Douglas K. Gray

A family law trial addressing custody, access, child support, spousal support, equalization, and property division following the breakdown of a marriage involving two young children.

The court accepted the recommendation of a custody assessor and granted sole custody to the applicant father while maintaining unsupervised access for the respondent mother, finding that although her parenting lapses were concerning, supervised access was not justified.

The respondent was ordered to pay guideline child support based on her previous year’s income and proportionate section 7 expenses.

Her claim for spousal support and damages was dismissed.

The court also ordered an equalization payment and resolved disputes regarding the value of the matrimonial home, ultimately ordering the transfer of the respondent’s interest to the applicant with a net payment calculated after deductions.

The employer sought an interlocutory injunction restricting picketing during a lawful strike at one of its warehouse facilities.

The union’s picketing activities caused substantial delays for vehicles entering and exiting several warehouse locations, effectively disrupting operations despite remaining largely peaceful.

The court applied the interlocutory injunction framework from RJR‑MacDonald and considered the special context of labour disputes and the balance between property access rights and constitutionally protected expressive activity in picketing.

The court held that while employers are entitled to access their property, labour picketing may justify some degree of inconvenience and delay as part of the economic dynamics of a strike.

An injunction was granted permitting continued picketing but limiting the extent of delays in accessing the employer’s facilities.

The applicant bank brought an application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act seeking an order declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant.

The evidence showed that the respondent repeatedly commenced motions, applications, and appeals related to mortgage enforcement proceedings and related matters, often relitigating issues already decided, attempting to represent another individual without standing, and disregarding court orders restricting further proceedings.

Numerous proceedings were initiated in multiple courts and tribunals, many of which were not pursued or were dismissed, and several outstanding costs orders remained unpaid.

Applying the principles in Re Lang Michener et al and Fabian et al, the court held that the respondent’s persistent litigation conduct constituted vexatious proceedings.

The court declared the respondent a vexatious litigant, imposed a requirement that she obtain leave of a Superior Court judge before instituting or continuing any court proceeding, and dismissed a related action she had commenced against the bank, its solicitors, and a property manager.

Employees brought a motion for default judgment in wrongful dismissal actions after the defendants’ statements of defence were struck and the defendants were noted in default.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants operated as common employers and were jointly and severally liable following the discontinuation of the business and termination of employees without adequate notice or severance.

Affidavit evidence detailed employment history, mitigation efforts, and damages.

Although the court rejected the proposed formula of one month’s pay per year of service and questioned the appropriateness of a fixed 24‑month cap, it held that the damages claimed were reasonable in the circumstances.

Default judgment was granted against two corporate defendants for the amounts claimed with pre‑judgment interest and costs.

The respondent father brought a motion to set aside an order made after an undefended trial that granted the mother sole custody, adjusted parenting time, imputed income to the father, and ordered child support.

The moving party sought leave to file an answer and financial statement, arguing the order resulted in injustice and that he had not participated in the proceeding.

The court held that the Family Law Rules did not authorize setting aside the order and that the Rules of Civil Procedure provisions respecting default judgments could not be applied by analogy.

Even if applicable, the moving party failed to provide any explanation for his default and did not satisfy the criteria required to set aside a default judgment.

The court further found no manifest injustice warranting use of inherent jurisdiction.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s commercial tenancy action on the basis that it was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff alleged that construction, signage interference, and other landlord conduct caused a severe decline in its restaurant business at a shopping mall.

The court held that the limitation period began when the plaintiff knew the defendants’ conduct had caused damage to the business, not when the business ultimately vacated the premises.

Evidence from the plaintiff’s principal indicated that he knew the business was “sinking” by July 2006.

As the action was not commenced until February 25, 2009, the claim was brought outside the two‑year limitation period and was dismissed on summary judgment.

A spouse sought substantial spousal support following a short marriage after becoming permanently disabled due to multiple sclerosis and residing in a nursing home.

The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines suggested support between $156 and $208 per month for a duration of two to five years based on the parties’ incomes and the length of the marriage.

The court considered the disability exception discussed in the Guidelines and the principles from Bracklow regarding non-compensatory support for a disabled spouse.

While recognizing the respondent’s severe disability and financial need, the court declined to award the requested $1,000 per month indefinitely.

Instead, it modestly exceeded the guideline amount and ordered $300 per month for an indefinite duration, subject to variation upon a material change in circumstances.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking after drugs were discovered beneath the driver’s seat of a vehicle.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove the accused had knowledge or possession of the drugs, particularly with respect to the driver who was not directly linked to incriminating text messages.

The court considered circumstantial evidence including text messages arranging a drug transaction, the presence of six cell phones, the planned meeting location, and cash found in another vehicle connected to the transaction.

Applying the definition of possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code as incorporated into the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court concluded that both accused had knowledge of the drugs and intended to use them in a drug deal.

The Crown proved possession for the purpose of trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent brought a motion to strike the applicant’s pleadings due to persistent non‑compliance with court orders and disclosure obligations.

The court found the applicant had repeatedly failed to pay court‑ordered interim child and spousal support, accumulated significant arrears, and provided incomplete or late financial disclosure despite multiple orders.

The applicant also improperly cashed a registered education savings plan intended for the parties’ children and failed to fully reimburse the funds.

The court concluded that the applicant’s conduct demonstrated ongoing disregard for court orders and the integrity of the process.

As a result, the applicant’s pleadings were struck and the matter permitted to proceed as an undefended trial.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff bank’s summary judgment motion on personal guarantees under the simplified procedure, the defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of over $18,000.

