Richard Mark Gordner

The applicant husband brought a motion for partial summary judgment to determine if a lump sum disability payment received by the respondent wife was excluded from her net family property for equalization purposes.

The court found that the respondent failed to meet her onus to prove that any portion of the settlement related to post-separation payments or that the funds could be traced into her interest in the jointly owned cottage property in a manner that would allow for an exclusion under the Family Law Act.

The motion for partial summary judgment was granted, concluding that the respondent had not proven the claimed exclusion.

This endorsement addresses an urgency motion brought by the respondent father during the COVID-19 pandemic court suspension.

The father sought to set aside custody and restraining orders concerning the three oldest children (over 18) and to vary child support due to alleged reduced income and the children no longer being "children of the marriage." The court found the matter met the criteria for urgency as it involved a restraining order and potentially dire financial circumstances, both explicitly mentioned in the Chief Justice's Notice to the Profession.

The motion was allowed to proceed, limited to the issues of the restraining order for the older children, ongoing child support, and arrears.

The applicant mother unilaterally suspended the respondent father's access to their medically fragile child, Mileena, citing COVID-19 risks.

The respondent father brought a motion for compliance and broader relief, while the applicant mother brought a cross-motion.

The court previously ordered the mother to restore access.

In this decision, the court found the respondent father's current motion for compliance was no longer urgent because the applicant mother had restored access.

The court emphasized the parents' obligation to ensure access and protect the child from parental conflict, warning against future non-compliance and potential police enforcement.

An earlier order regarding COVID-19 precautions was amended by consent.

The applicant mother unilaterally ceased the child's access to the respondent father, citing COVID-19 concerns, contrary to existing court orders.

The respondent father brought a motion to reinstate access and address primary residence.

This endorsement addresses the urgency of the respondent's motion.

The court found the matter urgent, involving the child's well-being and alleged wrongful retention, and allowed the motion to proceed.

The court noted that the mother's non-compliance with clear court orders raised serious concerns about her appropriateness as the primary residence parent.

Procedural orders were issued for the substantive motion.

This decision addresses costs following a motion brought by the applicant mother concerning child access for their medically fragile child amidst COVID-19 risks.

The motion, while unsuccessful in terminating the respondent father's face-to-face contact, served to highlight both parents' unreasonable conduct and failure to prioritize the child's best interests.

The court found both parties exposed the child to unnecessary risks and used affidavits for venting frustrations.

Applying principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court awarded the respondent father $1,000 in all-inclusive costs, significantly less than requested, due to his own unreasonable behaviour and the divided success of the motion.

The applicant mother sought to suspend the respondent father's access to their medically fragile child for three weeks due to the child's unusually high risk from the Covid-19 virus.

The respondent father cross-moved to continue access.

The court found both parents had exposed the child to unnecessary risks and failed to make full disclosure.

Balancing the child's best interests, including the need for both parents' support during disorienting times, against the risks of Covid-19, the court dismissed the mother's motion and ordered that the existing access schedule continue with strict safety protocols for both parents and during transportation.

A delinquent child support payor sought a retroactive reduction in his child support obligations extending far into the past, relying on the enactment of the Child Support Guidelines as a change in circumstances.

The motion judge granted the variation, reducing arrears from over $170,000 to $41,642.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to apply the governing principles from D.B.S. v. S.R.G. and Gray v. Rizzi regarding retroactive support variations.

The court held that while the Guidelines did constitute a change in circumstances permitting variation, the payor's conduct, delay, and failure to make full financial disclosure precluded a retroactive reduction extending more than three years before formal notice was given.

The appeal was allowed and no reduction to arrears was ordered.

The applicant father brought a motion within a motion to change for a temporary order specifying access exchanges with the parties' child and requiring the respondent mother to pay for therapy sessions aimed at reconciling the child with the father.

The child, born in 2006, had been in the mother's custody since 2008 with the father having unsupervised access.

