Bruce G. Thomas

The plaintiff brought a motion for civil contempt against the respondent for his participation as a spokesperson in a railway blockade, in defiance of an injunction.

The respondent admitted knowledge of the order and his continued participation, leading to a finding of contempt.

In determining the appropriate sanction, the court declined to issue a continuing restraining order, noting the respondent had helped dismantle the blockade.

Applying principles for aboriginal contemnors and costs rules, the court ordered the respondent to pay costs of $16,584.87 to the plaintiff.

Three ODSP recipients appealed the Social Benefits Tribunal's decision denying them medical travel benefits to attend a therapeutic aquafitness program for severe mental illness.

The Tribunal had found the program was not a 'medical treatment' and questioned why alternative funding or programs were not used.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeals, holding that the Tribunal erred in law by failing to apply a purposive interpretation to the ODSPA.

The Court found the medically prescribed, psychiatrist-supervised aquafitness program constituted 'medical treatment' and that the regulation does not require applicants to prove no alternative programs or funding sources exist.

The alleged contemnor, Ron Plain, brought a motion for extensive disclosure in a civil contempt proceeding arising from a railway blockade.

He sought the disclosure to mount a novel Charter challenge and collateral attack against the underlying injunction.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that a collateral attack on a valid court order is not permitted in contempt proceedings.

Furthermore, applying a contextual approach to civil contempt, the court found that the extensive disclosure sought was not necessary, particularly given that the applicant sought only costs as a sanction.

The employer applied for judicial review of a labour arbitration award that reinstated an employee who had been terminated for sexually harassing and assaulting a contract cleaner.

The arbitrator found the employee committed the acts over five years and showed no remorse, but substituted a lengthy suspension for termination because the complainant did not want him discharged and another cleaner had successfully stopped his harassment by threatening violence.

The Divisional Court held the arbitrator's decision was unreasonable, as it relied on irrelevant factors and undermined the employer's statutory duty to provide a harassment-free workplace.

The application was allowed and the termination upheld.

The applicant sought leave to appeal the dismissal of her contempt motion regarding unpaid child support.

The motion judge had dismissed the contempt motion for lack of jurisdiction, as it related to the non-payment of money.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the dismissal of a contempt motion is a final order, not an interlocutory one.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to grant leave under section 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Attorney General applied under the Civil Remedies Act for forfeiture of a 12‑unit residential apartment building alleged to be an instrument of unlawful activity.

Extensive police evidence showed persistent drug trafficking, frequent search warrants, arrests, and widespread criminal activity occurring throughout the building and surrounding areas.

The court found the property was used for unlawful activity likely to result in the acquisition of property through drug trafficking and therefore qualified as an instrument of unlawful activity under the statute.

The owner failed to establish that he was a responsible owner, having taken inadequate steps to prevent or address the criminal activity despite knowledge of it.

The court concluded that forfeiture was not clearly contrary to the interests of justice and ordered the property forfeited to the Crown.

Two applications were brought to determine the beneficiary of approximately $264,000 in segregated funds and a RIF annuity (the Disputed Funds) left by the deceased.

The deceased had designated a charitable foundation as the beneficiary of the funds, but later executed a will containing a general insurance clause leaving all insurance proceeds to her nephew.

The charitable foundation sought to rectify the will or interpret it to exclude the Disputed Funds, arguing the deceased intended the funds to go to charity.

The court held that the Disputed Funds were insurance policies governed by the Insurance Act, and the will's insurance clause effectively re-designated the beneficiary to the nephew.

Applying Robinson Estate v. Robinson, the court refused to admit third-party extrinsic evidence to contradict the clear language of the will, which the deceased had reviewed and approved.

The parties brought a motion under Rule 22.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for determination of a question of law by special case concerning uninsured automobile coverage.

The issue was whether a vehicle owned and driven by a spouse of the named insured, but uninsured at the time of the accident, qualified as an “uninsured automobile” under the standard Ontario automobile policy (O.P.F. 1) and s. 265 of the Insurance Act.

The court considered competing interpretations of the term “the insured” in the statutory exclusion and the definition of “insured” in s. 224 of the Insurance Act.

Applying principles of broad interpretation of coverage and narrow construction of exclusions, and relying on appellate jurisprudence, the court held that the term refers to the claimant rather than the named insured.

Accordingly, the vehicle was an uninsured automobile and coverage under the policy was available.

A children’s aid society appealed the dismissal of its summary judgment motion seeking Crown wardship without access in a child protection proceeding.

The motions judge had refused the order due to concerns about hearsay evidence and insufficient detail addressing statutory requirements under the Child and Family Services Act, including the plan of care and efforts to assist the parent.

The appeal court held that summary judgment is available in child protection cases where there is no genuine issue requiring a trial and that the affidavit evidence was sufficient in context, particularly given the absence of opposition and the parent’s consent.

The court also accepted fresh evidence regarding the child’s placement and adoptability.