The court rejected arguments that contractual provisions or the plaintiff’s decision to pursue summary judgment justified elevated costs.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs generally require reprehensible conduct, which was not established.

The claimed hours and duplication caused by a change of counsel rendered the defendants’ bill excessive.

Costs were therefore fixed on a partial indemnity basis in a reduced all‑inclusive amount.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order refusing to set aside a Certificate of Pending Litigation obtained ex parte.

The motion raised whether the moving party had failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts, including prior sworn testimony inconsistent with the position advanced in the current litigation.

The court held there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s approach to materiality, which focused on whether disclosure would have changed the outcome rather than whether the information should have been disclosed to provide a complete picture.

The court found the withheld information—particularly prior sworn testimony directly contradicting the current claim—was arguably material and significant.

Leave to appeal was granted and the prior costs order was stayed pending the appeal.

An execution creditor sought an order compelling a mortgagee bank to provide a mortgage discharge statement to permit enforcement of a judgment through a sheriff’s sale of the debtor’s property.

The moving party argued that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Citi Cards Canada Inc. v. Pleasance should not apply because it was decided per incuriam or was distinguishable where the creditor had unsuccessfully attempted to examine the judgment debtors.

The court held it was bound by the Court of Appeal authority, which found that mortgage discharge statements constitute personal information protected by the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).

Despite acknowledging significant practical difficulties for judgment creditors enforcing debts, the court concluded the precedent prevented ordering the disclosure.

The motion was therefore dismissed.

The appellant, a correctional officer, pleaded guilty to assaulting an inmate and was sentenced to 60 days' incarceration.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by improperly relying on hearsay evidence when finding the assault was unprovoked and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit, contending a conditional sentence should have been imposed.

The court held the sentencing judge erred in placing the burden on the offender to prove provocation rather than on the Crown to prove the aggravating circumstance of an unprovoked assault.

However, the error did not affect the fitness of the sentence.

Given the abuse of authority against a vulnerable inmate and the need for denunciation and deterrence, a custodial sentence remained appropriate.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action relying on deemed admissions arising from the defendant’s failure to respond to a Request to Admit.

The defendant brought a cross‑motion seeking leave to withdraw the deemed admissions and an extension of time to respond, arguing the failure was inadvertent because the company had been represented by a layperson unfamiliar with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied the test governing withdrawal of admissions and accepted that the failure was inadvertent and that any prejudice could be compensated in costs.

However, the court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate a genuine issue requiring a trial.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff for damages equivalent to three months’ notice.

The accused was charged with sexual interference involving a complainant under the age of consent and sexual assault involving a separate complainant.

The trial required the court to assess credibility where the accused denied any sexual conduct with the younger complainant and denied the alleged assault.

Applying the framework from R. v. W.(D.), the court assessed the evidence of multiple witnesses, including corroborative circumstantial evidence such as descriptions of the accused’s residence, tattoos, and the nature of the relationship between the accused and the younger complainant.

The court found the complainants’ evidence credible and rejected the accused’s explanations as implausible.

The Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court determined the issue of costs following a family law decision in which both parties claimed entitlement to costs.

The court found that success was divided between the parties.

Although the applicant had served multiple offers to settle, the court concluded that the offers did not materially affect the costs analysis because the applicant matched only one of the offers while failing to match the others.

In the circumstances, the court exercised its discretion to decline awarding costs to either party.

The court determined costs following a family law motion in which the respondent had served an offer to settle that mirrored the order ultimately made.

The court found the applicant failed to comply with her obligation to provide financial disclosure and refused to answer whether she intended to do so when questioned during argument.

This failure affected the substantive ruling on section 7 expenses and was a significant factor in the costs determination.

In light of the offer to settle and the applicant’s unwarranted refusal to disclose financial information, the court awarded the respondent full indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $2,744.45 inclusive of disbursements and HST and made payable forthwith.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary an existing child support order on the basis that the adult child of the marriage, who suffered from schizophrenia and was unable to work, had begun receiving benefits under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997.

The father argued that the ODSP payments should be deducted from his child support obligations retroactively.

The court held that the presumptive approach under s. 3(2)(a) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines applies to adult children unless applying the Guidelines is inappropriate.

ODSP benefits belong to the adult child and do not belong to the recipient parent, and their existence did not render the standard Guidelines approach inappropriate.

The court therefore refused to deduct ODSP benefits from child support and dismissed the motion to vary.

A contested passing of accounts involving a guardian of property appointed to manage the finances of an incapacitated parent.

The applicant challenged substantial cash withdrawals and legal expenses claimed by the guardian.

The court found the accounts wholly inadequate and concluded that the guardian had improperly withdrawn more than $120,000 from the estate and failed to maintain proper records or explanations.

The court rejected post‑hearing attempts to introduce new evidence and denied the guardian any compensation.

The guardian was ordered to repay the improperly withdrawn funds and personally pay the applicant’s costs.

The responding party brought a motion to dismiss or stay an application for child support on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction and that China was the more appropriate forum.

The child and the mother resided in China, while the alleged father resided in Ontario.

The court held that under the Family Law Act, jurisdiction for a child support claim can be grounded on the respondent’s residence in Ontario even where the child lives abroad.

Applying forum non conveniens principles, the court concluded the moving party failed to establish that China was clearly the more appropriate forum.

The motion to dismiss or stay the proceeding was therefore denied and the child support claim was permitted to proceed.