Gregory Lafontaine

The appellant appealed his conviction for multiple violent offences and his designation as a dangerous offender, which resulted in an indeterminate sentence.

The primary focus of the appeal was the dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code, which allows for designation based on the brutal nature of a single offence compelling a conclusion of future unrestrained behaviour.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's decision, finding no error in the assessment and weighing of conflicting expert psychiatric evidence regarding the appellant's future risk of violent reoffence.

The court affirmed that the sentencing judge was entitled to prefer the Crown's expert's opinion, which considered clinical factors in addition to actuarial tests, and that the evidence supported the conclusion that the appellant constituted a threat to public safety requiring an indeterminate sentence.

The conviction appeal was also dismissed.

The accused, Christopher Janisse, faced an eight-count indictment for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The trial proceeded on a written statement of facts.

Janisse conceded guilt on two counts of possession of cocaine for trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

The court found him not guilty of two counts of trafficking cocaine, determining that the circumstantial evidence, while suspicious, did not meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found Janisse guilty of a third trafficking count and two counts of possession of fentanyl and crystal methamphetamine for trafficking, concluding that the totality of circumstantial evidence established his knowledge and control of a drug stash house and the large quantities of drugs found.

The final judgment was guilty on counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8, and not guilty on counts 4 and 5.

The defendant, Thanh Hai Lu, was convicted of multiple commercial-level drug trafficking offences involving cocaine, fentanyl, fentanyl/heroin, MDMA, and ketamine.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the dangerous nature and large quantities of drugs, the commercial scope of the operation, and the defendant's subjective knowledge of trafficking fentanyl.

Mitigating factors included his lack of criminal record, strong family support, rehabilitative potential, and expressed remorse.

The court also considered the principle of parity with a co-accused and credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions.

A global sentence of 9.5 years' incarceration was imposed, reduced by pre-trial credit.

The accused was arrested for murder and a search incident to arrest revealed controlled substances.

The murder charges were later withdrawn, but the drug charges proceeded.

The accused brought a Charter motion to exclude the drug evidence, arguing his s. 8 rights were violated by an unlawful arrest and his s. 10(b) rights were violated by a delay in facilitating access to counsel.

The court found the arrest was lawful, but the police seriously breached the accused's right to counsel by inexplicably delaying his access to a lawyer for almost three hours.

Given the seriousness of the breach and misleading testimony by a police officer, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking following an undercover police investigation.

The accused delivered cocaine and fentanyl to an undercover officer on four occasions after deals were brokered by a co-conspirator.

The court admitted the co-conspirator's text messages under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found the accused guilty on all trafficking counts, concluding he had knowledge of the illicit nature of the substances.

The court also found the accused guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking regarding drugs found in an apartment, finding constructive possession proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, charged with multiple drug trafficking offences, brought an application to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that a tracking warrant was improperly issued.

The tracking warrant was based on information from a confidential informant.

Applying the Debot framework, the court found the informant's information was compelling, highly credible, and materially corroborated by police surveillance of counter-surveillance techniques.

The court concluded there were reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was trafficking drugs and that the tracking warrant was validly issued.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused, charged with drug offences following a search incident to an arrest for an unrelated murder, brought a motion to compel disclosure of redacted documents from the ongoing murder investigation.

The defence sought the unredacted documents to challenge the lawfulness of the murder arrest under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Crown asserted investigative privilege over the redacted portions.

The court applied the Richards test and the Barnes four-prong approach, concluding that while the information was relevant, it was unlikely to affect the outcome of the Charter hearing or prevent the accused from making full answer and defence.

The court held that the public interest in protecting the ongoing murder investigation outweighed the accused's marginal interest in disclosure, and dismissed the motion.

The applicant, Kevin Tran, convicted of drug trafficking and firearms offences, sought bail pending appeal.

The Crown opposed, arguing detention was necessary in the public interest under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant would surrender.

Despite the seriousness of the offences, the applicant's lack of criminal history, adherence to previous bail conditions, and strict proposed release terms, along with the co-accused's prior release on similar terms, led the court to conclude that detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The application for bail pending appeal was granted.

The applicant challenged the validity of a search warrant executed on his residence and vehicle on the grounds of a breach of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (unreasonable search and seizure).

The applicant raised three arguments: (1) the ITO failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe trafficking had occurred; (2) the ITO failed to establish reasonable grounds that evidence would be found at the residence; and (3) the warrant was facially invalid for authorizing searches of two separate independent places on a single warrant.

The court rejected all three arguments and found the warrant valid, admitting the evidence obtained from the search.

Omnibus Garofoli application challenging the naming of multiple accused persons in two authorizations to intercept private communications issued in Project Kraken, an investigation into criminal activity by the Deep Waters and Chester Le gangs in Toronto.

The applicants challenged their inclusion as named targets in the first authorization (March 25, 2019) and second authorization (May 21, 2019), as well as the inclusion of Maral Ashoury's telephone number in an earlier Transmission Data Recorder warrant (February 11, 2019).

The court applied the deferential Garofoli standard of review and upheld the authorizations, finding sufficient reliable evidence that the interception of the applicants' communications could assist in the investigation of criminal organization offences.

The respondent, Barry Lee Charpentier, was charged with fraud over $5,000.

The Crown alleged a scheme where Charpentier, as Vice-President of Construction for E & E Seegmiller Limited, colluded with a sub-contractor (Chym Engineering Limited) to inflate invoices, with half of the excess funds being paid to a company owned by Charpentier's former spouse.

