David H. Doherty

The appellants appealed an order appointing the respondent as receiver of two corporations, alleging a conflict of interest due to the respondent's role as trustee in bankruptcy for related parties.

The Court of Appeal first determined it had jurisdiction, finding the appointment order was final rather than interlocutory.

The Court admitted fresh evidence—a statement of defence filed by the respondent in related litigation—which crystallized a pervasive conflict of interest.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order appointing the receiver, and referred the matter back to the Commercial List Court, also setting aside the provision granting priority to the receiver's fees.

The appellant, a 42-year-old school teacher, was convicted of sexual assault and sexual touching of a 13-year-old complainant he met on a chat line while pretending to be a 17-year-old.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable, the jury charge was unbalanced, and the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding child witnesses and in denying a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable, the jury charge fair overall, and a custodial sentence appropriate given the predatory nature of the offence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference.

On appeal, he argued he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel failed to obtain or review the complainant's videotaped statement to police, proceeded to trial without a transcript of the preliminary inquiry, and based the defence on an inaccurate recollection of the complainant's evidence.

The Court held that trial counsel's conduct fell below a standard of reasonable competence and that the failure to cross-examine on prior inconsistent statements undermined the reliability of the verdict.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable due to misapprehension of evidence, reliance on improper factors in assessing credibility, and failure to consider defence submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully reviewed a wide range of factors, her credibility findings were supported by the evidence, and she had properly considered counsel's submissions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge improperly lumped his case with his co-accused and erred in rejecting his evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge explicitly considered the evidence against each accused separately and properly applied the standard of proof in rejecting the appellant's testimony.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a serious assault where he acted in concert with a co-accused to beat the victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions on self-defence or prior inconsistent statements, nor in the refusal to adjourn the trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in principle by refusing a conditional sentence or in the term of imprisonment imposed.

The respondent, charged with arson, brought a pre-trial motion for a stay of proceedings alleging abuse of process due to an insurance company's involvement in the criminal investigation.

The trial judge refused the stay but excluded wiretap evidence and ordered the Crown to pay approximately $150,000 in costs forthwith.

The Crown appealed the costs order.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown had the right to appeal the costs order immediately under s. 676.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the costs order, finding that the trial judge should not have determined the issue of costs or the abuse of process application until the conclusion of the trial, as the actual benefit of the exclusionary remedy to the defence could only be assessed at that time.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to grant a stay of proceedings after police negligently lost a five-minute videotaped statement from an eyewitness.

The trial judge found the loss breached the respondents' s. 7 Charter rights and prejudiced their ability to make full answer and defence.

The Court of Appeal agreed there was a s. 7 breach but held that a stay was inappropriate, as the lost evidence did not cause irreparable harm to the integrity of the justice system or such prejudice that no other remedy would suffice.

The Court noted other remedies, such as excluding the identification evidence, were available.

The stay was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of sexually assaulting two 15-year-old complainants.

The trial judge found that the complainants' bizarre and contradictory evidence was due to 'bolus drinking' and relied on a letter written by one complainant to find a lack of consent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, as one complainant had consumed very little alcohol, and the letter suggested consensual activity that was later regretted.

The Court set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding that while the trial judge erred, the verdicts were not unreasonable.

The appellant was convicted of possession of instruments adapted and intended to be used to commit forgery and sentenced to 11 months' imprisonment followed by one year of probation.

After the Supreme Court of Canada restored his convictions, the Court of Appeal considered his sentence appeal.

The Court found no error in principle by the trial judge but reduced the sentence to six months' imprisonment to account for the almost five years the appellant spent on bail pending appeal without breaching his conditions.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought a determination of whether she could recover no-fault medical and rehabilitation benefits beyond the 10-year benefit period under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, provided the need for such expenses was established with certainty within the 10-year period.

The Court of Appeal held that the plain meaning of section 6(1) of the SABS requires that the expenses result within the benefit period.

