Elise Sari Nakelsky

Crown appeal of sentence for three counts of attempted murder, one count of arson causing damage to property, and one count of possession of incendiary materials.

The accused set fire to his girlfriend's home with the intent to kill her and her two young children (ages 7 and 1) after she asked him to move out.

The seven-year-old suffered severe burns resulting in permanent scarring and loss of functionality in her hands and feet.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 11 years concurrent on each attempted murder count.

The Crown appealed, seeking a life sentence or elevated sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit and increased it to 20 years concurrent on each attempted murder count.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder in connection with a home invasion robbery in Minden, Ontario.

The appellant and three co-accused drove from Scarborough to commit the robbery, which resulted in the death of Ryan Kennedy.

The appellant struck Kennedy in the jaw with the butt of a pellet gun after Kennedy had already been struck twice on the head with a baseball bat by a co-accused.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: first, that there was insufficient evidence that his blow was a significant contributing cause of death, and second, that a statement by the trial Crown in closing argument caused a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury's verdict was reasonable and that any improper Crown statement did not materially influence the verdict.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent following conviction on four counts of sexual interference and four counts of sexual assault.

The trial judge stayed the sexual assault charges and imposed a total sentence of two and a half years.

The Crown argued the sentence was manifestly unfit and sought a sentence of five years.

The appellate court found that while the sentence could have been higher, it was not manifestly inadequate given the totality of circumstances, including the respondent's age and status as a first offender.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

Two members of the YBK (Young Buck Killers) criminal organization appealed their convictions for gang-related offences including trafficking in firearms and drugs.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on trafficking charges, territorial jurisdiction, and hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding no misdirection on the trafficking charges, no jurisdictional error as the offences had meaningful connections to Ontario, and no error in the admission of hearsay evidence.

The applicant's leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence of 13 years' imprisonment was upheld as proportionate to the serious offences committed in furtherance of a violent criminal organization.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Jonathan Chambers on March 7, 2007, north of Barrie.

The Crown's case relied heavily on evidence from three accomplices who had entered into plea agreements: Tafari Williams, Terrence Walker, and Gregory Millar.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge improperly relied on evidence from Walker and Millar to confirm Williams' testimony despite potential tainting, and that the trial judge misapprehended certain evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the Vetrovec principles and that any errors in misapprehension were not material to the conviction.

Three appellants convicted of first and second degree murder appealed their convictions.

Two were convicted of first degree murder and one of second degree murder.

The appellants challenged the verdicts as inconsistent and unreasonable, and raised multiple grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury charge, including issues regarding post-offence conduct instructions, circumstantial evidence instructions, and the treatment of various pieces of evidence.

The Crown cross-appealed on the acquittal of one appellant on first degree murder.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts neither inconsistent nor unreasonable, and that the trial judge committed no errors in her charge to the jury.

An anesthesiologist was convicted at trial of 21 counts of sexual assault against female patients who underwent surgery under conscious sedation at a hospital.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in finding he had the opportunity to commit the offences; (2) that the trial judge mishandled expert evidence regarding the effects of anesthetics on patient awareness and memory, including evidence about anesthetic-induced hallucinations and the bite-down reflex; and (3) that the trial judge improperly relied on evidence of similar acts to establish guilt on individual counts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's factual findings were grounded in evidence, free from misapprehension, and entitled to deference.

The court emphasized that the appellant had exclusive opportunity to commit the offences, that the trial judge properly assessed conflicting expert evidence, and that evidence of similar acts was properly used as circumstantial evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appeal from conviction and sentence.

The appellant was convicted of attempted kidnapping, attempted aggravated sexual assault, attempted murder, break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence, and possession of child pornography.

He was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment.

The appellant appealed the convictions for attempted kidnapping and attempted aggravated sexual assault arising from an August 29, 2005 incident, as well as the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the appellant's actions constituted attempts beyond mere preparation and that all criteria for dangerous offender designation were satisfied.

