The appellant appealed summary conviction convictions for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 and breaching an undertaking requiring zero blood alcohol while driving.
He argued that, after being arrested on the bail breach and asserting the right to counsel, police were required to hold off from making a roadside ASD demand, and further argued that the trial judge erred in the Grant analysis by understating both the seriousness and impact of the Charter breaches.
The appeal court held that the implied s. 1 limitation on s. 10(b) recognized in roadside impaired-driving screening jurisprudence continued to permit the ASD demand notwithstanding the prior arrest on the separate offence.
The court also upheld the trial judge’s assessment that the s. 8 and s. 10(b) breaches were not deliberate or systemic and that their impact on the appellant’s protected interests was limited.
The conviction appeal was dismissed.
