Cory A. Gilmore

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) requiring him to complete a continuing education program and undergo a practice assessment.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because the ICRC relied on a second report from an assessor that was not disclosed to him.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the failure to disclose the report breached procedural fairness.

The Court also held that the ICRC has the jurisdiction to order a practice assessment as part of a specified continuing education or remediation program.

The application was granted, the decision set aside, and the matter remitted for reconsideration.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissing his complaint for a second time.

The Tribunal had previously reinstated the complaint but ordered the applicant to provide all supporting material within two weeks, which he failed to do.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the complaint for failing to comply with procedural orders was reasonable in the interests of procedural fairness and finality.

The Court also dismissed the applicant's allegations of bias, finding no cogent evidence to rebut the presumption of impartiality.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario more than two years after the decision was made.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application due to excessive, unexcused delay and the applicant's failure to exhaust adequate alternative remedies, specifically the statutory right to appeal to the Appeal Committee.

The applicant wife sought temporary spousal support from the respondent husband after a 32-year traditional marriage.

The husband attempted to defeat the wife's claims by commencing divorce proceedings in Serbia, which the wife successfully challenged.

The primary issue was the husband's income, which fluctuated significantly in his financial statements and tax disclosures.

The court imputed income to the husband based on his historical earning pattern and insufficient disclosure, rejecting his lower income claims.

The court ordered interim spousal support of $1,825 per month, retroactive, and awarded costs to the wife due to the husband's low offer and lack of disclosure.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a judge's decision refusing to strike the respondent's documents or order costs and damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the respondent acted reasonably in filing its documents one day after the applicant filed his Certificate of Perfection, causing no prejudice.

The court also noted that damages cannot be ordered in a judicial review application and there was no evidence of judicial bias.

The self-represented applicant appeared before the Divisional Court for a judicial review application and indicated he was unwell.

Although he did not request an adjournment and accused the panel of bias, the court decided to adjourn the matter to a fixed date to ensure the applicant was capable of fully presenting his arguments.

The respondent's request to proceed was denied.

The applicant brought a motion requesting that the panel recuse itself, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias because two of the judges had previously heard other cases involving him in which he was unsuccessful.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, holding that the applicant failed to meet the test for reasonable apprehension of bias, as an adverse decision in a prior case does not demonstrate a lack of impartiality.

Justin Mitchell appealed the Consent and Capacity Board's decision that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic and ancillary medications.

The Board had confirmed Dr. Banik's finding of treatment incapacity.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decision on a standard of reasonableness, focusing on the appellant's ability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of treatment or lack thereof, as per *Starson v. Swayze*.

The court found the Board's decision reasonable, noting the appellant's contradictory evidence and disordered thinking, which precluded him from weighing risks and benefits.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Board's finding of incapacity was confirmed for both anti-psychotic and ancillary medications.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave under Rule 48.04(1) to bring a subsequent motion to strike a pleading in the defendants' Fresh as Amended Statement of Defence.

The plaintiff argued leave was not required because the action had been struck from the trial list.

The court held that leave was still required and denied the motion, finding no significant or unexpected change in circumstances to justify the delay of over three and a half years since the impugned pleading was delivered.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and proceeds of crime offences, brought applications challenging the admissibility of evidence seized during a search of his residence.

He argued that the Step Six procedure under R. v. Garofoli for reviewing redacted search warrant informations violates section 7 of the Charter by denying the right to make full answer and defence.

He also argued that the redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient detail to justify the warrant, violating his section 8 Charter rights.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the Step Six procedure provides a fair hearing in context and that the judicial summaries of the confidential informant's information provided sufficient grounds to uphold the warrant.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a jury verdict on liability or, alternatively, for a new trial on liability, after the jury found no negligence on the part of either driver involved in an accident.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there was an evidentiary foundation for the jury's verdict and that the verdict was not plainly unreasonable or lacking a foundation in law.

The jury was entitled to conclude that neither party had met their burden of proof.

The parties lived in a common law relationship for 13 years and purchased a home together.

Title was held as tenants in common with a 75% interest to the respondent and 25% to the applicant.

Following separation, the applicant sought an equal division of the house sale proceeds based on unjust enrichment and a joint family venture.

The respondent sought to enforce the 75/25 split or alternatively claimed deductions for a basement renovation, occupation rent, and the applicant's debt.