Therefore, expenses for treatments and services provided beyond the 10-year anniversary of the accident are not recoverable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured by a crank while attempting to connect his transport truck to a tomato wagon owned by the defendant in a farmer's field.

The defendant appealed a motion judge's finding that the tomato wagon was not an 'automobile' under s. 267.1(1) of the Insurance Act, which would have precluded the plaintiff's action for damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the tomato wagon was not being operated on a public highway at the time of the accident, it was not required to be insured under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act, and therefore did not fall within the expanded definition of 'automobile' in the Insurance Act.

The appellant appealed an order finding him in contempt of a Mareva injunction for depleting his self-directed RRSP and imposing various sanctions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding but found the sanctions, which effectively granted final judgment to the respondent on multiple claims, were disproportionate to the disobedience.

The Court set aside the disproportionate sanctions, including the striking of the appellant's defence, and substituted an order requiring the appellant to pay the value of the depleted RRSP into court as security.

The respondent operated a public parking garage as a legal non-conforming use under a new comprehensive zoning by-law.

The new by-law contained performance standards identical to those in the former by-law.

The respondent introduced valet parking, which contravened these performance standards, and was convicted of breaching the by-law.

The conviction was quashed on appeal, but the Court of Appeal allowed the municipality's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that subjecting a legal non-conforming use to performance standards identical to those in place when the use was acquired does not prevent the use of the property within the meaning of the Planning Act.

The appellant's second-degree murder conviction was previously overturned on appeal and a manslaughter conviction was substituted.

The Court of Appeal sentenced the appellant for manslaughter arising from the shooting of a convenience store owner during an armed robbery.

Considering the gravity of the offence, the appellant's extensive criminal record, his aboriginal status, and the time already served in pre-sentence and post-sentence custody, the Court imposed a sentence of 6 years' imprisonment, equivalent to a 14-year sentence had it been imposed at the original trial.

A lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order were also imposed.

The respondents originally brought an oppression application, and the appellants brought a cross-application.

The motion judge struck the cross-application on the basis that it sought relief that was or could have been sought in an earlier action commenced by the appellants, which had been dismissed on consent.

On appeal, the appellants sought to resurrect claims for an accounting and compensation for oppression.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the claims were barred by res judicata.

The parties separated after eight years of marriage.

The husband's income doubled to over $4.1 million annually after separation.

The trial judge declined to award the Guidelines table amount of over $65,000 per month for four children, instead awarding $16,000 per month under s. 4 based on the family's modest pre-separation lifestyle.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the table amount was inappropriate but found the trial judge erred by failing to adequately consider the post-separation increase in the husband's income and the reasonableness of the wife's proposed budget.

The Court of Appeal increased the child support to $32,000 per month and increased the required life insurance coverage to $2 million.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial.

During cross-examination, the Crown questioned the appellant about his association with two individuals who had been convicted of drug importing, despite no evidence linking them to the appellant's charges.

The trial judge failed to caution the jury against drawing an adverse inference of guilt by association.

The Court of Appeal held that the improper cross-examination and lack of a limiting instruction resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed after guilty pleas to two counts of sexual interference and one count of sexual assault involving young adolescent victims.

The court held that the sentence was manifestly unfit given the serious and repeated sexual violations, the sentencing judge's improper attribution of blame to the victims, and the respondent's repeated breaches of court-imposed release conditions.

The respondent's admitted attraction to young men, absence of a relevant treatment plan, and poor compliance history made him a poor candidate for a community-based sentence.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to 18 months' imprisonment less credit for time served under the conditional sentence, resulting in 6 months' incarceration.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding the wrongful distribution of corporate assets to themselves, to the detriment of the respondent shareholder.

The appellants argued the judgment should be set aside because the trial judge had also conducted the pre-trial conference, contrary to Rule 50.04.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants had explicitly waived any objection to the trial judge presiding and suffered no prejudice.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's findings on the wrongful distribution of assets and the imposition of liability on the appellants under the oppression remedy provisions of the Business Corporations Act.