Gregory Lafontaine

The defendant, Salvatore Joseph Badali, was sentenced for living on the avails of prostitution from a person under 18, obtaining sexual services from a female under 18, and procuring a female under 18 into prostitution.

The court had previously found mandatory minimum sentences under sections 212(2) and 212(4) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional.

Considering the victim's impact statement, the defendant's extensive criminal record, and the principles of denunciation and deterrence, the court imposed a global sentence of 3 years in custody, less 60 days for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 34 months.

Specific sentences were 22 months for living on avails (concurrent for procuring) and 12 months consecutive for obtaining sexual services.

A DNA order and a 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act order were also issued.

The defendant, having been found guilty of living on the avails of prostitution of a person under 18 and obtaining sexual services from a person under 18, brought a motion challenging the constitutional validity of the mandatory minimum sentences under sections 212(2) and 212(4) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant argued the sentences violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court applied the reasonable hypothetical framework and found that the mandatory minimum sentences would be grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable scenarios.

The court concluded the provisions violated section 12 of the Charter, could not be saved under section 1, and declared them of no force or effect.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with perjury and attempting to obstruct justice.

The Crown alleged that the accused encouraged a confidential informant to plant a firearm at a suspect's residence and subsequently swore a false Information to Obtain a search warrant that omitted this fact and contained other misleading information.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as improbable and found that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed perjury and attempted to obstruct justice.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to apply the 'last chance' doctrine, failing to consider his medical condition as a reasonable excuse, and misapprehending the evidence of his failure to comply.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was given six opportunities to provide a sample, his medical complaints were not supported by the evidence, and his refusal was unequivocal.

The accused appealed convictions for fraud and an order for a new trial on cheating-related counts arising from attempts to rig horse races by drugging horses.

The Court held there was evidence a horse race can involve mixed chance and skill through randomized post positions, supporting a new trial on cheating counts.

It further held the drugging scheme constituted dishonest conduct creating a non-remote risk of deprivation to bettors, and upheld entered fraud convictions.

The appeal was dismissed.

Two accused were charged with forgery‑related offences, tax fraud, and money laundering arising from a business producing false identification cards at a Toronto storefront.

The Crown alleged the moving party operated the enterprise through nominee businesses and bank accounts while failing to report significant income, thereby defrauding the federal government.

The court found that forged identification cards were manufactured and sold through the business and that the principal accused was the directing mind of the operation and the beneficiary of its revenues.

However, the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the second accused knowingly participated in the offences or benefited from the income flowing through accounts in his name.

The court convicted the principal accused of forgery‑related offences and tax fraud but acquitted the co‑accused and dismissed the money laundering counts.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately address his argument that breath samples were not taken 'as soon as practicable'.

The Superior Court found the trial judge's reasons were legally inadequate for failing to expressly address the issue.

However, applying the curative proviso, the Court held a new trial was unnecessary because the trial record clearly established the 13-minute delay waiting for another officer to secure the appellant's vehicle was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for refusing to comply with a demand to provide breath samples contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued the police officer failed to make the approved instrument demand "as soon as practicable" as required by s. 254(3) due to an approximately 11‑minute delay after arrest.

The court held that the governing standard requires a reasonably prompt demand assessed in light of the entire chain of events and whether police acted reasonably.

Reviewing the audio‑video evidence and the trial judge’s findings, the court concluded the officer’s actions during the delay—including search incident to arrest, managing the scene, and advising the accused of rights—were reasonable.

The trial judge committed no error in concluding the demand was made as soon as practicable.

The accused were jointly tried for fraud over $5,000 arising from a scheme using a stolen and forged TD bank draft to obtain approximately $1.9 million in gold bullion from a Montreal dealer.

The Crown’s case was largely circumstantial and relied on telephone records, cell tower data, and evidence concerning the acquisition and subsequent disposition of Perth Mint gold bars.

The trial judge assessed the evidence under the principles governing circumstantial cases and the framework in R. v. W. (D.).

The court rejected the explanations advanced by the accused and concluded that they had acted together to present the fraudulent draft, obtain the gold, and distribute or conceal it afterward.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that acquitted a police officer of assault.

The trial judge had convicted the officer after finding that kicking a non-aggressive suspect twice constituted excessive force.

