Surinder K. Multani

The Father brought a motion to expand his parenting time with his 18-month-old son, MJ, from supervised twice-weekly visits to a graduated schedule leading to unsupervised overnight parenting time.

The Mother brought a cross-motion for a section 30 assessment or Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) referral, and to maintain supervised parenting time with only a slight increase in frequency.

The court dismissed the Mother's request for an assessment/OCL referral, finding no compelling clinical issues and that the Mother's concerns were largely unsubstantiated.

The court granted the Father's motion for a graduated expansion of parenting time, transitioning from supervised to unsupervised, finding it to be in the child's best interests to foster a meaningful relationship with both parents and that the Mother's restrictive approach was unfounded.

A delinquent child support payor sought a retroactive reduction in his child support obligations extending far into the past, relying on the enactment of the Child Support Guidelines as a change in circumstances.

The motion judge granted the variation, reducing arrears from over $170,000 to $41,642.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to apply the governing principles from D.B.S. v. S.R.G. and Gray v. Rizzi regarding retroactive support variations.

The court held that while the Guidelines did constitute a change in circumstances permitting variation, the payor's conduct, delay, and failure to make full financial disclosure precluded a retroactive reduction extending more than three years before formal notice was given.

The appeal was allowed and no reduction to arrears was ordered.

The appellant father sought to vary a child support order retroactively and have arrears rescinded after the children ceased to be "children of the marriage" under the Divorce Act.

The motion judge dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, relying on S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court has jurisdiction under section 17(1) of the Divorce Act to vary or discharge child support arrears even after children are no longer "children of the marriage," distinguishing the variation provision from the original order provision based on statutory language and child support principles.

The applicant moved to remove the respondent's solicitor, Rayleen Cantin, on the grounds of a conflict of interest.

The applicant alleged that he had contacted Ms. Cantin's office on two occasions in May 2017, disclosing confidential information regarding criminal charges, bail conditions, his stance on allegations, his history with the respondent, and concerns about the respondent's parenting ability.

Ms. Cantin denied recalling any conversation with the applicant and deposed that she did not receive confidential information or provide legal advice.

The court found conflicting evidence but determined that the applicant failed to satisfy the balance of probabilities that confidential information was provided to Ms. Cantin.

The court applied the objective test of whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice required removal of counsel, and found that removal was not warranted.