Keith Smockum

This ruling addresses three requests by the plaintiffs for specific jury instructions during a civil trial concerning a motor vehicle accident.

The court granted the request for a standard instruction on rear-end collisions, finding sufficient evidence for the jury to consider it.

The request for a mandatory adverse inference against the defendant for failing to testify was granted in principle, but the court clarified that such an inference can only be drawn if the plaintiff first establishes a prima facie case.

The request for a mandatory adverse inference against the defence for not calling a psychiatric expert was denied, with the court distinguishing the applicable law in Ontario from British Columbia and emphasizing that both parties had the power to call the expert.

This trial ruling addresses the admissibility and content of Ms. Pollard's summary charts for future care costs in two personal injury actions.

The court clarified the scope of Ms. Pollard's expert qualifications, limiting her opinions to unit costs and excluding recommendations on specific treatments, dosages, or frequencies unless supported by qualified medical evidence.

The ruling provides guidance on what items can be included in the summary charts for jury consideration, emphasizing the need for "reasonable evidence" and distinguishing between expert opinion and jury common sense.

This ruling addresses jury questions in two consolidated personal injury actions.

The court clarified the distinct concepts of future loss of income, loss of earning capacity, and loss of competitive advantage, explaining how they relate to claims for future income loss depending on the plaintiff's ability to return to work.

It also confirmed the retention of questions regarding past and future housekeeping and future healthcare costs for jury deliberation, while removing past health care costs by consent.

The court issued a ruling on the formulation of jury questions in a civil trial involving a motor vehicle accident.

The judge addressed disagreements between the plaintiff and defendant counsel regarding the wording and inclusion of specific questions.

Key determinations included the necessity of separate questions for past versus future losses and different damage types, the appropriateness of using the term "negligent" rather than "liable," the requirement for a distinct causation question, and the decision to exclude a question asking for particulars of negligence, given the straightforward nature of the rear-end collision case.

In a personal injury trial, the defendants brought a motion to exclude the evidence of the plaintiffs' future care expert, Yvonne Pollard.

The defendants argued that Ms. Pollard's reports lacked factual foundation because they relied heavily on opinions from medical experts whom the plaintiffs had previously elected not to call, following a prior ruling limiting the number of duplicative experts.

The plaintiff, Kenisha Desmond, argued that Ms. Pollard's reports had an admissible factual basis and that her evidence was crucial for future care costs.

The court denied the defendants' motion, finding that sufficient evidentiary foundation existed from other called experts and potentially from future witnesses.

However, the court clarified that the plaintiff could not introduce reports from the uncalled, duplicative experts through Ms. Pollard, as they would constitute inadmissible hearsay.

This ruling addresses the plaintiffs' motion for leave to call more than three medical experts in a personal injury trial, as permitted under Section 12 of the Evidence Act.

The court reviewed the proposed experts for both plaintiffs, Kenisha Desmond and Shian Henry, and found significant overlap and duplication in their anticipated testimony, particularly among medical specialists.

Applying the criteria for granting leave and emphasizing the court's gatekeeping function to prevent unnecessary trial length and disproportionate costs, the judge granted leave to call only one expert from each identified group of duplicative specialists for both plaintiffs, while allowing economic and occupational therapy experts.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a jury verdict on liability or, alternatively, for a new trial on liability, after the jury found no negligence on the part of either driver involved in an accident.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there was an evidentiary foundation for the jury's verdict and that the verdict was not plainly unreasonable or lacking a foundation in law.

The jury was entitled to conclude that neither party had met their burden of proof.