Gregory Lafontaine

The appellant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder for killing her two young sons.

At trial, she instructed her counsel not to raise the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) and refused to testify.

On appeal, she sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence that she was suffering from severe paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the offences and was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of her acts.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it met the Palmer criteria and that her decision at trial was a product of her untreated mental illness.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions, and substituted a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant appealed his conviction for extortion and his sentence of four years' imprisonment.

The sole ground of appeal argued was the trial judge's failure to give a limiting instruction to the jury regarding evidence of the appellant's association with the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the instruction should have been given, its absence occasioned no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the strong Crown case and the lack of objection by trial counsel.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the four-year term was within the fit range.

The appellant appealed his conviction for perjury, which related to his testimony about his prior criminal record.

The trial proceeded on a shared misapprehension by counsel and the trial judge that the appellant had five prior convictions, when he actually had at most four, and possibly only three.

The Court of Appeal held that this error was crucial, particularly given that the jury acquitted the appellant of one closely connected charge while convicting him of another.

Finding the verdict unsafe, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, as well as his sentence of 11 years and 4 months.

The appellant had confined his former girlfriend in the trunk of her car, bound her, and placed a plastic bag and canvas bag over her head secured with duct tape.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions regarding the use of the plastic bag and the appellant's subjective intent to kill were supported by the evidence.

The court also upheld the threat conviction, noting it did not require proof of a weapon.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the trial judge properly considered the aggravating factors, including the domestic context and breach of bail.

The appellant appealed his conviction and three-year sentence for historic sexual assault.

He argued that the trial judge failed to adequately set out the theory of the defence and relate the evidence to it during the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's brief charge was adequate for a short, single-issue trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year term was deemed appropriate for several acts of sexual intercourse with a minor.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons appealed an order granting a physician a stay of his licence revocation pending his appeal of a finding of incompetence.

The College argued that s. 71 of the Health Professions Procedural Code ousted the court's jurisdiction to grant a stay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 71 merely eliminates the automatic stay that would otherwise apply under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, but does not remove the court's inherent and statutory jurisdiction to grant a stay on application where appropriate.

The appellant, a former psychotherapist, appealed his convictions for historical sexual offences against five female patients.

At trial, the appellant argued that the sexual acts were either consensual, part of bona fide therapy, or occurred outside the therapeutic relationship.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge fundamentally erred in his jury instructions on consent by conflating medical 'informed consent' with criminal consent and failing to properly put the defence's theory to the jury.

The Court also held that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence from a prior disciplinary hearing under the principled exception, as the necessity and reliability criteria were not met.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for drug offences.

The Crown conceded that the guilty plea, entered in error at the conclusion of a Charter voir dire, should be struck.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in minimizing the seriousness of a section 8 Charter breach, which occurred when the appellant was searched without reasonable and probable grounds before entering a police cruiser after being detained in freezing weather.

The Court concluded that the seriousness of the breach favoured exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and acquittals were entered.

The respondent was convicted of possessing instruments adapted and intended to be used to commit forgery under s. 369(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge instructed the jury that 'adapted' meant 'suitable for'.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, finding the word ambiguous and interpreting it in favour of the accused to mean 'altered or modified'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the French version of the statute clearly resolves any ambiguity, confirming that 'adapted' in s. 369(b) means 'suitable for'.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for welfare fraud.

The Court of Appeal found it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the appellant had undisclosed assets and income, and that his false reporting allowed him to continue receiving welfare.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The indictment was amended on consent to charge fraud over $1,000 to conform to the Criminal Code at the relevant time.

The appellant appealed his convictions for indecent assault and gross indecency, arguing errors in the jury charge, improper cross-examination by the Crown, and the improper admission of expert evidence regarding delayed disclosure.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge departed from the Lifchus standard, failed to adequately relate the defence's position, and failed to caution against propensity reasoning.

The Court also found the Crown's cross-examination improper and the expert evidence inadmissible under the necessity requirement.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to import drugs, importing, and attempted possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals against the conspiracy and importation convictions, finding sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions and rejecting arguments regarding the misuse of disclosure and directed verdicts.

However, the Court applied the Kienapple rule to stay the convictions for attempted possession for the purpose of trafficking, as a single act underlay the multiple charges.

The appellants were committed for trial on charges arising from the alleged misuse of funds of a rape crisis line to pay legal costs.

They applied for certiorari to quash their committals, which was largely dismissed by the reviewing judge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no error, affirming that there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could find guilt.

The court also upheld the extension of the timeframe for the charges against one appellant, finding it covered a series of connected acts.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of causing death by criminal negligence after firing a rifle into a lake, resulting in a bullet ricocheting and killing a seven-year-old boy on the opposite shore.

At trial, the Crown introduced evidence from a police officer who conducted an experiment firing the appellant's rifle into the water to demonstrate how bullets ricochet.

The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing the experiment evidence was novel scientific evidence that failed to meet the Mohan criteria for expert opinion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the officer's testimony was primarily factual observation rather than expert opinion, and was relevant, material, and properly admitted.

The appellant sought to appeal a conviction entered after a guilty plea, after the federal Crown concluded that the conviction occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal received fresh evidence in the form of a sealed affidavit, granted an extension of time, quashed the conviction, and directed a new trial, with the Crown undertaking to stay further proceedings.

The court also addressed an application by the federal and provincial Crown to continue a sealing order over the affidavit.

Applying open court principles discussed in Dagenais, the court held that a sealing order was appropriate in rare circumstances but required notice to media outlets.

The appellant was convicted of indecent assault and gross indecency against his step-daughter for historical offences.

He appealed his convictions on grounds including improper cross-examination regarding his character, failure to give a propensity warning regarding his lifestyle, failure to give a warning regarding the lapse of time before charges were laid, and failure to stay a conviction under the Kienapple principle.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or the Crown's cross-examination.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly emphasized general deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant was convicted of unlawful cultivation of a narcotic and possession for the purpose of trafficking after a marijuana grow operation was found in an apartment he rented.

The Crown relied on personal documents and papers related to hydroponics seized from the apartment and another residence as circumstantial evidence of his control over the premises.

The appellant appealed, arguing the documents had no probative value.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the documents were admissible as circumstantial evidence of the appellant's knowledge and control of the marijuana.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of sexual assault, forcible confinement, and uttering threats.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in excluding the hearsay statement of the parties' six-year-old child, who was present in the apartment during the alleged offences but was unable to testify due to emotional trauma.

Although the trial judge found the statement met the threshold for necessity and reliability, he excluded it under his residual discretion, concluding that its admission without the opportunity for cross-examination would be fundamentally unfair to the accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion.

The appellant appealed convictions for uttering a forged document, breach of recognizance, and fraud under $5,000, as well as a nine-month custodial sentence.

The court rejected the challenge to the identification evidence, holding that the trial judge was entitled to accept the courier manager's identification despite an initial mistaken photo lineup selection.

The Crown conceded that the full offence of uttering had not been made out because the document was not dealt with by the intended recipient as genuine.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part by substituting a conviction for attempting to utter a forged document and reducing the sentence on that count to three months concurrent.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for two counts of robbery with a weapon.

He argued the trial judge failed to separate evidence between the counts and that there was insufficient evidence the weapon used was a firearm under s. 2 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The court held that while mandatory minimums applied, imposing consecutive minimum sentences resulted in an unduly long total sentence.

The sentence was reduced from eight years to six years.