Access had been expanded informally by January 2017 but ceased in July 2017 when the mother refused the father's request for expanded summer access.

The child, now 11 years old, was resistant to access.

The court found the mother had not made sufficient effort in certain respects but had generally complied with her obligations.

The court ordered electronic communication via video chat on specified days and directed the parties to obtain a therapist's report and schedule a case conference.

The applicant sought enforcement of a separation agreement and child support for two adult children, while the respondent sought to set aside the spousal support provisions and terminate his support obligations.

The court found that structured settlement annuity payments constitute income for child support purposes and should be grossed-up for tax purposes.

The court awarded table amount child support for both children, including an adult child enrolled in post-secondary education.

The court rejected the respondent's arguments to set aside the spousal support provisions and found no material change in circumstances warranting termination.

Retroactive child support arrears were rescinded based on the parties' oral agreement and the DBS factors.

The appellant father sought to vary a child support order retroactively and have arrears rescinded after the children ceased to be "children of the marriage" under the Divorce Act.

The motion judge dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, relying on S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court has jurisdiction under section 17(1) of the Divorce Act to vary or discharge child support arrears even after children are no longer "children of the marriage," distinguishing the variation provision from the original order provision based on statutory language and child support principles.

The claimant sought retroactive child support from the respondent under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act for a child born in Saskatchewan to parents who did not cohabit.

The respondent initially disputed paternity but DNA testing confirmed his biological relationship to the child.

The court applied the principles from D.B.S. v. S.R.G. to determine whether retroactive support should be awarded and, if so, from what date.

The court awarded retroactive child support from January 1, 2015 to August 31, 2016, with ongoing prospective support commencing September 1, 2016.

Motion to change a custody and access order dated November 22, 2012.

The applicant sought to change the access pick-up location, retain a psychologist to facilitate access, and modify the child support arrangement and overpayment repayment schedule.

The respondent sought appointment of the Children's Lawyer for a section 112 investigation and requested the applicant designate the respondent as beneficiary on a life insurance policy in trust for the child.

The court approved retention of a psychologist for open intervention to assess the child's views regarding access, dismissed the Children's Lawyer appointment request, deferred the pick-up location change pending the psychologist's report, modified the child support amount based on changed income circumstances, and established a repayment schedule for the overpaid child support.

The court dismissed the life insurance beneficiary designation request as exceeding its jurisdiction.

The applicant sought leave to file an amending agreement that reduced spousal support obligations with the Ontario Court of Justice for enforcement purposes through the Family Responsibility Office.

The Clerk of the Court refused to accept the amending agreement, taking the position that support provisions could only be amended through a motion to change under the Family Law Rules.

The court held that an amending agreement constitutes a domestic contract under the Family Law Act and can be filed for enforcement purposes without requiring a formal motion to change, provided the parties have already agreed to the amendment.

Following the breakdown of a long marriage, the applicant sought ongoing spousal support, alleging both compensatory and non-compensatory entitlement.

The court found no compensatory basis because both spouses had maintained successful careers and shared household and parenting responsibilities without significant economic sacrifice by either party.

However, given the substantial income disparity and the marital standard of living during the final year of the relationship, the court found entitlement to transitional non-compensatory spousal support.

Applying the Divorce Act and guidance from the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, the court ordered time-limited support to assist the applicant in adjusting to a lower post-separation standard of living.

Child support arrears were also ordered.

The grandmother sought costs against the Children's Aid Society following a temporary care and custody motion in a child protection proceeding.

The grandmother argued the Society acted unfairly by failing to investigate her as a potential caregiver despite her close relationship with the children and her offer to provide care.

The Society maintained it acted professionally and in good faith.

The court found that while the Society could have been more diligent in investigating the grandmother's plan, its conduct did not amount to unreasonable, unfair, or indefensible behaviour when viewed in context of the emergency circumstances and timeline of events.

The grandmother's request for costs was denied.