Eva Taché-Green

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault for anally penetrating a 19-year-old co-worker at a workplace Christmas party without consent.

The trial judge sentenced him to nine months' imprisonment followed by two years' probation.

The appellant, a permanent resident of Canada, appealed on the basis that the sentence was unfit, particularly given that a sentence of six months or more would trigger immigration consequences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, resulting in loss of the right to appeal a removal order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and holding that the trial judge did not err in first determining an appropriate sentence and then considering whether immigration consequences warranted reduction.

The appellants were convicted of drug and firearm offences following a search executed pursuant to a telewarrant.

The trial judge dismissed their Charter section 8 application challenging the validity of the warrant.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of the affiant regarding the corroborating evidence from the property manager.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge committed errors in principle by refusing cross-examination and by relying on his own assessment of the confidential informant's reliability to deny the motion.

The court held that when the defence demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that cross-examination will generate evidence tending to discredit the grounds for the warrant's issuance, cross-examination must be permitted.

The convictions were quashed and new trials ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence of four years' imprisonment plus 13 months pre-sentence custody for multiple driving-related offences including impaired driving, dangerous driving, flight from police, driving while disqualified, and failing to provide a breath sample.

The central issue was whether the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum of five years when pre-sentence custody was included in the calculation.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was illegal as it exceeded the maximum by one month and 19 days.

The court established that pre-sentence custody must be considered when calculating sentences against statutory maximums, following the principle established in minimum and conditional sentence cases.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 34 months and 11 days from the date of sentencing.

The appellant, Ming Ning Karl Zhao, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault.

He raised three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge, misapprehension of evidence regarding the complainant's psychological state, and an unreasonable verdict for unlawful confinement.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds, finding that while the trial judge's comments were at times inappropriate, they did not demonstrate bias.

The court also concluded there was no material misapprehension of evidence and that the evidence supported the unlawful confinement conviction.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for shooting and killing Andrew Christie in the doorway of Christie's apartment on December 19, 2004.

Although charged with first degree murder, the jury convicted him of the lesser charge.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 17 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of evidence regarding an accomplice's manslaughter conviction, the deceased's ante-mortem statements, and the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct, self-defence, and provocation.

The appellant also challenged the sentence as unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and finding the sentence fit.

The applicant, Zekrollah Walizadah, sought an order under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code to reduce his period of parole ineligibility for first-degree murder.

The pre-screening judge applied the "substantial likelihood" threshold, considering the applicant's character, conduct while serving the sentence, the nature of the offence, victim information, and remorse.

Despite positive conduct in custody, the applicant's continued failure to fully accept responsibility for the planned and deliberate nature of the murder and the extreme violence inflicted was a significant negative factor.

The application was dismissed, as the court was not satisfied there was a substantial likelihood that a jury would unanimously agree to reduce the parole ineligibility period.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm and related offences arising from a home invasion.

The convictions rested primarily on the testimony of an accomplice who had pleaded guilty but had not yet been sentenced.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to exercise necessary caution in accepting the accomplice's evidence and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the accomplice's subsequent sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding it lacked cogency, and dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly cautioned himself regarding the unsavoury witness and made no reversible error in assessing credibility.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended circumstantial evidence and seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding the non-existence of an alleyway described by a taxi driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the alleged misapprehensions insignificant to the overwhelming circumstantial case.

The court declined to admit the fresh evidence, noting the issue could have been pursued at trial and the alleyway's existence was not the significant feature of the taxi driver's evidence.

The court concluded it defied credulity to claim the appellant was not a participant in the robbery.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for his role in a home invasion.

The Crown argued that the respondent should have received a longer sentence than his co-accused due to his older age and longer criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found that while a distinction could have been drawn, the failure to impose a significantly longer sentence did not render the sentence manifestly unfit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, uttering death threats, and firearm offences, as well as his nine-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence of the complainant and defence witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and sought independent confirmation for the complainant's testimony.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part only to correct an error in pre-sentence custody credit, granting enhanced credit at a 1.5:1 ratio, while upholding the overall sentence length.

The appellant appealed his eight-year global sentence for six counts of robbery, attempted robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and flight from police.

He argued the trial judge erred by imposing consecutive sentences, failing to consider prior sentences for related offences, and insufficiently weighing rehabilitation prospects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the imposition of consecutive sentences and concluding that the trial judge appropriately applied the totality principle and considered the appellant's rehabilitation.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on drug trafficking charges, which followed the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Police executed a search warrant at a multi-unit building but entered the respondent's basement apartment by mistake, as the warrant targeted a different unit and suspect.

Despite realizing the error, police continued searching for over an hour before obtaining a second warrant, which was also found to be facially invalid for failing to specify the unit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the warrants were invalid and that the serious Charter breaches warranted exclusion of the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for impaired driving, and that the refusal evidence should have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter due to a section 9 breach.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's acceptance of the officer's evidence was reasonable despite missing notes, and that the appellant's flight from police combined with other indicia of impairment provided objective reasonable grounds for the arrest.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

He was arrested during the execution of a search warrant in an apartment, holding cash and a knife, moments after being seen on a balcony where drugs were later found.

The Court of Appeal held that the drug convictions were unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence did not support guilt as the only reasonable inference.

However, the court upheld the proceeds of crime conviction, finding no other reasonable explanation for the cash.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of heroin for the purposes of trafficking and breaking and entering.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the drug conviction, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the large quantity of heroin and other indicia supported trafficking.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the break and enter conviction, finding the trial judge's one-sentence reasons insufficient and failing to address the frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence.

A new trial was ordered for the break and enter count.