The applicant, convicted of first degree murder and committing an indignity to a human body, applied for the appointment of publicly-funded appellate counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the applicant lacked means to retain private counsel.

The court found the applicant had arguable grounds of appeal challenging the trial judge's pre-trial rulings on the admissibility of evidence regarding the applicant's cannibalistic ideation, including statements to a psychiatric nurse and rap lyrics.

The court determined the applicant could not effectively argue the complex appeal without counsel assistance.

The appointment was granted on a limited basis, restricted to addressing the effects of the pre-trial rulings on trial fairness, excluding issues of post-offence conduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in 1971 for the death of his common-law wife and served over three years in prison.

Decades later, fresh medical evidence from multiple pathologists concluded the deceased died of natural causes following a fall, contradicting the trial evidence of blunt force trauma.

The Supreme Court of Canada remanded the case to the Court of Appeal.

On a joint submission with the Crown, the Court admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal, noting the appellant was wrongly convicted.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of first degree murder.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by allowing the accused to lead her lengthy, exculpatory police video statement as part of her defence under the Edgar exception for prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge applied the correct principles and reasonably exercised his discretion in finding the statement was spontaneous and made when the accused was first confronted with an accusation of a crime.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of discreditable conduct, misdirected the jury on post-offence conduct, and misdirected the jury on the elements of first degree murder, specifically regarding unlawful confinement and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The applicant, convicted of historical sexual assault against his daughters and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending appeal.

He argued his appeal had merit based on his hearing impairment preventing a fair trial and alleged collusion between the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the grounds of appeal arguable but weak, and concluding that the public interest favoured the continued enforcement of the sentence.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in failing to exercise discretion against the designation and in finding he did not qualify as a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly assessed the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism, his extensive criminal history, and the lack of a reasonable possibility that his risk could eventually be controlled in the community.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after her girlfriend killed the appellant's boyfriend with an axe.

The Crown alleged the appellant planned the murder and manipulated her girlfriend into committing it.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred by giving a Carter instruction (co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule) because the alleged conspiracy involved only two people.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed its prior decision in Bogiatzis, holding that the Carter instruction applies to two-person conspiracies.

The Court found no reversible error in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the Carter framework, post-offence conduct, or party liability.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and threatening death, as well as his sentence and designation as a long term offender.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting and instructing the jury on bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was necessary narrative and largely elicited by the defence.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal due to a procedural fairness error where the trial judge denied submissions on whether the offences constituted serious personal injury offences.

However, the Court found the offences met the statutory definition and imposed the same sentence, adjusting the community supervision order to reflect time already served.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the trial Crown engaged in improper cross-examination by asking him to comment on the veracity of the complainant.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the question violated the rule against asking an accused for their opinion on another witness's truthfulness.

The trial judge erred by relying on the appellant's equivocal response to this improper question to erase his reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

In a criminal appeal involving a niqab-wearing complainant at a preliminary inquiry, the Court addressed how to reconcile freedom of religion with fair-trial rights.

The majority held neither an absolute ban nor an absolute permission rule is acceptable, and adopted a contextual four-step framework.

A witness may be required to remove a niqab only where necessary to prevent a serious trial-fairness risk that cannot be avoided by alternatives, and where the benefits of removal outweigh the harms.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter remitted for application of that framework.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing a man in a bar.

At trial, he claimed self-defence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the partial defence of provocation, admitting evidence of the victim's peaceful disposition, and making various errors in the jury charge, including the instruction on self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the subjective element of provocation, as the appellant's own testimony indicated he acted out of self-preservation rather than sudden passion.

The court also found no reversible errors in the jury charge or evidentiary rulings.

The sentence appeal regarding the 14-year parole ineligibility period was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for spousal sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in his credibility findings and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the grounds relating to the trial judge's reasons but allowed the appeal based on fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence included post-conviction allegations made by the complainant and undisclosed police reports that supported the defence theory that the complainant fabricated the allegations to gain sole custody of their children.

The Court found the undisclosed evidence met the Stinchcombe threshold and impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.