar recovery of non‑pecuniary damages.

The moving party argued the plaintiff failed to establish a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function.

The court reviewed the statutory definitions under Regulation 381/03 (Bill 198) and considered extensive medical and lay evidence regarding chronic pain, knee injury, psychological effects, and functional limitations.

The court held the plaintiff established a permanent and serious impairment affecting important functions, including employment capacity and activities of daily living.

The threshold was met and the defendant’s motion was dismissed.

A fire chief applied for an order under the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 requiring a commercial property owner to comply with an inspection order mandating installation of a sprinkler system and seeking injunctive relief prohibiting occupancy until compliance.

The respondent had appealed the order to the Office of the Fire Marshal, which upheld the sprinkler requirement but allowed submission of alternative fire protection measures prepared by a professional engineer for approval by the local fire department.

After the fire department rejected proposed alternatives, the applicant sought enforcement through the court.

The court held that the Fire Marshal’s decision improperly delegated final authority back to the fire department without a mechanism for further review, undermining procedural fairness.

The matter was referred back to the Office of the Fire Marshal to determine whether the respondent’s alternative measures constituted compliance.

The applicant brought a motion for interim child support, interim spousal support, and an advance of funds to retain a forensic accountant and cover legal fees.

The dispute concerned the respondent’s true income from a financial planning business operated through a corporation, with allegations of co‑mingled personal and corporate finances and inadequate disclosure.

Applying Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules and authorities governing interim disbursements, the court held that expert assistance was necessary to assess the respondent’s income and level the playing field.

The respondent was ordered to contribute $10,000 toward the cost of a forensic accounting report and to pay interim child support based on an imputed income of $60,000.

No interim spousal support or advance for legal fees was ordered.

An interpleader application was brought by a municipality holding the remaining balance of a developer’s subdivision security deposit after the original developer defaulted.

Competing claims were made by the developer’s secured creditor and by a subsequent purchaser who completed the subdivision under a new agreement.

The court interpreted the original subdivision agreement, particularly provisions governing default and the return of securities upon voiding of the agreement.

It held that once the municipality declared the agreement null and void, the remaining security was contractually required to be returned to the original owner, subject to expenses.

As the secured creditor of that owner, the creditor was entitled to the remaining funds.

In a family law proceeding, the responding spouse brought a motion seeking disclosure from three non-party corporations connected to the applicant spouse’s business interests.

The requested documents were required by the moving party’s business valuator to assess the value of the applicant’s corporate interests and income for matrimonial property purposes.

The corporations resisted disclosure citing confidentiality concerns and sought to redact information relating to other shareholders.

The court applied Rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules and held that it would be unfair for the moving party to proceed without the requested information.

The court ordered production of the outstanding documents without redactions, subject to litigation privilege and a confidentiality agreement.

Following dismissal of a motion for partial summary judgment, the successful defendant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff opposed costs or alternatively argued that any award should be proportional given the simplified procedure context and the modest amount in issue.

The court applied the general rule that costs follow the event and considered proportionality and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court reduced the amount sought and awarded a reasonable partial indemnity costs amount.

The plaintiff suffered a debilitating stroke and sued his family physician for medical malpractice, alleging negligence in the management of his Coumadin (blood thinner) therapy.

The court found that the physician breached the standard of care by failing to appropriately adjust the plaintiff's dosage and monitor his INR levels after subtherapeutic readings and a reported transient ischemic attack.

The court concluded that this breach caused the stroke and dismissed the defendant's claim of contributory negligence, finding the plaintiff acted reasonably.

The applicant corporation brought an application concerning a restraint order affecting property.

It was uncontested that neither the corporation nor its sole shareholder, officer, and director had been charged with any criminal offence related to the restraint order or the property.

The respondent did not dispute these facts and there was no cross‑examination on the supporting affidavit.

The court issued a supplementary endorsement confirming that these uncontested facts informed the earlier decision dismissing the application.

The applicant sought to vary an ex parte restraint order under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to allow the sale of a property that had been used as a commercial marijuana grow operation.

The applicant wanted to use the sale proceeds to pay out a first mortgage held by a credit union before remitting the balance to the Attorney General.

The Attorney General opposed the payout, arguing that the mortgagee's innocence had not been established and should be determined at a forfeiture hearing.

The court dismissed the application, finding that it would be premature to allow the payout before a full hearing under s. 20 of the CDSA.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, production of marijuana, and possession of brass knuckles.

Police executing a search warrant discovered 451 marijuana plants, seeds, and sophisticated growing equipment in the offender’s residence.

The offender had a prior conviction for marijuana production and had previously received a conditional sentence.

The court held that the scale of the operation, the residential setting, the presence of a weapon, and the offender’s prior similar conviction required a custodial sentence to achieve denunciation and deterrence.

A conditional sentence was rejected as inappropriate given the recidivist conduct.

Following a successful motion to change regarding post-secondary expenses for a child of the relationship, the court considered a costs request by the responding parent.

The responding parent argued entitlement to substantial indemnity costs based on an Offer to Settle that was allegedly close to the final order.

The court found the offer did not qualify as a valid offer under Rule 18 of the Family Law Rules because it contained additional stipulations and releases not reflected in the judgment.

Considering Rule 24(11), the financial circumstances of the custodial parent, and the best interests of the child, the court declined to award costs.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim after trial under the Simplified Procedure Rules, the successful defendant sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff acknowledged entitlement to costs but argued for a reduced amount.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant cost principles, the court determined that a reduced all-inclusive costs award was fair and reasonable.

The court also granted additional costs against a defendant by counterclaim who had been noted in default in connection with the counterclaim judgment.

The parties separated after a high-conflict relationship and sought a determination on child custody, child support, and equalization of net family property.

The applicant mother sought sole custody and permission to relocate with the child to another municipality, while the respondent father sought joint custody and to maintain the child in a French immersion school.

The court found that joint custody was inappropriate due to the parents' inability to communicate and cooperate.

The court granted the applicant sole custody, permitted the relocation as it was in the child's best interests, and ordered the child to be transferred to an English school.

The court also calculated the net family property and ordered the respondent to pay an equalization payment of $43,245.

The plaintiff subcontractor brought a motion for partial summary judgment against a surety insurer under labour and material payment bonds after obtaining default judgments against the general contractor in Small Claims Court.

The insurer opposed the motion, arguing that multiple factual issues required determination at trial, including whether the bonds provided coverage, whether notice requirements were met, and whether limitation defences applied.

Applying the post‑amendment summary judgment framework and the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, the court held that the competing affidavits revealed significant factual disputes requiring credibility assessments.

The court concluded that the “full appreciation test” could not be satisfied on the motion record.

The motion for partial summary judgment was dismissed and the matter was directed to proceed by summary trial under Rule 76.