George W. King

The accused was charged with multiple firearm and drug offences.

The police conducted warrantless searches of the accused's rental property based on the consent of the landlord (the accused's mother).

The court found that the landlord did not have the authority to consent to the search of the tenant's residence, resulting in a breach of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the firearm, marijuana, and a portion of the cocaine from evidence, finding that their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the seriousness of the police conduct.

The applicants sought a declaration that a proposed municipal fee for a fill permit was an illegal tax, and a mandamus order compelling the respondent municipality to issue the permit.

The municipality had refused to issue the permit until a fill agreement and fill management plan were finalized, which included resolving several outstanding technical and environmental issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding that the applicants did not yet have a clear legal right to the permit and the municipality was not under an obligation to issue it while significant issues remained unresolved.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to pay interim spousal support.

The original motion was brought solely to seek the sale of the matrimonial home, and neither party had requested interim spousal support in their motion materials.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge committed an error of law by ordering interim spousal support without providing the parties notice or an opportunity to make submissions on the issue.

The provision ordering spousal support was struck.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order requiring it to pay unpaid legal fees to the respondent bank.

The bank had made an arithmetic error in a mortgage discharge statement, omitting the legal fees from the final total, though they were listed in the body of the statement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the discharge of the mortgage did not extinguish the underlying contractual debt and that the appellant had not detrimentally relied on the error.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his complaint of workplace discrimination on the basis of race.

The Tribunal had dismissed the complaint because the 2009 and 2011 allegations were out of time, the 2014 termination was appropriately dealt with through a union grievance and arbitration, and there was insufficient evidence for the 2015 allegations.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's decisions were reasonable, there was no denial of procedural fairness, and the Charter did not apply to private workplace interactions.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The accused, Brandon Nunn, charged with possession of fentanyl for trafficking, brought an application to exclude evidence (fentanyl tablets) under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police unlawfully detained the accused, conducted an unreasonable search, and profoundly violated his right to counsel by forcing him to choose between medical treatment for pepper spray exposure and his constitutional rights, and by questioning him after he requested a lawyer.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court determined that the egregious state conduct and significant impact on the accused's liberty, privacy, and dignity interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

Consequently, the fentanyl evidence was excluded.

The applicant father and respondent mother lived in California but jointly decided to relocate to Ontario, purchasing a home and shipping their belongings.

During the move, the mother travelled to Connecticut with their child and decided to separate.

The father continued to Ontario and later brought the child to Ontario for a visit, subsequently commencing a custody application.

The mother challenged the Ontario court's jurisdiction under s. 22(1) of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court found that despite the child not being habitually resident in Ontario, the court had jurisdiction under s. 22(1)(b) because the parties had a shared settled intention to move to Ontario, establishing a real and substantial connection, and the balance of convenience favoured Ontario.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the 83-year-old plaintiff to attend an examination for discovery with the defendant present.

The plaintiff, who alleged the defendant (her son) misappropriated her funds and breached his fiduciary duty, argued she would be intimidated by his presence.

The court found that the plaintiff established cause for the defendant's exclusion, noting the likelihood of intimidation and disruption, and the lack of prejudice to the defendant.

The motion was dismissed, and the discovery was ordered to proceed without the defendant present.

The plaintiff, acting under an assignment from a trustee in bankruptcy, brought a partial summary judgment motion against the defendants for amounts allegedly owing on a shareholder loan account to the bankrupt company.

The defendants argued the loan was offset by payments made to creditors and unpaid wages.

The court rejected most of the defendants' evidence as lacking documentary support and found that payments made after bankruptcy could not be credited.

The court granted partial summary judgment for $161,724.75, finding no genuine issue for trial on that amount, while leaving the remaining $57,590.25 for trial.

The plaintiff, Champion Products Corp., sought partial summary judgment for replacement costs under a multi-peril insurance policy following a significant fire.

The parties had entered into two settlement agreements, the first establishing a 24-month deadline for replacement and the second modifying terms for a specific property in Scarborough.

Champion failed to complete the Scarborough transaction and subsequently sought to substitute a Pickering property.