The appeal was allowed and the court substituted an order finding the child in need of protection and granting Crown wardship without access.

The appellant appealed a conviction and sentence for sexual assault following a summary conviction trial.

The trial judge had found a reasonable doubt about the complainant’s lack of consent but concluded that any consent was legally vitiated by abuse of a position of trust or authority under ss. 265(3) and 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code and by public policy considerations.

The appeal court held that the statutory provisions require proof of both the existence of the position and evidence that the complainant’s free will was overborne by the abuse of that position.

While a trust relationship between the parties could be found, there was no evidence establishing the subjective impact of that relationship on the complainant’s consent.

The court also held that civil law doctrines such as unconscionability and fairness cannot independently vitiate consent in criminal law where Parliament has already addressed the issue in statute.

On a Rule 20 summary judgment motion, moving defendants sought dismissal of claims as statute-barred under ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court heard affidavit and oral evidence on discoverability and due diligence, and found the responding parties knew by 2005-2006 of the impugned transfer and related litigation but chose not to investigate potential claims against additional actors.

Applying the objective branch of discoverability and diligence principles, the court held that a reasonable person in their circumstances ought to have known the material facts in 2006.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring trial on the limitations defence and dismissed the action against the moving defendants.

Two competing law firms brought motions for carriage of a proposed securities class action against Armtec Infrastructure Inc. and its directors and underwriters, alleging misrepresentations in a prospectus and press release.

The court evaluated the competing actions based on the nature and scope of the causes of action, the proposed class definitions, the named defendants, and the representative plaintiffs.

The court granted carriage to the Simmonds plaintiffs, finding their approach to the class definition and damages to be simpler and more cohesive, and their representative plaintiffs to possess significant business acumen.

The competing Locking action was stayed.

The appellant, an inmate, appealed the dismissal of his action for malicious prosecution and Charter damages against a police officer and the Crown.

The appellant had been charged with assault causing bodily harm following a prison fight, but the charge was later withdrawn.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charge and did not act with malice.

The court also confirmed that mala fides is required to establish a breach of section 7 of the Charter in this context, and that the appellant sued the wrong level of government for his transfer to a maximum-security facility.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff’s law firm as solicitors of record on the basis of conflict of interest.

A lawyer associated with the firm had previously been retained by the hospital defendant to assist with workplace conflict mediation and had obtained confidential information while acting in that capacity.

The court found that the lawyer was an associate of the firm and that the hospital was therefore a client of the firm.

Applying the “bright line” rule from R. v. Neil and the principles from MacDonald Estate v. Martin, the court held that a law firm cannot act against a current client in directly adverse litigation absent informed consent.

Because confidential information was obtained and no effective screening measures existed, the firm was disqualified.

The applicant union sought judicial review of decisions by the Ontario Labour Relations Board approving a settlement between a rival union and the employers.

The settlement declared two drugstore chains to be related employers and granted the rival union sole bargaining rights for all employees of the non-unionized chain in Ontario, including the Ottawa region where the applicant traditionally represented employees of the unionized chain.

The applicant was not given notice of the settlement or the underlying applications.

The Divisional Court granted the application for judicial review, finding that the Board breached the duty of procedural fairness by unreasonably requiring the applicant to already represent employees of the non-unionized chain to be entitled to notice.

The Court held that the applicant was significantly affected by the decision and had a right to intervene.

The applicants brought a joint motion on consent for an order allowing their application for judicial review of several decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, quashed the Tribunal's decisions, and ordered that the matter be adjudicated in a hearing de novo before a differently constituted panel of the Tribunal.

The applicant, a residents' association, sought judicial review of decisions by the Ministry of the Environment and the Ontario Realty Corporation relating to the sale of a former psychiatric hospital cemetery to a private purchaser who intended to build a crematorium.

The applicant argued that the MOE Director erred in issuing an air approval without considering fine particulate emissions and that the ORC failed to conduct a proper environmental assessment under the Environmental Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Director's decision was not patently unreasonable given the lack of existing standards for fine particulates at the time, and that the ORC reasonably applied its Class Environmental Assessment, which did not require assessing the private purchaser's subsequent planning actions.

The applicant college sought judicial review to quash an award made by a Workload Resolution Arbitrator, arguing the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction under the Collective Agreement to hear workload complaints initiated by the respondent union rather than individual teachers.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that Article 11 of the Collective Agreement clearly limited access to the arbitrator solely to individual teachers.

The court held that the arbitrator's decision to read in a right for the union to pursue arbitration was patently unreasonable and exceeded his jurisdiction.

The application for judicial review was granted and the arbitrator's award was quashed.

The appellants appealed an order appointing a receiver and setting conditions for the appointment.

The respondents raised a preliminary issue regarding the court's jurisdiction, arguing the order was interlocutory and required leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the order was designed to implement a prior judgment and was therefore interlocutory.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to the appellants seeking leave to appeal.