Bruce G. Thomas

The accused was charged with second degree murder after brutally beating a 75-year-old woman on a walking trail.

The accused admitted to causing the victim's death but argued he lacked the requisite intent due to extreme intoxication from consuming magic mushrooms and marijuana.

The court rejected the defence of non-mental disorder automatism, finding no psychiatric evidence to support it.

The court concluded that the accused's coordinated actions before, during, and after the attack, along with the targeted and severe nature of the blows, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to cause bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless as to whether death ensued.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter for his role in the execution-style shooting of a 16-year-old victim.

The court determined the appropriate sentence range was 8 to 12 years, fixing the sentence at 8 years due to the offender's limited participation and young age.

The court then reduced the sentence to 7 years to account for the collateral consequences of harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, including lockdowns and the COVID-19 pandemic, before applying a 1.5:1 credit for time served.

The final sentence to be served was 2 years and 325 days.

The applicant, having pleaded guilty to manslaughter, sought interim release pending sentencing.

The court considered the release plan, including electronic monitoring and cultural supports, against the applicant's lengthy criminal record, history of non-compliance, and the serious nature of the offence.

Despite the principles favouring release for Aboriginal accused and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the court found that detention was justified on both secondary (public safety) and tertiary (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice) grounds.

The court endorsed previous findings that the applicant's history of re-offending and non-compliance outweighed the proposed supervision plan.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging a prior detention order on the secondary ground.

The applicant proposed a revised release plan, including a full-time surety due to COVID-19 related layoff and a different electronic monitoring system, and argued that the pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court found no error in the original decision and determined that the proposed plan, even with COVID-19 considerations, did not amount to a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant release, particularly given the applicant's extensive criminal record and history of breaching court orders.

The application was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter for his limited participation in the fatal beating of a victim.

The court considered the offender's background, including his exposure to systemic racism as a Black man, but found it to be of limited mitigating significance given the gravity of the offence.

The offender was sentenced to six years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a net sentence of three years and 355 days.

The moving defendants sought leave to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered by the plaintiffs to allow a corporation to grant a second mortgage to the Royal Bank of Canada.

The plaintiffs and other defendants opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the grounds for discharging the CPL did not satisfy the criteria under section 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act, nor did the equities favour the moving parties, as ownership interests remained in dispute and the proposed mortgage would dilute the plaintiffs' interests.

The defendant, Corporation of the Town of LaSalle, brought a motion to dismiss the action or, alternatively, to strike the matter from the trial list or adjourn the trial, supported by the Tedesco defendants.

The motion was based on the plaintiffs' non-compliance with pre-trial orders regarding expert reports, cost estimates, and financial disclosure, as well as unanswered undertakings from discovery.

The court found that the plaintiffs had not fully complied with disclosure requirements, particularly concerning repair cost estimates and corporate income loss documentation.

Consequently, the court struck the action from the March 30, 2020 trial list, ordering that it not be restored until a court-approved schedule for remaining steps is established, to allow defendants to react to newly provided information and conduct further examinations.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's $2,000,000 action for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution on a motion for summary judgment, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting the litigation was ill-advised and had no chance of success.

The court awarded costs to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis, reducing the amount sought to recognize the effect on the plaintiff, fixing costs at an all-inclusive sum of $15,000.

The applicants sought to rectify the title of the respondents' property to reinstate an easement that provided the only access to their landlocked parcel.

The Land Registry Office had inadvertently deleted the easement from the servient tenement's parcel register in 2005.

The Deputy Director of Titles had previously ordered the easement deleted.

The Superior Court, hearing the matter as a new trial under section 26 of the Land Titles Act, found that the easement was deleted in error and could not be extinguished without an express release.

The court ordered the register rectified to reinstate the easement.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution.

The plaintiff, a legal assistant, had been previously acquitted of immigration fraud charges following an undercover RCMP investigation, while her employer was convicted.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and prosecute the plaintiff based on intercepted communications and her involvement in fabricating a refugee claim.

As reasonable and probable grounds existed, both the negligent investigation and malicious prosecution claims failed.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The Crown applied for an order granting prohibition with certiorari in aid to quash a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice.

The lower court had ruled that amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-75) limiting the availability of preliminary inquiries did not apply retrospectively to cases already scheduled.