The defendant insurer, Intact, argued that Champion had forfeited its right to recoverable depreciation due to missed deadlines.

The court found that Intact had waived its right to claim forfeiture through its conduct, which included assessing the substitute Pickering property over an extended period.

Champion was awarded $3,000,000 for replacement costs, representing the amount agreed upon in the second settlement, and its request for a further appraisal to determine a higher amount was dismissed.

The court heard two separate motions for adjournment of a four-week trial.

Desjardins Financial Security Investments Inc. sought an adjournment to bring a summary judgment motion against the plaintiffs, arguing that an MFDA finding of misconduct against plaintiff Popovich provided just cause for termination.

The Woodall defendants sought an adjournment to pursue leave to appeal a decision by Carey J. that dismissed their motion to strike or stay the plaintiffs' claim due to unpaid costs orders.

The court denied Desjardins' motion, finding that they had delayed in bringing the summary judgment motion and that it would not fully dispose of the claim.

However, the court granted the Woodall defendants' motion, adjourning the trial, to allow their appeal process to conclude, citing the risk of conflicting outcomes and wasted judicial resources if the trial proceeded while a potentially dispositive appeal was pending.

The plaintiff pharmacy brought a motion to amend its statement of claim to add four new defendants and a new cause of action for conspiracy against the existing landlord defendants.

The plaintiff alleged the landlords conspired with the proposed defendants to sell the commercial property to them and oust the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amended claim did not disclose a viable cause of action for conspiracy against the landlords, as they were merely exercising their legal right to sell their property to a bona fide third-party purchaser.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that it was exempt from municipal taxes on certain railway lands under s. 315 of the Municipal Act.

The appellant argued the lands were leased to a third party for valuable consideration.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the agreements between the parties created a business relationship akin to a joint venture, not a lease, as they did not grant exclusive possession.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant hospital sought judicial review of an arbitration award regarding the reduction of hours for regular part-time nurses following a bed closure.

The arbitrator had found that while the hospital was not obliged to schedule part-time nurses to their committed hours if work was unavailable, failing to do so constituted a lay-off under the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court held that these two findings were fundamentally inconsistent and led to an absurd result.

The court granted the application, setting aside the arbitration award as unreasonable, and remitted the matter back to the arbitrator.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision that upheld the employer's prorating of an employee's vacation entitlements due to an unpaid leave of absence.

The Divisional Court found the arbitrator's decision unreasonable because it ignored the presumption that vacation entitlements based on service continue to accrue during authorized leaves absent clear language to the contrary in the collective agreement.

The application was allowed, the award set aside, and the matter remitted to a new arbitrator.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissing his appeal of a police discipline hearing outcome.

The Commission had ruled the appeal was filed out of time because, although faxed and received on the final day of the 30-day limit, a statutory deeming provision deemed faxed documents received the following day.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, holding that the standard of review was correctness and that the deeming provision created a rebuttable presumption, not an absolute one.

The provision is intended to protect the serving party, not to act as a trap to deprive them of a statutory right of appeal when actual receipt within the time limit is established.

The parties executed a separation agreement in 2000, which the responding party filed with the Ontario Court of Justice in 2002.

In 2011, the responding party commenced proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice seeking compliance and child support under the agreement.

The moving party brought a motion to dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction.

The court held that under s. 35 of the Family Law Act, once a separation agreement is filed with the Ontario Court of Justice, it becomes an order of that court and the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to vary or enforce it.

The court ordered the entire proceeding transferred to the Ontario Court of Justice to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

On a summary judgment motion by an unpaid subcontractor, the court held that owners breached the statutory trust scheme under the Construction Lien Act by directing a large advance payment to a related company that supplied no services or materials to the improvement.

The court rejected the argument that lack of privity barred relief, holding that the Act's trust provisions protect parties further down the construction chain and discharge the owner's obligations only where payment is made within the statutory scheme.

The payment to the related company was outside the Act, did not engage s. 10 protection, and did not satisfy holdback requirements.

Summary judgment was granted for the unpaid subcontract amount, with liability also extending to the owners' directors and officers under s. 13(1).