Charpentier denied fraud, claiming the payments were compensation agreed upon with Tim Seegmiller due to unfulfilled employment contract terms and his involvement in Seegmiller's alleged bid-rigging and other unethical activities.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the identity of the victim (E & E Seegmiller Limited as a legal entity), deprivation, and mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, largely due to the absence of crucial corporate documents and the testimony of Tim Seegmiller.

Consequently, Charpentier was found not guilty.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug-related offences and his sentence.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in finding the Information to Obtain (ITO) for search warrants was sufficient and whether evidence obtained from a warrantless swab of his car door handle should have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that the warrantless swabbing of the car door handles, followed by chemical analysis, constituted an unreasonable search under section 8 of the Charter, requiring prior judicial authorization.

However, the Court upheld the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence under section 24(2), deferring to the trial judge's assessment of the Grant factors, particularly the police's good faith and full disclosure.

The Court also dismissed the appeal against sentence, finding the six-year consecutive sentence (resulting in a total of 16 years) was not demonstrably unfit given the serious nature of the drug trafficking enterprise and the appellant's conduct while on bail.

The applicant sought an order under ss. 462.34(1) and 462.34(4) of the Criminal Code for the return of $99,475 in seized Canadian currency to cover reasonable legal expenses.

The primary issue was whether the applicant was required to apply for Legal Aid funding as a prerequisite.

The court, informed by R. v. Rafilovich, found that requiring a Legal Aid application would conflict with the statutory objectives of providing access to counsel and upholding the presumption of innocence, especially given the applicant's desire for counsel of choice.

The court was satisfied that the applicant had an interest in the seized property and no other available assets or means.

The application for the return of funds for legal expenses was granted, with the reasonableness of the expenses to be determined at a subsequent in camera hearing.

Siavash Norouzian was charged with heroin trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an undercover officer, Detective Constable Gazey, and Sergeant Sutton.

However, forensic phone data contradicted Detective Constable Gazey's sworn evidence regarding phone calls, voice identification, and text messages, leading the court to find him not credible and unreliable.

Sergeant Sutton's evidence was also deemed unreliable due to lost notes and delayed report writing.

The court emphasized the importance of reliable forensic evidence in challenging police testimony and the Crown's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Given the significant credibility and reliability issues with the key Crown witnesses, Mr. Norouzian was acquitted of all charges.

The accused was stopped by police while driving on a highway.

The officer detected the smell of marijuana and air freshener, and subsequently observed marijuana shake in plain view, leading to the accused's arrest.

A search of the vehicle yielded significant quantities of marijuana, cocaine, and cash.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found a s. 10(b) violation because the officer elicited an admission from the accused before providing a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the accused's admission but admitted the physical evidence, finding the drugs and money were discoverable independent of the breach.

The appellant, convicted of drug trafficking offences, had previously obtained a judicial order returning seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses under s. 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, having demonstrated no other assets or means.

At sentencing, the Crown sought a fine instead of forfeiture under s. 462.37(3) equal to the returned amount.

The majority held that, as a general rule, sentencing judges should not impose a fine instead of forfeiture on funds judicially returned for the payment of reasonable legal expenses, as doing so would undermine Parliament's secondary purposes of providing access to counsel and giving meaningful weight to the presumption of innocence.

The discretion to impose a fine may be exercised only where the offender lacked a real financial need or did not use the funds to alleviate that need.

The dissent would have imposed the fine in lieu unless the offender could demonstrate a constitutional entitlement to state-funded counsel under the Rowbotham test.

The offender pleaded guilty to serious sexual offences against three male victims aged 14, 15, and 17-18 years old.

The offences included sexual assault, sexual interference, luring, and transmission of sexually explicit material.

The offender, aged 41-42 at the time of the offences, engaged in grooming behaviour, provided money and substances to the victims, and used online platforms to facilitate contact.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7.5 years in the penitentiary, with credit for pre-trial custody and enhanced credit for harsh detention conditions.

The court rejected the Crown's proposed range of 8-10 years, finding that the absence of a position of trust and the guilty pleas warranted a more moderate sentence within the 5-9 year range.

The applicant challenged the issuance of a DNA warrant on the grounds that the Information to Obtain contained inaccurate information regarding observations of the applicant engaging in drug trafficking activity and exiting a specific unit.

The court found that two aspects of the ITO should be excised as they were not supported by the original surveillance evidence.

However, the court determined that even with these excisions, there remained sufficient basis to authorize the seizure of the applicant's DNA based on other evidence, including CCTV footage showing the applicant using a fob associated with the unit, observations of the applicant leaving with a suspected drug trafficker, and possession of a key to the unit where a firearm was found.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants brought applications under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to challenge the lawfulness of search warrants executed on three apartment units.

Thanh Nguyen lacked standing to challenge the search of the Sherway location as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a unit he was merely permitted to use as a guest.

Catherine Vu and Kevin Tran challenged the search of the Lakeshore location where Vu was the tenant.

The court found the warrant for the Lakeshore location was issued without reasonable grounds to believe evidence would be found there, as the connection between Tran and the residence was insufficient to establish more than occasional guest status.

The search violated section 8 rights.

However, under the R. v. Grant analysis, the evidence was admitted as the police acted in good faith, the state conduct was not improper, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits outweighed the privacy breach.

Three defendants applied for orders staying criminal proceedings on the grounds that their right to be tried within a constitutionally tolerable time had been breached.

The applicable ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice cases is 18 months.

The Crown argued that when defence delay periods were subtracted, the total delay did not exceed the ceiling.

The court found that two applicants' delay did not exceed the 18-month threshold after deducting defence delay caused by their decision to change counsel.

For the third applicant, although the delay exceeded the Jordan guidelines by nine days, the court found exceptional circumstances existed that rebutted the presumption of unreasonable delay.

All three applications were dismissed.