The court found that the parties were engaged in a joint family venture and that the applicant contributed significantly to the property.

The court ordered an equal division of the proceeds, dismissed the respondent's claims for deductions, and granted the applicant a restraining order due to a history of domestic abuse.

The applicants challenged the validity of a will and an acknowledgment of trust purportedly executed by the deceased, alleging the signatures were forged.

The respondents, the deceased's parents and brothers, sought to uphold the documents and argued the applicant wife was separated from the deceased and not a dependant spouse.

Relying on expert handwriting evidence, the court found the will and trust documents were forged and therefore invalid.

The court also found that the applicant wife and the deceased were in a spousal relationship at the time of his death, entitling her to be appointed Estate Trustee Without a Will and declaring her and her children dependants of the estate.

The plaintiff vendor and defendant purchaser entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for a property.

The purchaser paid an $80,000 deposit.

On the closing date, the purchaser's lawyer emailed the vendor's lawyer stating the purchaser did not have financing and could not close.

The vendor's lawyer responded with a letter accepting the anticipatory breach, stating the deposit was forfeited and the vendor would sue for damages.

The purchaser argued the acceptance was not clear and unequivocal because the vendor had discussions with a real estate agent about extending the closing.

The court found the vendor's lawyer's letter was a clear and unequivocal acceptance of the anticipatory breach and the discussions did not constitute a waiver.

The court ordered the $80,000 deposit paid to the vendor as damages and dismissed the purchaser's counterclaim.

The plaintiff and her small dog were attacked by the defendant's large dog, resulting in puncture wounds, scarring, and psychological trauma to the plaintiff.

Liability was previously established in an undefended proceeding.

Following an assessment of damages, the court awarded the plaintiff $28,000 in general damages, plus an OHIP subrogated claim and partial indemnity costs.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for an interest in her property and repayment of contributions to household expenses made during their cohabitation.

The court granted the defendant leave to amend her pleadings to include a Limitations Act defence, which barred most of the plaintiff's claim.

The court found that a written agreement between the parties was unenforceable due to duress and lack of consideration.

Furthermore, the plaintiff's contributions were akin to rent and not significant enough to establish a constructive trust.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed, the certificate of pending litigation was discharged, and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion to withdraw admissions made by her former counsel at a status hearing, which had limited her damages claim to avoid the action being dismissed for delay.

The defendants brought cross-motions to hold the plaintiff to those admissions and strike portions of the statement of claim exceeding them.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendants' cross-motions, holding that a client is bound by the representations and admissions made by their counsel in court under the doctrine of ostensible authority.

The plaintiff, L.A.K.E.S Leasing Corporation, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a deficiency balance on the sale of a repossessed leased Mack Dump Truck.

The defendants opposed, arguing the motion was premature and unnecessary, and disputed the quantum of damages.

The court granted partial summary judgment on liability, finding the defendants contractually liable for costs and expenses related to the lease default and repossession based on the lease agreement, general security agreement, and consent to take possession.

However, the court denied summary judgment on damages, concluding that the plaintiff had not provided sufficient detailed breakdown and supporting documentation for the claimed arrears and expenses, particularly regarding work done by subsidiary companies and the reasonableness of those charges.

The issue of damages was referred to be determined by the usual Simplified Rules procedure.

The appellant pleaded guilty to impaired operation and dangerous driving and was sentenced to three years' probation, fines, and consecutive driving prohibitions totaling five years.

He appealed the driving prohibition as demonstrably unfit.

The Crown conceded the consecutive prohibitions were an error.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the sentencing judge overemphasized denunciation, noting the appellant's lack of prior record, glowing pre-sentence report, and successful rehabilitation efforts.

The appeal was allowed and the driving prohibition was reduced to a total of two years.

The accused, Daniel Kenneth Porter, charged with failing to stop at the scene of a fatal accident, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained by the Crown, alleging a breach of solicitor-client privilege by his former lawyer, Ms. Elme Schmid, under sections 7 and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defence argued that Ms. Schmid breached privilege by providing information to the police without explicit waiver, and that the waiver was not voluntary.

The Crown contended that Ms. Schmid's advice was competent, Porter fabricated his account, and any remedy would not apply to a non-state actor.

The court found Porter's evidence unreliable and incredible, preferring Ms. Schmid's testimony, and concluded there was no breach of solicitor-client privilege, finding an implied waiver.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and the trial was ordered to proceed.