Gregory Lafontaine

The appellant appealed his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the suggestion the appellant did not leave the scene with the intent to flee civil or criminal liability was totally destroyed by the evidence.

The Court held that regardless of whether the trial judge was correct in her treatment of the presumption, the result would necessarily have been the same.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder arising from a random drive-by shooting.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a change of venue or trial by judge alone due to extensive pre-trial publicity.

He also raised several grounds regarding the jury charge, including alleged errors in instructions on the fact-finding process, reasonable doubt, and the use of discreditable conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or instructions to the jury.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to six years' imprisonment after punching the deceased once outside a bar, causing the deceased to fall and suffer fatal head injuries.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding self-defence, provocation, and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and applying the curative proviso regarding the omission of a section 37 self-defence instruction.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the six-year term was within the appropriate range.

The appellant, a 14-year-old young offender, appealed his conditional discharge for trafficking $10 worth of marijuana to undercover police officers at a rock concert.

At trial, his application for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by applying an overly onerous test for entrapment from Amato rather than the correct test from Mack.

Based on the trial judge's own findings that the appellant would not have sold the drugs but for the officers' importuning, the Court concluded the police went beyond providing an opportunity and induced the offence.

A stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for abduction, his designation as a dangerous offender, and the indeterminate sentence imposed.

The court rejected arguments that the trial judge applied the wrong mens rea test under s. 281 of the Criminal Code or that the actus reus was incomplete because the child had not yet been taken to a location of control.

The court also upheld the dismissal of an abuse of process stay application in the dangerous offender proceeding and found the predicate offence qualified as a serious personal injury offence under s. 752(a)(ii).

Given the record of actual and attempted sexual incidents with young girls and medical evidence concerning treatment prospects, the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence were affirmed.

The appellant sought to withdraw a guilty plea to welfare fraud over $5,000 on the basis that it was not voluntary.

The court held that the plea was entered after significant pressure arising from a pending obstruct justice charge, the prospect of immediate arrest and custody, and comments made by the presiding judge to an emotionally distraught accused caring for an infant.

Applying the governing law on the voluntariness of guilty pleas, the court concluded the plea was not made voluntarily and unequivocally.

The conviction and sentence were set aside and a trial was ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal and, if granted, appealed from the dismissal of his summary conviction appeal respecting convictions for two assaults and uttering death threats.

The court held that complaints about the summary conviction appeal judge's refusal to revisit credibility findings on an overextended collateral property issue did not raise an issue of law.

However, the sentences imposed below were conceded to be blended and therefore illegal.

Leave to appeal was granted, the conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was allowed with concurrent 90-day custodial sentences and the probation order left in place.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence arising from an impaired driving causing death matter involving egregious facts.

The Court of Appeal held that, although a substantial penitentiary sentence was warranted because of the grave consequences, prior alcohol-related record, and lack of remorse, the sentencing judge erred in principle by imposing a sentence above the range imposed on similar offenders in similar cases.

Applying the parity principle in s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code, the court reduced the custodial sentence from eight years to six years.

The 10-year driving prohibition was left undisturbed.

The appellant appealed a 16-year penitentiary sentence imposed following guilty pleas to robbery, wounding, committing an indictable offence while disguised, and possession of a stolen vehicle.

The offences involved an armed robbery by a 17-year-old offender during which the victim was shot and left permanently paralyzed.

The court held that the sentencing judge properly considered the offender's youth, limited prior record, difficult background, and pre-trial custody, but was entitled to give significant weight to poor rehabilitation prospects, public protection, and denunciation.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the sentence, while at the high end of the range, was not unfit.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing that the trial judge improperly relied on prior consistent statements, made an unreasonable finding regarding attempted anal intercourse, and reversed the onus when discussing physical evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not use prior consistent statements to bolster credibility, but only to identify the scope of the alleged recent fabrication and assess the explanation offered.

The court further held that the impugned factual finding was reasonably open on the evidence, including testimony and medical evidence.

It also found no onus reversal, as the trial judge merely noted the absence of an explanation capable of raising a reasonable doubt in the context of an admitted intercourse and consent defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction and advanced, among other grounds, ineffective assistance of counsel and improper use of evidence connected to a bail hearing.

Applying the governing two-part framework, the court held the proposed fresh evidence established neither incompetence nor a miscarriage of justice, and found the suggested alternative trial strategy would have exposed the appellant to highly prejudicial bad character evidence.

The court also held that the impugned questioning did not engage s. 13 of the Charter and did not violate s. 7 because the appellant was not confronted with his prior bail testimony and the reply evidence regarding the bail document was inconsequential.

The application to admit fresh evidence was dismissed and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed sentence from a three-year penitentiary term.

The court agreed that a conditional sentence was not appropriate given the nature of the offence, but held that the circumstances of the offence and the offender did not justify a penitentiary term.

Significant weight was given to the appellant's youth, lack of criminal record, the immediate context of the offence, genuine remorse, and fresh evidence showing meaningful rehabilitative progress.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to two years less a day followed by 18 months' probation, together with a 10-year weapons prohibition order under s. 109 of the Criminal Code.

In advance of a criminal conviction appeal, the appellant brought motions to compel attendance and production from an alleged alternate suspect and treating physicians to support a proposed fresh evidence application grounded in ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The court held that the alternate suspect was compellable because the defence sought exculpatory, not predominantly incriminating, evidence.

Production of one physician's records was granted on consent, but the application concerning a psychiatrist's records was dismissed without prejudice for failure to proceed within the Criminal Code records regime.

On the Crown's responding motion, production and examination were granted for one psychologist where threshold relevance was established, but denied for a correctional risk assessment for lack of sufficient evidentiary foundation.

The appellants appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal had dismissed one appellant's appeal against conviction and allowed the Crown's appeal against the other appellant's acquittal for conspiracy to commit robbery.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals for the reasons given by the Court of Appeal of Ontario.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings and ordered a new trial.

The issue concerned whether the use of a police informant, who was to be paid in full only in the event of a successful investigation, constituted an abuse of process.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal that the informant's evidence was not inadmissible.