The Superior Court held that the amendments are procedural, do not affect a vested or substantive right, and therefore apply retrospectively.

The lower court's decision was quashed, and an order was issued prohibiting the Ontario Court of Justice from conducting preliminary inquiries for the respondents.

The plaintiffs brought a successful motion for leave to file a late expert report and affidavit.

The court determined the costs of that motion.

Finding that the relief granted to the plaintiffs was an indulgence to ensure trial fairness, and noting the unreasonable delay by plaintiffs' counsel in delivering the report, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the defendants' costs of the motion.

The defendants were awarded a total of $18,000 in costs.

The applicants, charged with manslaughter and second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to determine whether the amendments in Bill C-75 eliminating peremptory challenges (repeal of s. 634 of the Criminal Code) have retrospective effect.

The court held that the availability of peremptory challenges is a procedural matter, not a substantive right.

Therefore, the repeal applies retrospectively to all matters before the court as of the coming into force date, September 19, 2019.

The plaintiff brought a motion to transfer his wrongful dismissal action from Toronto to Sarnia, citing the declining health of his wife who required his care.

The defendants opposed the transfer.

The court applied the holistic balancing test under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While acknowledging the plaintiff's caregiving responsibilities, the court noted that the other parties and counsel were located closer to Toronto, and the corporate defendant operated virtually.

The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that Sarnia was a significantly better venue and dismissed the motion.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer the plaintiff's action from Brampton to Windsor.

The plaintiff, a self-described problem gambler, sued the defendants for losses sustained at Caesars Windsor.

The court applied a holistic analysis of the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding that the events occurred in Windsor, the damages were sustained there, the community had an interest, and a trial could be heard much sooner in Windsor, the court concluded that Windsor was a significantly better venue.

The motion to transfer was granted.

The accused was tried for the second-degree murder of his wife, whose body was found near a gas tank on their property.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on motive, opportunity, and post-offence conduct, including the accused's destruction of his wife's poetry.

The defence argued the victim may have interrupted a gas theft or been killed by an alternate suspect with whom she was having an affair.

The court found the investigation had tunnel vision and failed to adequately explore other possibilities.

Concluding that the accused's guilt was not the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, the court found the accused not guilty.

The Appellant, S.V., appealed his conviction for sexual touching, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately consider inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and applied an uneven standard of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no significant error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or the application of scrutiny, and affirmed the deference owed to the trial judge's findings.

The defence brought an application to admit expert testimony from a psychotherapist on the issue of traumatic grief, specifically to explain the accused's conduct in discarding his murdered wife's poetry as a coping mechanism.

The Crown opposed the admission.

The court analyzed the necessity criterion under the Mohan framework for expert evidence.

The application was dismissed, with the court finding that the trier of fact possesses the requisite experience and knowledge to understand that grieving individuals may react in unpredictable ways, rendering the expert assistance unnecessary.

This pre-trial application in a first-degree murder trial addressed the admissibility of hearsay evidence, specifically ante-mortem statements made by the deceased, Barbara Short.

The Crown sought to admit these statements to establish the deceased's state of mind, the nature of her marriage, the accused's animus and motive, and her future intentions.

The defence contested much of this evidence, citing concerns about reliability due to "circumstances of suspicion" and potential "impression management" by the deceased, and argued that the evidence was cumulative and prejudicial.

The defence also sought to admit several hearsay statements of its own.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, balancing threshold reliability against probative value and prejudicial effect.

The applicant, Roger Craig Short, charged with first-degree murder, sought to admit evidence from a failed "Project Somerton" undercover police operation (a "Mr. Big" scenario) where he did not confess.

The defence argued the statements were admissible under the Edgar exception, as unique evidence from a failed "Mr. Big" project, or as evidence of consciousness of innocence.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Edgar exception inapplicable due to lack of spontaneity and no undertaking to testify.

The "Mr. Big" argument was rejected as the project was not "unbeatable" and lacked the inducements/threats seen in Hart.

While the court initially considered admitting the evidence to counter Crown's post-offence conduct evidence, the Crown subsequently abandoned significant portions of its post-offence conduct evidence, rendering the Project Somerton evidence lacking sufficient probative value for admission.