The appeal judge overturned the conviction, finding the trial judge improperly required aggressive action as a pre-condition for police use of force.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly considered the suspect's lack of aggression as a contextual factor, not a pre-condition, and that the appeal judge failed to consider proportionality.

The conviction was restored and a conditional discharge was imposed.

On a summary conviction appeal from an excess blood alcohol conviction, the appellant argued that police breached s. 10(a) of the Charter by failing to promptly advise him of the reason for detention, and that the breath tests were not taken as soon as practicable under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the ASD demand, read within minutes of the stop, adequately informed the appellant of the true grounds for his detention and therefore satisfied the informational requirement of s. 10(a).

The court also held that a 12-minute additional delay between the first and second breath tests, caused by the breath technician performing another breath test in a separate investigation, was reasonable in the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his drug convictions, arguing they were unreasonable because there was no evidence of where in his residence the drugs were found.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and proceeds of crime, finding sufficient evidence to support the inference of possession.

However, the court quashed the convictions relating to various pills, holding that without evidence of where the pills were discovered in the house, it was unreasonable to infer possession based solely on the appellant's residency.

The respondent, a licensed horse trainer, injected a performance-enhancing drug into a horse before a race.

He was acquitted at trial of fraud and cheating while playing a game.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by concluding the betting public was not at risk of deprivation, as bettors are entitled to rely on compliance with the regulatory scheme.

The trial judge also erred in finding horse racing is a game of pure skill without considering if it is a game of mixed chance and skill.

The acquittals for fraud were set aside and convictions entered, while a new trial was ordered for the cheating charges.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after participating in the beating death of a drug dealer.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting a witness's videotaped out-of-court statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule after the witness claimed no memory of the conversation at trial.

The appellant also challenged the jury instructions regarding the use of the hearsay statement, the effect of intoxication on the intent for murder, and the use of post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the admission of the hearsay evidence or the jury instructions.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from a large marijuana grow operation discovered on his rural property, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on his silence at arrest and the absence of detail in parts of his testimony when assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did err in drawing an adverse inference from the accused’s exercise of his constitutional right to silence and in relying on certain missing details in the testimony.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the Crown’s evidence overwhelmingly established guilt and that the verdict would inevitably have been the same.

The appellant also challenged the forfeiture of 50% of his property under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court held the forfeiture was a proper exercise of discretion and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon arising from a bar altercation.

The trial judge had relied on generalizations about “bar fight” cases and drew adverse credibility inferences from the accused’s failure to provide certain details during a police statement.

The summary conviction appeal court held that the trial judge improperly relied on the accused’s partial silence when assessing credibility, contrary to principles affirmed in appellate jurisprudence on the right to silence.

The court also found the trial judge’s analytical framework, which treated bar fight cases as having predictable credibility dynamics and sought a “franchise witness,” was inconsistent with the approach mandated by R. v. W.(D.).

The convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

Following convictions for drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, possession of proceeds of crime, and related offences, the Crown applied under s. 462.37 of the Criminal Code for forfeiture of assets and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court applied the reverse onus provisions for criminal organization offences and accepted forensic accounting evidence showing substantial unexplained wealth.

Certain assets were found to be proceeds of crime or partly derived from such proceeds, including cash seized from a residence, equity from a property sale, a vehicle, and unexplained deposits.

The court exempted a condominium claimed by a third party where evidence established it had been purchased using inherited funds.

Significant fines in lieu of forfeiture were imposed where assets were no longer available.

Following a forfeiture hearing, defence counsel requested the release of additional funds from seized assets to pay legal fees.

The court had previously authorized the release of $80,000 from the seized funds.

In a supplementary order correcting an inadvertent omission in the earlier decision, the court refused the request for additional funds.

The court cited the accused’s lack of cooperation and the costs associated with the prosecution as reasons not to release further assets.

The appellants, two drug dealers, were convicted of first-degree murder after killing a customer who had ripped them off.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on constructive first-degree murder, the application of the W. (D.) formula, and the Vetrovec caution.

One appellant also argued the trial judge failed to instruct on the defence of accident and the evidentiary value of an unaccepted guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the jury instructions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to traffic in GHB.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of a police agent, in applying a previous binding decision, and in treating the nature of GHB as a date-rape drug as an aggravating factor on sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment, legal analysis, or sentencing.